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Intolerance and Foreign Intervention in Early Eighteenth-Century Poland-Lithuania*

L. R. LEWITTER

We need hardly remind ourselves that on the political horizon of northern Europe the first quarter of the eighteenth century saw the eclipse of Sweden, the ascent of Russia, and the continuing decline of Poland-Lithuania. Although the Commonwealth did not suffer any territorial losses, it was weakened by the ravages of war and reduced to a condition of inferiority or vulnerability in relation to all its neighbors. The delicate balance of power and influence between the Commonwealth and Russia which had been adjusted by the treaty of peace and alliance of 1686 gave way within a span of twenty years or so to an unequal partnership of the two countries in the conflict with Sweden. After the battle of Poltava, Peter I took charge of the conduct of the war and made the Commonwealth a strategic and logistic base for his operations in Pomerania and North Germany against Sweden. His assertion of 1720 that Augustus II, king of Poland and, as Frederick Augustus II, elector of Saxony, was indebted to him not only for recovering the Polish throne in 1710, but also for mounting it in the first instance in 1697 (when Peter threatened to invade the Grand Duchy of Lithuania if the Saxons' Bourbon rival, the prince of Conti, were enthroned) is an exaggeration bordering on distortion. Be that as it may, its boastfulness exemplifies the attitude of superiority which the tsar and autocrat adopted towards an elective and constitutional monarch whom in the end he wished to replace with an incumbent of his own choosing, probably Francis II Rákóczi of Transylvania. His undoubted contempt for the Commonwealth's form of government notwithstanding, Peter I took care not to tamper with it, preferring to maintain and manipulate it to his own advantage. Although from 1710 he was more than once lured by Prussia to take part in some scheme or other for the dismemberment of the Commonwealth, he never yielded

* This essay is the amended text of a paper presented at the Seminar in Ukrainian Studies at Harvard University on 2 April 1981.

to the temptation and claimed credit with its inhabitants for his abstemiousness. In 1716 he had the satisfaction of being invited by the rebellious nobility to arbitrate between them and their king in the dispute caused by the quartering of Saxon troops in the Republic, something which he himself had done and was soon to do again with his own forces. By mutual agreement the Russian army was to strike at whichever party was found to be willfully obstructing the negotiations. The task of mediation was carried out on the tsar's behalf with great skill by Prince Grigorii Fedorovich Dolgorukii, his envoy plenipotentiary in the Commonwealth, one of the few Russians who in this period succeeded in gaining a modicum of popularity with the Poles — some of which, however, he lost when his master's troops reappeared on the scene. The series of measures embodied in the agreement concluded at the end of 1716 between the plenipotentiaries of the king and the delegates of the confederacy — a polite term for a constitutionally recognized movement of protest — was approved early in 1717, without debate, by a one-day Diet convened for the purpose and known in history as the "dumb" or speechless diet. Its mood of cooperativeness and self-restraint owed much to the presence in the offing of sizeable contingents of Russian soldiers. Their task accomplished, the tsar's troops nevertheless remained on the territory of the Commonwealth, once more eating its inhabitants out of house and home and ready to serve their overlord's undisclosed political intentions.

To the surprise and intense irritation of Tsar Peter, J. H. von Flemming, Augustus II's chief minister in Saxony and right-hand man in the Commonwealth — where he commanded the troops organized on the foreign, that is, western model — succeeded in bringing into being a league between the emperor and the kings of Great Britain and of Poland, as electors, respectively, of Hanover and Saxony. One of the express purposes of the alliance was to defend and preserve Poland-Lithuania, and one of the secret ones, to ensure that the Russians kept the promise to withdraw their armies from that area. The tsar, temporarily cornered, moved his troops out of the Republic in the first half of 1719, but they remained in readiness on the other side of the frontier, and until Peter's death in 1725 their return never ceased to be a possibility. The Commonwealth remained a sovereign state, but one well within the Russian sphere of influence and so long as he lived, in the power of Tsar Peter. His supremacy in Poland-Lithuania from 1710 is, I believe, indisputable.

From the outset one factor constituted a potential threat to the

balance of power between Russia and Poland-Lithuania. This was article 9 of the treaty of 1686, which obliged the king of Poland to uphold all the ancient rights and liberties of the Orthodox dioceses, parishes, communities, and individuals, and to prevent their being oppressed in any way or compelled to adopt the Roman Catholic religion or the Uniate rite. This stipulation virtually cast the ruler of Russia — whether regent, co-tsar, or tsar — in the role of guardian of the Orthodox community in the Commonwealth, and in practice gave him the right to make official representations on behalf of his co-religionists there whenever circumstances demanded or justified such action. The concomitant requirement that the handful of Roman Catholics in Russia should likewise not be allowed to suffer any ill-treatment or discrimination and should be free to practice their religion at home could hardly be accounted a reciprocal condition. The Greek Catholic church (or the Uniate church) was from the Russian point of view a dangerous offensive weapon in the hands of the Polish state and ecclesiastical hierarchy, since it made possible, in theory at any rate, a rapid and wholesale conversion of the Orthodox population on both sides of the border, although regarding the Russian side the apprehensions of the Orthodox clergy on the one hand and the rosy hopes of the papacy on the other were wholly unrealistic. But in the Belorussian and Ukrainian lands under John III Sobieski, the support received by the Uniate church from the crown, the Roman Catholic church and the chief dignitaries of the realm (who were also the biggest landholders) was of a kind to give rise to protests from across the border as frequent as they were fruitless, since all conversions were assumed to be entirely voluntary.

At this time the Polish ruling class was apparently still obsessed with the fear that the Russians would establish their rule in some eastern parts of the country, as they had done in the past, by making use of the "schismatic Greeks," who presumably would take up arms on behalf of their faith. John III, having evidently come to the practical conclusion that the only way to cut the ground from under the Muscovites was to turn his Orthodox subjects into Uniates, was from a distance lending a hand to the accomplishment of what the papal nuncio called "this great task." The king used his influence with the bishops, who in due course were followed into the Uniate fold by the monasteries, the lower clergy, and their flocks. Landowners, especially the great ones, exercised their authority as patrons of the churches on their estates in the interests of the Union, and the local Jesuits used their powers of

persuasion. Where legal devices and words failed, physical pressure was applied. No voice was raised in protest against forced conversions to echo the admonitions of a Jan Szczęsny Herburt (1613) or of a Lew Sapieha (1622).[1] In view of the tsar's claim to the role of guardian and protector of the Orthodox population of Poland, the Venetian resident, Girolamo Alberti, considered the situation in southeastern Poland in 1694 to be a dangerous one: the embers glowing beneath the ashes might, he feared, one day burst into flames. The papal nuncio reporting to Rome on the same subject in 1697 deplored the readiness of all sides in the conflict to resort to violence. The change in the person of the monarch from Sobieski, the ardent Catholic and savior of Vienna, to Augustus II, who had gone over to Rome on the eve of his election to the Polish throne, made little difference to this state of affairs. Augustus's conversion, in the words of Alberti, had produced "nec lux, nec crux," that is, neither the light nor the cross divine (there was not even a crucifix in the king's apartments, meat was constantly being served at table, no alms were being given to the poor; in the absence of his wife the king did not scruple, in his own words, to live as did so many other Catholic monarchs). But those who had initiated the policy of what Florian Znaniecki calls "assimilative expansion" continued to prosecute it with undiminished vigor. In 1648 the "schismatics"[2] were still considered to reign in Lviv, but in 1699, when the Orthodox bishop of that diocese, Josyf Shumlians'kyi (Józef Szumlański), attempted to take possession of the Orthodox cathedral at Kamianets', the town and fortress newly recovered from the Turks, he was denied entry by the civil authorities on the spot, since the Diet of 1670 had already excluded Podolia from Orthodox jurisdiction (as well as yet again prohibiting Jews from settling in Kamianets').[3] Faced with the prospect of isolation in the midst of a hostile environment, Shumlians'kyi finally redeemed his earlier secret promises to embrace the Union.

The degree of assimilation in the process of expansion was very

[1] See J. Tazbir, *Arianie i katolicy* (Warsaw, 1971), pp. 159–61. Herburt's "Zdanie o narodzie ruskim" is printed in *Dokumenty obiasniaiushchie istoriiu Zapadno-russkogo kraia* . . . (St. Petersburg, 1865), pp. 214–28, and Sapieha's "*List* do JWImci Xiędza Jozefata Kuncewicza Archi-Episkopa Połockiego," in E. Likowski, *Historia unii kościoła ruskiego z kościołem rzymskim* (Poznań, 1875), pp. 237–44; but S. Estreicher, *Bibliografia Polska*, vol. 27 (Cracow, 1929), doubts its authenticity.

[2] In F. Znaniecki, *Modern Nationalities: A Sociological Study* (Urbana, Ill., 1952).

[3] The Diet of 1699 forbade persons of both categories to settle in Kamianets'; *Volumina Legum*, vol. 6 (St. Petersburg, 1860), p. 35.

limited and the benefits reaped by the converts were proportionately modest. A conversion from Orthodoxy to Uniate Catholicism, whether of bishops, abbots, priests or ordinary laymen, brought little more than relief from persecution; and privilege, political influence, and financial benefit were still denied to the inhabitants of that half-way house between Byzantium and Rome, who for all practical purposes were no more than second-class citizens, looked down upon on both sides of the border. Tsar Peter (who was to show little patience with schismatics in his own country) despised the Uniate church more than he feared it as being neither one thing nor the other, a double monstrosity, a religion for the deformed. The conversion of Russia to the Union was beyond the bounds of probability, but in 1705 Stefan Iavors'kyi, the head of the hierarchy, was said to have declared that he would work for an extension of the Union if ordered to do so by the tsar. The Orthodox fared even worse, being not only subject to discrimination in the filling of any office under the Crown and to constant harassment, but also to forced conversion. In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, according to the petition presented to Tsar Peter by the Tseperskii monastery near Slutsk, conditions were such that "Tartars and Jews were more respected as members of their religions than Orthodox Christians." As a social group this conglomeration of a diminishing body of szlachta, petty townspeople, minor clergy, and a mass of peasants, long since deserted by their social superiors and erstwhile leaders, the old princely families, did not command any consideration in a society dominated by a senatorial body, part secular and part ecclesiastical, of Polish and Roman Catholic nobles. By 1702 the number of Orthodox dioceses, all subject to the jurisdiction of the metropolitan of Kiev on the other side of the border, had fallen from four in the reign of Sobieski to one, that of Belorussia, headed by Serapion Polkhovs'kyi, newly nominated by Augustus II while the backs of his ecclesiastical advisers were turned.

The papal nuncio, in writing to Rome in 1697, drew a comparison between the "schismatics" and the "heretics." The former have no assistance other than that of the Muscovite who, being a rival, is suspect in the eyes of the Republic, while the latter have the moral support of the elector of Brandenburg and receive money from Holland. They want permission to establish their churches in the towns and would like a definite number of their "sect" to have seats in the senate — a privilege, incidentally, likewise desired by the Orthodox and Uniate bishops but denied to them as well. Unlike the fairly compact and well defined groups of Graeco-Ruthenians (as the Ortho-

dox were also called) and Uniates in the eastern regions of the Republic, the Protestants were dispersed and subdivided, the szlachta being for the most part Calvinists, the German-speaking townspeople generally Lutherans, whereas in Great Poland there survived a sizeable community of Bohemian Brethren. The rights of the Protestants were protected by successive "constitutions" or acts of parliament, beginning with that of 1573 under which the "dissidentes in religione Christiana," in other words, the whole body of szlachta, Roman Catholic and Protestant (with the disputed addition of the towns in Royal or Polish Prussia), had agreed to live together in peace and not to shed blood because of their religious divergences. A further safeguard was contained in the promise made by every newly elected king, including Augustus II, to maintain the peace among men of different denominations. But by the end of the seventeenth century, neither the Orthodox nor the Protestants were as relatively secure in the practice of their religion as they had been before the Cossack uprising and the Swedish invasion of the late 1640s and the 1650s. Popular feeling had turned against the religious minorities, which came to be associated with the depredations and outrages committed by enemy troops and particularly by the soldiery of the Lutheran persuasion. Having once been invaded and devastated by Swedes, Transylvanians, Cossacks, Muscovites, and Tartars, Poland-Lithuania could again become the prey of non-Catholic assailants. It is a truism that insecurity does not make for tolerance: it may heighten religious feelings but tinges them with virulence; the non-conformists became suspect. In the second half of the seventeenth century the religious climate in Poland had changed from exceptionally mild to harsh and inimical to exotic growths such as Socinianism: the "Polish Brethren" who professed it were banished in 1658. In the bracing atmosphere of diminishing tolerance Polish Catholicism, penetrated in depth by the Society of Jesus, appears to have gained in vigor and developed a militancy which it displayed in the service of assimilative expansion in the east and of the last phase of the Counter-Reformation in the north and west.

Xenophobia, too, was on the increase. At the turn of the century, before there was any inkling of yet another Swedish invasion, foreigners in Warsaw were being treated with undisguised hostility. No sooner had the newly elected Augustus II taken up residence in Warsaw than the szlachta were voicing their dissatisfaction at the number of Germans, officials and others, he had brought into the Republic. The primate, Cardinal Michał Radziejowski, only recently

described by the nuncio as infirm of purpose and paying little attention to ecclesiastical matters, chose to perceive a danger to the Roman Catholic religion in the presence of so many Lutherans and Jews amongst a lukewarm laity. Having discovered to his evident annoyance that Lutheran services were being held in a house which the concierge of his own palace had let to a Saxon state councillor, Radziejowski gave instructions for the letting to cease at once, for fear that the Protestants might next seize hold of a church or build one of their own. The leasing of the salt mines at Wieliczka and Sambir to some Jewish enterpreneurs caused further indignation. Jewish contractors were also supplying the army, but all Jews were under notice to leave the capital at the end of the parliamentary session in accordance with the laws of the province of Masovia forbidding the presence of Jews and "heretics." In 1701 the bishop of Chełmno (Culm), Teodor Potocki, without consulting the Holy See, issued an edict prohibiting marriages between Roman Catholics and "heretics."

The upheavals of the subsequent ten years put the three religious minority groups — Orthodox, Uniate and Protestant — at the mercy of rival political interests. At various times during most of that period vast areas of the Republic were now under Swedish, now under Russian control. The Russians continued to give their support to the adherents of Augustus II, who, in turn, remained loyal to the Russo-Polish alliance of 1704; in the same year the Swedes engineered the election of a puppet king in the person of Stanislas Leszczyński. Charles XII is invariably described by contemporary observers as a champion of Protestantism,[4] and it seems fair to say that as many evangelical chapels were reopened or rebuilt under the protection of the Swedish military commanders as Roman Catholic churches were looted by their rank and file. Under the terms of the treaty concluded in Warsaw in 1705 between Charles XII and Stanislas, the Republic confirmed the security and tranquility enjoyed by the Protestants; their religion was not to expose them to loss or injury, they were to be allowed to hold services in the accustomed and permitted places and to bring up their children in the faith of their forebears. The religious rights, privileges, and immunities in the towns of Royal (Polish) Prussia were likewise confirmed. Owing to the refusal of the Polish side to agree to terms that would have outraged the majority of their

[4] On this point see C. von Noorden, *Europäische Geschichte im achtzehntem Jahrhundert*, vol. 2 (Düsseldorf, 1874), pp. 578–91.

fellow countrymen, the Swedes obtained much less than they had demanded, but even these modest concessions were branded by the leaders of Augustus II's party as a capitulation to heresy.

On the eastern religious front Augustus II and the Republic, from one side, and Peter I, from the other, hurled accusations at one another or made concessions as circumstances and the pressure exercised by the religious hierarchy in each country demanded. It must here be said in fairness to the king that he personally constantly tried to meet the wishes of the Orthodox (as well as to protect the Protestants) whereas Peter I never missed a chance to repress the Uniates, from personal dislike as much as from political motives: a Greek schism in close and dangerous proximity to Russia was not to be tolerated. Even before the outbreak of the Great Northern War Augustus II had ordered the restitution to the Orthodox of churches and monasteries which had been seized by the Uniates during the interregnum, the readmission, in Vilnius, of Orthodox townsmen to offices in the town council and to membership in the craft guilds, of which they had been deprived. In 1701 the Church of the Assumption in Lviv was handed back to the Orthodox, as was the Tseperskii monastery near Slutsk in 1703; in the same year the Orthodox character of another monastery, that of Novyi Dvor near Pinsk, was preserved. There can, however, be no certainty as to the lasting effectiveness of these injunctions.

In 1705 occurred the much publicized incident which weakened Peter I's bargaining position in relation to the Poles and irretrievably damaged the reputation which, at a time when the pope had to be prevented from recognizing Stanislas Leszczyński as king of Poland, he had worked so hard to acquire by means of private hints and public gestures — that is, of a ruler kindly disposed towards Rome and perhaps not averse to entertaining the possibility of a direct union between the Russian Orthodox and the Roman churches. In the Uniate cathedral of St. Sophia in Polotsk, on being informed by one of the monks from the adjacent monastery of the same name that the Blessed Josaphat Kuntsevych, in his lifetime the local archbishop, had been martyred by "schismatics" or, in Tsar Peter's own version of the incident, "your co-religionists, heretics, apostates, and persecutors like yourselves," the tsar, who was in his cups, reacted violently: five of the monks were killed, one of them by Peter himself. The incident may have caused him to make amends: first, by now putting his signature to the charter issued by his chancellery in 1704, giving permission for the

construction in stone of a Roman Catholic church in Moscow; and second, by guaranteeing, at the end of 1705, to respect the immunity of ecclesiastical persons and estates of the Roman and Uniate churches in Poland. Tarnished though his reputation may have become, the tsar did not fail to counterbalance the first of these concessions with the demand that the Republic should respect the right and liberties of its Orthodox inhabitants in accordance with ancient custom and formal treaties, and to complain that in many places in the Commonwealth persons of the Greek faith were grievously oppressed, being prohibited from receiving the Sacrament in their homes or holding public funerals, and were suffering all manner of abuse and constraint, mostly from the Uniates, which was contrary to the law and to Christian conduct. So no doubt were the breaches of the tsar's guarantees of immunity constantly committed by his auxiliary forces in Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Ukraine. Apart from the looting and brawling habitually indulged in by troops, Uniate churches and monasteries were plundered and reconverted to Orthodoxy, monks and priests driven out, ecclesiastical estates occupied. The Uniate church in Polotsk castle was turned into an ammunition depot and an icon of the Virgin ornamented with jewels was taken away by a commandant named Ozerov. But the Russian presence in that part of the world did have its lighter moments. Marriages between Russian officers and daughters of Polish landowning families were apparently not uncommon, although the exportation of the brides' dowries to Russia caused some legal difficulties. But the exchange of accusations, counter-accusations, and denials continued endlessly.

Next it was Tsar Peter's turn to assert that it was the Orthodox who were suffering persecution at the hands of the Uniates, being deprived of their churches, forced under duress to adhere to the Union, prevented from going to confession and from receiving Communion, and being scandalized by acts of desecration. There must have been a good deal of truth in these and other charges, or else the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide would not have considered it necessary to instruct the papal nuncio in Poland in emphatic terms not to tolerate the enticement of Ruthenians into the Latin rite. The situation was further complicated by the dispute over the see of Luts'k. Here Kyrylo Shumlians'kyi (Cyryl Szumlański), newly elected bishop in succession to Dionisii Zhabokryts'kyi (Dionizy Żabokrzycki), who had been deported to Russia for intelligence with the enemy and had died in Moscow, chose, no doubt with the moral if not physical support of the

Russian troops in the area, to be consecrated by the Orthodox rather than by the Uniate metropolitan of Kiev. Only at the end of 1711, when the Russian troops had begun to withdraw from the Commonwealth under the terms of the peace treaty recently concluded on the Pruth between Russia and Turkey, was he ousted from the diocese by the joint efforts of the dietine of Volhynia and the civil authorities.

For reasons which are not entirely clear — from some temporary abatement in the Polish crusading activities, the temporary absence of Russian troops from the southeastern lands of the Commonwealth during the next five years, the tsar's preoccupation with the war against the Swedes in Pomerania, or from a combination of all three factors — Peter's active interest in the fate of the Orthodox on the other side of the Russo-Polish frontier did not extend beyond arbitrating the dispute between the new Orthodox bishop of Mahilёŭ, Syl'vester Chetvertyns'kyi (Sylwester Czetwertyński), and the monastic houses in his diocese.

By contrast the Protestant powers were watching with growing concern the deterioration in the condition of their co-religionists in Royal Prussia, Great Poland, and Little Poland. The return in 1710 of Augustus II to Poland and his restoration to the throne did nothing to assuage the feelings which provided the emotional impetus for a Roman Catholic counter-offensive against the recent resurgence of Protestantism. Its chief strategists appear to have been Stanisław Szembek, the primate, and his brother Jan, by turns vice-chancellor and chancellor of the Kingdom of Poland (he was remembered as the benefactor of the Carmelites in Cracow and the Jesuits at Łomża and was later to be described by the British envoy, John Scott, as "prone to bigotry"), and Konstanty Szaniawski, who originally was a gray eminence held in high regard by the tsar and later became bishop of Cuiavia and finally of Cracow. By 1720 Szaniawski had moved to the fore, and Scott calls him one of the ablest leaders in Poland and the most dangerous enemy of the Protestants there. His zeal, according to Scott, proceeded from hopes of a cardinal's hat and other advantages he might expect from Rome. The king continued to be favorably inclined towards the Protestants, but the Roman Catholic zealots, without any regard for the law of the land or even that of humanity, seemed to have no other aim than the destruction and extermination of any fellow citizens who differed from them in outlook or religion. Even allowing for a strong element of prejudice on Scott's part, his strictures could not have been without foundation. The men alluded to

by Scott and others like them seemed determined to extirpate the Protestant "heresy," to promote the bringing through the Uniate rite of an even greater part of the population of the Republic into union with the Church of Rome, and to continue seeking the fullest possible rights for Roman Catholics in Russia. They and their successors were to achieve the first and second of these aims; the third was doomed to failure from the outset. Polish priests and missionary monks were never allowed to enter Russia in large numbers, and could not therefore effect conversions or establish relations with the local hierarchy. At the end of the seventeenth century the Bohemian Jesuits in Moscow had been requested by the authorities to preach not in Polish but in German, so as not to attract too large a congregation. Very few of the Capuchins on whose behalf Jan Szembek and the then Monsignor Szaniawski had exerted themselves and who finally arrived in St. Petersburg in 1720 were Polish. In what circumstances and from what ulterior motive Fr. Francesco Arcelli, a Theatine priest, came in 1722 to be appointed tutor to the sons of Tsar Peter's envoy in Warsaw, Prince Grigorii Fedorovich Dolgorukii, in his house in Moscow, is not clear.

If, as Scott suggests, the Roman Catholic zealots took the view that the extermination of Protestantism was pleasing in the eyes of God, then the Almighty had good reason to be satisfied with what was done in Poland-Lithuania from about 1710. The Protestant community was denied the right to establish consistories, call synods, or publish religious literature; individual Protestants were accused of adhering to the Arian heresy even though such charges were contrary to the law *de regestro Arianismi* of 1685; with the approval of the courts, churches were being seized or precluded from being repaired. The building of new Protestant churches, chapels, or schools was not allowed in towns or on private estates of the szlachta, owners of such estates were prevented from inviting ministers of religion to perform rites and ceremonies in their manor houses or to exercise the right of ecclesiastical patronage in favor of Protestant clergy. The Protestant powers in western Europe were alarmed at these blows sustained by their "interest," some — those in England and Brandenburg Prussia — more than others. Scott contrasts "the zeal and artifices which the Roman Catholics seldom fail to use where the interest of their religion is concerned" with "the sleepy indifference in matters of religion of the most part of the Protestant Princes and States." In Poland the Protestants themselves were looking for assistance to their co-religionists

abroad. An early cry for help came from a prominent *szlachcic* in northern Poland, Bonawentura Kurnatowski, and was addressed to Queen Anne in person. The queen was much exercised by the discomfiture of Charles XII and the prospect of the electoral prince of Saxony — the son of Augustus II — being perverted to "the Roman superstition." In 1713 in Warsaw the envoys of Prussia, the Netherlands, and England lodged a joint protest with the king at the "hardships to which the Protestants had of late been exposed and at the infractions of their privileges." The Russian resident in Poland, Aleksei I. Dashkov, who had been invited to join the demarche, excused himself on the grounds that he had no instructions in the matter, nor did he wish to incur any further odium with the Poles. From that time until the end of the period under consideration, the British envoys in Warsaw were almost invariably instructed to plead with the king and his ministers for an alleviation in the plight of the Protestants. They themselves sent emissaries to England, Scotland, and Ireland to make propaganda and raise funds. In 1715, after a judgment of the tribunal (or court of supreme judicature, as Scott calls it) had deprived the Calvinists of their church in a place called Radzięcin, the elector of Brandenburg made a formal protest, asserting that the decree was contrary to the statutes and cardinal laws of the Republic, and threatening reprisals against Roman Catholic churches in Brandenburg. The chancellor of Poland, Jan Szembek, retorted by arguing that whereas the security of the Catholic churches in Brandenburg was guaranteed in the treaties between the two countries, the "meeting houses" (*zbory*) of the Calvinists enjoyed only "permissive toleration" and were subject to the same laws and penalties as the rest of the country. Privately he dismissed the Prussian protest as being "more flame than fire" and in an official note rather extravagantly warned of counter-reprisals which could result in the expulsion of non-Catholics from Elbląg, Malbork, and Toruń (Elbing, Marienburg, and Thorn).

In these and other cities of Royal Prussia, Catholics were in fact in a minority, and in Toruń the roles were reversed. Here, and there is no reason to disbelieve their tale, the Catholics were the victims of petty persecution and discrimination practiced by the Lutheran majority; they were overtaxed, debarred from civic office and from the merchant and craft guilds, generally oppressed and deprived, and destined for eventual expulsion. Roman Catholic churches were stripped of their income through the expropriation of their endowments; at unspecified dates a school was taken away and placed under a Lutheran teacher.

Hospitals with their incomes and provisioning were transferred to the Lutherans, Roman Catholic church festivals were studiously disregarded and employees were made to work on those days in order to create as much noise and disturbance as possible, and so on. In Grudziądz in 1724 the mother superior of the Benedictine community complained of petty harassment by the local burghers, "proud, haughty, and disdainful," who refused to provide a water supply for the convent although it had been paid for, and had recently taken to hindering the purchase of provisions.

It was into a land already impoverished by the rapacity of the many armies, native and foreign, repeatedly marching and counter-marching across its territory, a country pervaded by a mood of mounting xenophobia and deepening religious prejudice, that Augustus II moved some of his Saxon troops — into Lithuania at the end of 1714 and into Great Poland in 1715. The ostensible purpose of these movements was to guard the Republic's northern frontier against a possible Swedish incursion from Pomerania. The undisciplined behavior of the Saxon troops, apart from driving the Poles to desperation and utter ruin with the usual exactions of food and forage, gave grave offense to their religious feelings. In one instance men under the command of a Captain Forbes were said to have broken, desecrated, and thrown into a cesspit an effigy of the Virgin. According to contemporary accounts the Saxons broke the rule of law and the rules of war, pillaging and burning churches and manor houses and oppressing priests and szlachta with numerous vexations. In 1715 the szlachta formed a confederacy in self-defense against these abuses and demanded the removal of the Saxons. The hostilities between the crown and the opposition were brought to an end in the last months of 1716 with the mediation of Tsar Peter's plenipotentiary, Grigorii Fedorovich Dolgorukii, whose hand was strengthened by the reappearance of Russian troops in Great Poland and in Volhynia. The agreement between the two parties, already mentioned, included an article concerning religion. According to Scott, the original intention of the zealots on the king's side had been to outlaw Protestantism altogether, but they ran into strong opposition from the confederates in Great Poland and Lithuania, many of whom were, as the papal nuncio put it, "sectarians." At first the objectors resisted any change whatever in the existing status of the dissenters; even the modified proposal was attacked in a memorandum signed by a sizeable body of men of standing and influence and hotly contested in a lengthy debate before

being finally accepted by the two parties. In its final form article 4 of the Treaty of Warsaw embodies in a statute what had hitherto been no more than the policy of the Roman Catholic hierarchy with regard to the Protestants. It forbade the restoration of old Protestant churches and ordered the destruction of those erected between 1704 and 1709. All worship in the latter was prohibited under pain of a fine in the first instance, imprisonment in the second, and banishment in the last. In the army, as before, Protestant officers were not to outnumber Catholic ones, to the detriment of the latter.[5] Dolgorukii in his capacity as chief mediator approved the article only after some moments of hesitation caused not by the pleas of the Protestants to use his influence on their behalf but by the apprehension that the new law might also be applied to the Greek church. Having been assured that this could not possibly be the case, he allowed events to take their course, perhaps to his regret, since in 1718 the Russian vice-chancellor, P. P. Shafirov, informed a Polish envoy that he "disliked" the Treaty of Warsaw because it was contrary to the interests of the Greek religion. This was also the opinion of the anonymous author of a brief gloss dating from the time of the treaty. The question of the rights of the Orthodox community was certainly not regarded as irrelevant to the purpose of the treaty by its authors, since at one point they contemplated the inclusion of an article on "dissenters of the Orthodox religion." The Prussian envoy (G. F. Loelhoeffel), in pursuit of the support of his Russian colleague, insinuated that article 4 endangered the security also of the Protestant community, and in 1717 representatives of the Protestant party themselves tried to prevail on Dolgorukii to protest against that section of the treaty. The Protestants were sparing no effort to make common cause with the Orthodox and to create the impression that the two groups had joined forces in self-defense. A synod of representatives of the Protestant communities in Poland-Lithuania held in Gdańsk in 1718 confirmed the union with the Orthodox entered into by a similar assembly held in 1592. Evidently taking its cue from this resolution and from current usage, a list of grievances dated 1721, unsigned but clearly emanating from a Protestant source, speaks of "Dissidentes in Religione Christiana tam Graeci quam utriusque Evangelicae Confessionis." The signification of the term *dissidentes in religione Christiana* had shifted from the whole body of Roman Catholics and Protestants who had agreed to differ

[5] *Volumina Legum,* 6: 124–25, 127.

among themselves to the Protestants as dissenters from the official church and thereafter, with increasing frequency, to all the Christian non-Catholics in the Republic.[6]

A plan of action for a joint Russo-Prussian intervention on behalf of the Protestants was already in existence, thanks principally to the endeavors of Daniel Ernst Jablonski, grandson of John Amos Comenius, co-superintendent of the congregation of the Bohemian Brethren in Great Poland, court preacher at Berlin, founding member and later president of the Berlin Academy, advocate of Protestant Church Union, and a sworn enemy of the Habsburg monarchy, which he identified with the Counter-Reformation. Among his correspondents were, at different levels of importance and distinction, Leibniz, William Wake, archbishop of Canterbury, and Heinrich von Huyssen, one of Tsar Peter's minor diplomatic agents and a propagandist on his behalf. The publication in 1708 of a tract entitled *Iura et libertates dissidentium in Regno Poloniae* marks the espousal by Jablonski of the cause of the Protestants in Poland and its association with the early Enlightenment in Prussia. If the information communicated in 1718 to Rome by the nuncio in Warsaw is correct, Jablonski's activities had long since crossed the borderline between religion and politics: as part of an agreement between the tsar and the king of Prussia they, the king of Sweden, and other rulers in Germany were to act against the emperor with a view to obtaining an improvement in the legal status of the Protestants in the empire. The tsar and the king of Prussia were in touch with the Polish Protestants through a man named Jablonski, who in turn was in communication with Hungary, where Rákóczi — at that time in Turkey — would put himself under the protection of the tsar and use it when the opportunity arose.

The policy of joint action with Russia over the matter of the dissenters as recommended by Jablonski was strenuously followed by the Prussian envoys in Warsaw, who took every opportunity to obtain the support of their Russian counterparts for their attempts to induce the king and his Polish ministers to bring about some alleviation in the distressed condition of the Protestants. But among the Poles national consciousness was growing and religious feeling was running high. The

6 The use of the term *dissidentes* as early as 1632 in the "Puncta dissidentium de religione" to cover all non-Catholic Christians seems to have been exceptional. See J. Woliński, *Polska i kościół prawosławny* (Lviv, 1936), p. 90; Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł, *Memoriale rerum gestarum in Polonia, 1632–1656*, vol. 1, ed. A. Przyboś and R. Żelewski (Wrocław, 1968), p. 29.

demand for the polonization of the army, first voiced in 1710, was constantly reiterated: the officers should be Catholics and "nationalists" (*nacjonaliści*), as well as being propertied and members of the szlachta, and drill and exercises should be conducted in Polish. Devotion to the interest of the Catholic religion, so the saying went, was a great Polish virtue, any threat to Catholic orthodoxy was thought to imperil liberty, and, as *Libertas adorat fidem,* how, it was asked, will it be upheld by the dissenters who have trampled underfoot the precepts of the church and dishonored the Mother of God? In 1717 the miracle-working image of the Virgin at Częstochowa was adorned with a crown to confirm the sovereignty of the Mother of God over the people of Poland. A similar ceremony was held at Trakai, in Lithuania, in 1719.[7] The notion of "Polak-katolik" seems to have won general acceptance in this period; it was as if the ancient law *Rex Catholicus esto* had been extended to all Poles. The law concerning the king had been stretched further in the second half of the seventeenth century and used to prevent the appointment of Protestant and Orthodox senators. In 1718 the principle of Roman Catholic exlusiveness read into article 4 of the Treaty of Warsaw was for the first time formally applied to the composition of the Diet when, admittedly after a lengthy debate, a deputy was debarred from the house purely and simply because he was a Calvinist. In the towns, according to a speaker in the same session, Protestant burghers were "undesirable" because they "spoilt" the credit available to Catholics; the primate in his speech reproved landowners for colonizing their depopulated land with non-Catholics. He had already in a pre-election circular letter called for the total removal of the Jews — "that heap of rubbish," productive of more harm than good, prejudicial to the laws and customs of the Church. He further proposed that the mining of silver be resumed and improved; foreigners might be engaged for this purpose, but all should be genuine Catholics — "let there not be a single Jew among them or God help us." The application of article 4 of the Treaty of Warsaw caused much misery to those against whom it was directed and aroused sympathy even outside strictly Protestant circles. In 1721 the French envoy in Warsaw, although in his own estimation a good Catholic, spoke of "les

[7] See *Solemnitas Coronationis B. Virginis Mariae in antiquissima ad Praepositalem Palatino Trocensis Basilicam . . . gratiis et miraculis Clara Icone, ab. Ill. Excell. ac Rever. D.D. Constantino Casimiro Brzostowski, Episcopo Vilnensi, celebrata* (Vilnius, 1719), cited in K. Estreicher, *Bibliografia Polska,* vol. 13 (Cracow, 1894), under Brzostowski.

justes griefs des Protestants." Scott, reporting in 1720, writes of Protestants being branded as heretics and cited before Roman Catholic consistories which fined heavily those who failed to appear, or being dragged before the tribunals which imposed savage sentences. The ceremonies of baptism, marriage, and burial provided so many opportunities for vexations and insults. The enemies of Protestantism, clearly impervious to persuasion or pressure, followed but one maxim — conform or perish.

Poland-Lithuania, formerly the proverbial *asylum haereticorum,* was well on the way to becoming an arena of Protestant martyrdom. So disturbing was this prospect to behold from England, the Netherlands, and Prussia that the Polish countercharges of discrimination against Roman Catholics and the silencing of their church bells in those countries went unheeded. The Greek Orthodox religion in the Belorussian and Ukrainian lands seems no longer to have been considered a subject worthy of parliamentary debate, at a time when it had become the religion of only a handful of szlachta, the vast majority of whom were by now Roman Catholics or Uniates.

As well as feeling imperiled by the new law, the Orthodox inhabitants of Belorussia were again being forcibly converted and from 1718, in a succession of petitions, they begged the tsar to intercede on their behalf. It appears that in at least one instance fines were indeed imposed on an Orthodox community for an infringement of article 4 of the Treaty of Warsaw, despite the fact that it refers unmistakeably to Protestant services in churches or private houses. In the new circumstances which first arose in 1720, when the tsar's influence over the country was unquestioned and unrivaled, since the Republic then had no friend other than this dubious ally, the pleas on behalf of the Orthodox received prompt and on the whole effective attention. Peter I was now playing his full part as defender of the Orthodox faith in the Commonwealth. In 1720 some Poles feared that he might wish to use this role as a pretext for armed intervention. They little knew that the treaty concluded early in the same year between Peter and Frederick William I contained a secret article in which Russia and Prussia promised one another to protect the rights of the dissenters and to safeguard the Republic's political institutions, well known to be antiquated. The underlying assumption that the want of a strong government would continue to contribute to the perpetuation of the religious conflicts in Poland-Lithuania was a sound one.

Whether Peter I ever seriously contemplated the use of force on

behalf of the Orthodox community in Poland-Lithuania may be doubted. If the Poles discerned in Peter the master of the situation in the Commonwealth, he himself had a shrewd notion of what outside influence was second only to his own. In 1722, through an intermediary, he called on the pope to protect the Commonwealth's Orthodox community from further harassment by using the ecclesiastical and secular channels open to him, failing which the freedom of Roman Catholic worship in Russia would be withdrawn and the (very few) Catholic churches pulled down. This counter-blow, aimed against the extra-territorial interests of the Catholic pressure group in Poland, which evidently he considered to have been responsible for the persecution of the Orthodox, seems to be the only form of retaliation to have been contemplated by Tsar Peter. The Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide agreed that a letter should be sent to the bishops in Poland urging moderation and gentleness in returning schismatics to the bosom of the church and also that appropriate representations should be made to Augustus II's minister in Rome. Whether any of this was ever done I have been unable to discover. Nor did Peter have any intention of creating in Poland-Lithuania a Russian party recruited from the ranks of the Orthodox; the mistaken assumption that this could be done was to be made later, by Catherine II.

Any credit he may have received from his own clergy for prevailing on the Poles to leave the Orthodox in peace, or any favor he may have gained with the king of Prussia for championing the Protestants as well as his own co-religionists, had to be weighed against Peter I's position as sole arbiter in the Commonwealth and his standing with the Polish dignitaries. The latter included the primate until his death in 1721, Szaniawski, bishop of Cracow from 1720, and the four hetmans, whose support, though to some extent paid for in pensions, he could not expect to receive irrespective of what course he pursued in the Commonwealth. The man whom in 1722 Tsar Peter appointed as commissary for the protection of the interests of the Orthodox there, the self-styled Count Rudakowski, previously employed as an interpreter with the Russian diplomatic mission in Warsaw and a nominee of the Orthodox community, was nevertheless in suspiciously close contact with the Prussian envoy in Warsaw. He displayed a constant tendency to exceed his authority both in the field and in Warsaw, where he pressed Dolgorukii[8] to join the Prussian envoy in making representa-

[8] Grigorii Fedorovich was replaced by Sergei Grigorevich in May 1722.

tions on behalf of the Protestants long before he finally received instructions to that effect from the tsar. The affair of Pinsk in 1722 where three Orthodox monasteries and a large number of churches together with 20,000 parishioners had been forced into union with Rome on the occasion of the marriage on the same day of two daughters of the chancellor of Lithuania, M. S. Wiśniowiecki, gave Rudakowski the chance to show his ability to manipulate the Polish legal and constitutional system to the advantage of an oppressed minority. In a very short time, by order of the king's own court, the monasteries and churches were restored to their rightful owners by a team of royal commissioners. This outcome caused great irritation to the Roman Catholic bishop of Luts'k and Brest, Stefan Rupniewski (of Protestant stock), who had performed the double wedding ceremony at Pinsk and was also notorious for the ill-treatment of Protestants in his diocese. The fiery bishop threatened to excommunicate all Roman Catholics who had taken part in the handing back of the churches, but there is no evidence that he actually did so. Not all of Rudakowski's missions of rescue or arbitration were as completely successful or ran into so little opposition; he was rebuked by the tsar for interfering in matters which did not concern him and accused by S. G. Dolgorukii of showing a lack of discretion. But in the end, by the time of his recall in 1726, Rudakowski had achieved the reconversion of a total of fifty churches and three monasteries, which was about as much as the Orthodox lost to the Uniates in the first quarter of the century.[9]

This then, in numerical terms, was the sum total of Peter I's achievement as defender of the Orthodox faith in Poland. Of far greater significance was the qualified willingness which he showed from 1722 to include the Protestants in his tutelage of the oppressed minorities and to instruct his envoy to defend their interests on a basis of reciprocity, thus setting a precedent for a policy of joint intervention to be pursued by Russia and Prussia in the period immediately preceding the first partition of Poland. It is hard to say whether this change in the tsar's attitude was dictated to any extent by a realization that a tendency was developing to treat the position of the two communities as a single issue, or whether it was his own cooperation with Prussia in this area that accelerated the process. By acting in this way he did not weaken his power and prestige in the Commonwealth. This was brought out very clearly in 1724 in the aftermath of the tumult at

[9] Archiwum Czartoryskich (Cracow), MS IV 754.

Toruń, in which a Protestant mob provoked by a pupil at the local Jesuit college broke into its precincts and desecrated the chapel. At the subsequent trial by the chancellor's court, the twelve principal rioters as well as the mayor — for losing control of the situation — were sentenced to death and all but one duly executed, to the great indignation of the Protestant countries and the court of St. Petersburg. Soon afterwards, when it was thought that retaliatory action from the east and from the west might follow, the British envoy, Edward Finch, reported from Dresden that Augustus II and his entourage, at any rate, were convinced that the interested — i.e., Protestant — powers would not act in concert, and that the outcome of the whole business would depend on any decision taken by the tsar, who, the writer facetiously added, was yesterday anounced dead — which in fact he was.

The death of Peter I put new heart into the Polish senators. In a memorandum of September 1725 the new primate, Teodor Potocki, administered a stinging rebuke to the elector of Brandenburg (as the king of Prussia was still referred to in Poland-Lithuania) for his interference in Polish affairs, complained of vexations inflicted on Roman Catholic churches in Ducal (or East) Prussia and in Elbląg, and threatened the harshest reprisals against the Protestants in Poland, including the sealing of churches and the detention of preachers. The final paragraph of the diatribe puts forward a stirring proposal for calling the szlachta to arms, but at once lowers its tone to declare that the purpose of the mobilization would be no more than to oblige "foreign powers" to intercede not by violent and extreme means, but by persuasion and friendly overtures. The principle of interference if only by intercession was thus conceded when the raison d'état demanded that it should be rejected.

The events reviewed above contain a paradox which in a general sense may have become a recurrent theme in Polish history: a gradual diminution in the sovereignty of the state is seen to coincide with an assimilative expansion of Polish-Catholic nationalism. Of this contradiction the "question of the dissenters" was born. In allowing it to arise, the men who governed Poland at the time showed as little vigilance and foresight as their predecessors had done in 1686 in accepting the principle of Russian tutelage over the Orthodox community, with the difference that whereas the first error of judgment entailed a concession to tolerance, the second was a deliberate choice of exclusiveness. Given the circumstances of diminishing sovereignty,

there was every chance that the abandonment of toleration would be used as a pretext for foreign intervention. It fell to Catherine II and Frederick II to exploit this weakness.

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Some of the material for this paper has been taken from my article "Peter the Great and the Polish Dissenters," published in vol. 33, no. 80 (1954) of the *Slavonic and East European Review.* The manuscript sources not used for that article are shown below against the relevant years:

Abbreviations

ASV, NP	=	Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Rome, Nunziatura di Polonia[1]
ASCPF	=	Archivio della Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fide, Rome
Czart	=	Archiwum Czartoryskich, Cracow[2]
BL	=	British Library, London
PRO	=	Public Record Office, London

1696	ASV, NP 116
1697	ASV, NP 118, 119; ASCPF, Acta Sanctae Congregationis Anno 1697, vol. 67
1698	ASV, NP 117, 119, 121
1699	ASV, NP 121; Czart 616
1701	ASV, NP 123
1702	Czart 196
1703	BL Add MS 8526
1705	ASCPF, Acta, vol. 75
1707	Czart 534
1710	Bodleian Library, Oxford, Rawlinson MS 286; Czart 2205; PRO SP.100.116
1711	ASV, NP 143; Czart 200, 500
1712	ASV, Varia Miscellanea, Arm. I, No. 85; Rawlinson MS (as above) C392; PRO SP.104.123, SP.88.20
1713	Rawlinson MS (as above) C392; Czart 201; PRO SP.104.123, SP.88.20

[1] See also Petrus Savio, *De Actis Nuntiaturae Poloniae quae partem Archivi Secretariatus Status constituunt* (The Vatican, 1947).
[2] See also Ioseph Korzeniowski, *Catalogus codicum manu scriptorum musei principum Czartoryski Cracoviensis,* vol. 1 (Cracow, 1887–93).

1715	Czart 202
1716	BL Add MS 37363, Harley MS 7016; Czart 203, 204
1717	Czart 205, 2209
1718	Czart 205, 1679; SP.88.25, SP.100.46, SP.100.116, SP.104.123
1719	Czart 205; PRO FO.90.46, SP.90.9, SP.100.46
1720	BL Add MSS 37378, 37386; Czart 205, 478; PRO SP.44.270, SP.88.26
1721	BL Add MS 37386; PRO SP 88.26, SP.88.28, SP.100.116
1722	ASCPF, Scritture Riferite nei Congressi, Moscovia, Polonia e Ruteni, 1720–1725; Czart 206
1723	Czart 479
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The Political Reversals of Jurij Nemyryč

JANUSZ TAZBIR

Jurij Nemyryč (Jerzy Niemirycz), the coarchitect if not the initiator of the Hadjač agreement of 1658, has yet to be the subject of an objective biography. Instead, critical assessments of the Antitrinitarian magnate's relations with the Swedes and the Cossacks have colored evaluations of him and his career. The nineteenth-century sketches of Nemyryč by Józef Łukaszewicz and O. Fotyns'kyj, for instance, were clearly negative, although for different reasons.[1] On the other hand, in a study on Nemyryč published in 1960 to mark the 300th anniversary of the Hadjač agreement, Stanisław Kot depicted the magnate in exclusively a positive light, omitting or cursorily summarizing any potentially damaging data.[2] My own brief assessment found Nemyryč's motives to be debatable: "Whereas some researchers see him as merely a careerist and multiple traitor who was guided exclusively by his own class interests, others cast Nemyryč as a precursor of modern federalist concepts who always gave first place to the interests of his Ukrainian homeland."[3] This disparity of opinion deserves consideration even before Nemyryč is the subject of the comprehensive biography which he fully merits. Let us investigate, then, why Jurij Nemyryč first supported the Swedish king Charles X Gustavus and then went over to the Cossack side.

Kot devoted barely three pages to Nemyryč's "illusory hopes relating to the Swedes," and Fotyns'kyj was equally laconic. Łukaszewicz limited his treatment to extensive quotations from documents. Recently the history of Polish religious dissent has been discussed at

[1] J. Łukaszewicz, "Jerzy Niemierzyc, podkomorzy kijowski, starosta owrucki i krzemieniecki," *Biblioteka Warszawska* 2 (1860): 355–70; O. Fotinskij, "Jurij Nemirič: Èpizod iz istorii Volyni XVII veka," *Volynskij istoriko-arxeologičeskij sbornik* (Žytomyr), 1 (1896): 3–29.

[2] Stanisław Kot, *Jerzy Niemirycz: W 300-lecie ugody hadziackiej* (Paris, 1960). A French translation has also appeared: *Georges Niemirycz et la lutte contre l'intolerance au 17ᵉ siècle* (The Hague, 1960). Cf. also J. Tazbir, "Prawdziwe oblicze Jerzego Niemirycza," *Przegląd Historyczny* 51 (1960): 721–26.

[3] *Polski słownik biograficzny*, vol. 22 (Wrocław, 1977), p. 816. Unfortunately, I have not had access to Myxajlo Bryk, *Jurij Nemyryč na tli istoriji Ukrajiny* (Losser, The Netherlands, 1974).

length in Polish historiography, and a clear polarization of opinion has resulted. Some researchers believe that acts of international Protestantism against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were taking place during the consecutive Cossack, Swedish, and Muscovite wars (1648–1660). They are said to have culminated in dissident activity during the so-called Deluge which aimed against the very existence of the Polish-Lithuanian state. Another group of scholars argues that the existence of such a conspiracy cannot be verified, and that because supporters of the Counter-Reformation curtailed the rights of religious minorities, Polish-Lithuanian Protestants were compelled to seek help from abroad. A kind of vicious circle resulted: Catholics persecuted non-Catholics, who then sought agreement with the Commonwealth's enemies, in the hope that if the prince of Transylvania or the king of Sweden ascended to the Polish throne, their situation would improve dramatically.[4]

Such hopes were shared by Nemyryč, as expressed in his statement of March 1656: "Either God will liberate the oppressed dissenters by granting victory to His Majesty the Swedish king, or we shall never have another occasion to cast off the yoke of slavery to the papists."[5] Obviously, the yoke to which Nemyryč referred weighed differently on the Protestant burghers — who feared religious pogroms and legal discrimination — than on the dissident nobility, not to speak of the magnate elite to whom Nemyryč belonged. Profession of a religion other than Catholicism, even under the rule of the tolerant Władysław IV, barred entry to the highest offices. A prominent Polish commander, Grand Crown Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, said about Nemyryč that "had religion not stood in his way, he, of all the Polish lords, would have been worthy of the hetman's mace in his times."[6]

Nemyryč considered himself fully able to hold the highest offices. Having received some estates through an inheritance divided with his brothers (Stepan and Volodyslav), Jurij added to them by purchase so that he soon became one of the largest landowners in the Ukraine. On the eve of the Cossack uprising, in 1648, he owned 14 towns and 50 villages, with a total of 35,000 serfs. As the lord of 4,907 households,

[4] A discussion of this controversy appears in J. Tazbir, "Problèmes faisant l'objet des recherches sur l'histoire de la contre-reforme en Pologne," in *Istituzioni, cultura e società in Italia e in Polonia* (Galatina, 1979), p. 145 ff.

[5] Kot, *Jerzy Niemirycz*, p. 40 (from a letter to Suchodolski).

[6] J. Tazbir, "Diariusz Stanisława Lubienieckiego (młodszego)," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* (Warsaw), 5 (1960): 221.

he stood second only to Jarema Vyshnevets'kyi (Jeremi Wiśniowiecki), who owned 7,603 households, and certainly far ahead of the other "kinglets" of the eastern borderland. Some scholars, especially Kot, have suggested that his estates across the Dnieper (on the Vorskla and Orel') were purchased with the intent of spreading Antitrinitarianism there.[7] Władysław Wielhorski, however, rightly proposed that Nemyryč gathered together the vast latifundium primarily to obtain a prominent position in the political life of the state.[8] Landholding was indeed coupled with political influence. The dietine resolutions passed by the nobility of the Kiev palatinate reflect the popularity that Jurij and the whole Nemyryč family enjoyed there. Even in February 1665, the dietine of Volodymyr demanded that the village of Łopiennik remain in the hands of the Nemyryč family, stating that "the late Lord *Podkomorzy* [referring to Jurij Nemyryč]" had acquired rights to it "by his own blood, shed in the defense of the Commonwealth."[9]

But at sessions of the Diet, Nemyryč was aware that his right to hold any office, especially that of *podkomorzy,*[10] was always questioned. In November 1648, after the outbreak of the Cossack rebellion, when the solidarity of the noble estate was essential, Catholic deputies responding to Protestant objections stated that "the office of *podkomorzy* of Kiev was given to Lord Nemyryč against the privileges of the Palatinate of Kiev, because he is neither Catholic nor Orthodox and because they have the law that either a Catholic or an Orthodox can hold offices of the land."[11] Nemyryč had actually occupied that office since 1641, but even at that time his nomination had aroused the vehement protests of Catholics.

Nemyryč was so influential that he successfully withstood an accusation of blasphemy in 1641. But in the struggle that took place in the

[7] Kot, *Jerzy Niemirycz*, p. 27.

[8] See W. Wielhorski's review of the Polish edition of Kot's book on Nemyryč in *Pamiętnik kijowski,* vol. 2 (London, 1963), p. 162.

[9] *Arxiv Jugo-Zapadnoj Rossii* (hereafter *AJZR*), pt. 2, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1888), p. 17.

[10] Initially the *podkomorzy,* or *subcamerarius,* was a subchamberlain in charge of princely possessions. Later the post became more important than that of *komorzy* and was renamed *archicamerarius.* The office evolved into a provincial position whose holder was in charge of determining the boundaries between royal and private lands. Selected by the king from a list of four candidates presented by each dietine, the *podkomorzy* was the highest elected local official in the Kingdom of Poland.

[11] *[Jakuba Michałowskiego wojskiego lubelskiego a później kasztelana bieckiego] Księga pamiętnicza* (Cracow, 1864), p. 330. Also cf. K. Kłoda, "Sprawa ariańska w czasie bezkrólewia 1648 roku," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 22 (1977): 179–80.

Diet, his influence failed to secure religious liberty for the Antitrinitarians. Only the chaos reigning in the Ukraine prevented the enforcement in 1646 of the Lublin Tribunal's ruling that the Antitrinitarian churches on Nemyryč's estates be closed down. The simple solution of religious conversion was proposed to Nemyryč many times, sometimes in jest, as by the bishop of Kiev, Stanisław Zaremba, in 1648, but more often in all seriousness. Antitrinitarian documents show that this possibility was taken into account more than once. It was with great relief, then, that Krzysztof Lubieniecki wrote to Piotr Sieniuta in 1636 that the Jesuits' efforts to woo Nemyryč through disputations ("for three weeks and more — this is how long the devil incessantly haggled for his soul") had been in vain. Antitrinitarians also rejoiced that Nemyryč had married a Calvinist (Elżbieta Słupecka) when the Catholics had wanted "to entangle him in papism through a high marriage into a princely house, like into a snare."[12]

Three centuries later, it is difficult to ascertain what guided Jurij Nemyryč to resist these solicitations. Surely one factor was the piety so evident in his treatise about the duties of a Christian knight (*Panoplia, to jest zupełna zbroja człowieka chrystyjanskiego*). Nemyryč's religious heritage (i.e., his family's Antitrinitarianism, fervent because it was recent, having been accepted by Jurij's father at a mature age) and his fear of being accused of seeking position also must have played some role. Nor can we discount Nemyryč's hope for a reversion to the complete religious tolerance that had existed in Poland-Lithuania in the sixteenth century.

Nemyryč's maximalist program for the religious rights of Polish-Lithuanian dissidents was set forth in October 1655 in the project for a privilege that he compiled jointly with Jan Moskorzowski. The two Antitrinitarians demanded that the Swedish king restore to Lutherans and Calvinists, on the one hand, and to Antitrinitarians and the Orthodox, on the other, their former freedom of conscience, "which was guaranteed by our Lords the kings with oaths and by our ancestors with acts of confederation." Included in the demands were freedom of worship on royal leaseholds as well as private estates, the right to found schools, shelters, and churches, and full access to all government posts.[13] Initially Nemyryč thought the executor of this program

[12] *Miscellanea arianica,* ed. J. Domański and L. Szczucki, Archiwum historii filozofii i myśli społecznej, vol. 6 (Warsaw, 1960), p. 273.

[13] Cf. J. Tazbir, "Die Sozinianer in der zweiter Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts," in *Reformation und Frühaufklarung in Polen: Studien über den Sozinianismus und seinen*

would be George I Rákóczi, prince of Transylvania. As the head of a delegation of Ukrainian nobility, Nemyryč took part in the negotiations that were carried on in 1648 (during the interregnum after the death of Władysław IV, when George I was a candidate for the Polish throne) between Janusz Radziwiłł and the prince's envoys. After the death of George I, Jurij Nemyryč and other representatives of the Antitrinitarian nobility in the Ukraine asked George II Rákóczi for the right to reside in Transylvania "not to propagate our religion or some kind of innovations, but to save our property and lives."[14] In June 1649, Nemyryč made a personal request to the prince, asking for the allotment of estates where he might support himself and his family and for permission to send his sons to Transylvania.[15]

Yet Nemyryč's motives were certainly not only religious. Like Janusz Radziwiłł in Lithuania, Nemyryč in the Ukraine was convinced that the only chance for keeping the eastern territories within the Commonwealth was to accept Swedish protection. The one difference was that whereas for Radziwiłł the greatest danger came from Muscovy, for Nemyryč it came from the Cossacks led by Xmel'nyc'kyj.[16] Initially Nemyryč believed that the Commonwealth would be able to suppress Xmel'nyc'kyj's uprising on its own. He recruited soliders at his own cost, fought against the Cossacks at Zboriv (1649), at the Diet repeatedly called for a general mobilization of the nobles, argued for prompt organization of recruitment and taxation, and criticized the administration of the state and treasury. Kot described the situation as one in which "the leadership of the Commonwealth was unable either to prevent a catastrophe or to protect residents of the threatened provinces, [and] when the Diet refused to call up a general mobilization in order to suppress the civil war, the Ukrainian nobility considered itself entitled to organize a defense with its own resources. . . . It planned desirable changes in the leadership of the Commonwealth. And when these failed, it looked for security through various combinations with neighbors and allies."[17] Thus, behind

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Einfluss auf das westeuropäische Denken im 17. Jahrhundert, ed. by P. Wrzecionko (Göttingen, 1977), p. 13.

[14] Sándor Szilágyi, ed., *Erdély és az északkeleti háború: Levelek és okíratok/Transylvania et bellum boreo-orientale: Acta et documenta*, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1890), p. 45.

[15] Kot, *Jerzy Niemirycz*, p. 35.

[16] Cf. H. Wisner, "Dysydenci litewscy wobec wybuchu wojny polsko-szwedzkiej (1655–1660)," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 15 (1970): 101 ff.

[17] Kot, *Jerzy Niemirycz*, p. 50.

Nemyryč's accession to the Swedes lay despair not only in the efficacy of the state apparatus, but also at the possibility for its improvement. As early as at the outbreak of the Cossack uprising, Nemyryč had asked the palatine of Cracow, Stanisław Lubomirski, how to rescue landholdings "for which heathen troops are not as terrible as is the rebellion of our subjects."[18] Speaking out at the Diet of 1639, he had argued that even if the Antitrinitarians' belief was in error, their religious liberties must not be taken away, because "we were born as Polish nobles and we are in a free republic of citizens."

Nemyryč did not, however, advocate substantive reforms of the political and social structure. His discussion of religious liberties emphasized the rights of nobles, and by so arguing the issue, he kept himself at a distance from the Protestant burghers.[19] Also, his criticism of Poland-Lithuania's inefficient defense system at Diets during the 1650s seems to have stemmed from concern about the lands lost to the Xmel'nyc'kyj uprising, rather than from a wish to reform the military-political structure. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand why at Hadjač he accepted the constitutional models of the nobility's Commonwealth without significant modification. Also, in a famous speech before the Diet on 23 April 1659, he made a complete justification of the nobles' "golden liberty." One can only surmise that he was brought to the Swedish camp by political calculations, rather than by any desire to reform the state.

Not surprisingly, Charles X saw Nemyryč as a valuable ally. Nemyryč's expertise in military matters was well evident in a treatise he had written on war with Muscovy. In addition, his diplomatic talents and excellent understanding of Cossack affairs must have seemed particularly useful to the Swedish king after his conquest of Poland-Lithuania. In the second half of October 1655, Nemyryč arrived in Cracow, having escaped "the Cossacks by barely two miles." He had brought the news that "the Cossacks with the Muscovites have taken and plundered Lublin" (the raid took place on October 15). Ten days later the Swedish king informed an Antitrinitarian delegation that he had already received Nemyryč. Their meeting probably occurred around October 20. During that audience, Stanisław Lubienecki showered praise on his coreligionist ("for more than twenty years he has been dealing with the affairs of the Commonwealth and war in a good

[18] Cf. Tazbir, "Prawdziwe oblicze," p. 722.
[19] W. Czapliński, *O Polsce siedemnastowiecznej* (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 127 and 264.

cause"), to which Charles X replied, "I, too, like his qualities."[20] Nemyryč, for his part, was probably less well satisfied with the new ruler. The Swedish king refused to confirm the privilege for dissenters proposed by Nemyryč and Moskorzowski, giving only the noncommittal response, "we shall look into your problems in due time because we want, God willing, to satisfy the demands of all citizens."[21] Charles's posture is understandable: Antitrinitarians constituted only an isolated handful of the noble order, and support for them might have disillusioned the Catholic nobility who, when the invasion happened, had flocked to the Swedish king with acts of allegiance. On 7 November 1655, Nemyryč also took an oath of loyalty to the king and, in exchange, received the rank of major general in the cavalry and a warrant for the recruitment of 3,000 to 4,000 soldiers. Nemyryč also provided the king with good advice: for example, in Cracow he warned him — or so Nemyryč later claimed — that the regular Crown troops would refuse to obey.

Early in December, Nemyryč went to Masovia. His letter dated December 19 might have been written by any Swedish commander, for it advised the king to reinforce the military garrisons at Łęczyca and Inowłódź and to fortify or set fire to Rawa "so it would not succumb to enemies or revolt." It also warned about the Polish detachments and nobility, who might follow the regular Crown troops in refusing to fight, and asked Charles for German infantry and one or two detachments of cavalry, as well as weapons, powder, and money.[22] Nemyryč himself fought with the Swedes at the battle of Gołęb (February 1656), probably at the head of his detachment.

In April 1656, Charles X issued a manifesto promising the dissenters extensive privileges in exchange for armed support. But at the same time, he dashed the political hopes of Nemyryč. The Swedish king proved to be in no hurry to begin a war against the Cossacks — on the contrary, he entered into negotiations with them. Yet, the Antitrinitarian magnate remained loyal. In April 1656, Transylvanian diplomats reported to their ruler that of the most prominent "Poles," only

[20] "Diariusz Stanisława Lubienieckiego," p. 221.

[21] "Diariusz Stanisława Lubienieckiego," p. 219.

[22] Nemyryč complains also that a royal commissioner exempted the estates of the archbishop in the Rawa palatinate from contribution and thus seriously diminished revenues to the Swedish treasury: cf. *AJZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6 ("Akty švedskogo gosudarstvennogo arxiva, otnosjaščiesja k istorii Malorossii [1649–1660 gg.]") (Kiev, 1908), pp. 104–106.

Nemyryč still stood with Charles.[23] Moreover, Nemyryč rendered great service in the diplomatic negotiations the Swedes conducted with George II Rákóczi and Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj. Their purpose was not only to form an alliance, but also to partition the Commonwealth among Sweden, Transylvania, and the Cossack state, as subsequently became manifest in the Treaty of Radnot (December 1656). In exchange for his able services, Charles X defended Nemyryč's interests. His instructions specifically named Bogusław Radziwiłł, Jurij Nemyryč, and Colonel Krzysztof Korycki, all of whom were in a position to render service to the Cossacks.[24]

During 1656 and 1657, Nemyryč traveled constantly between the Cossack Hetmanate, Transylvania, and the Commonwealth on missions for the Swedes. After George II Rákóczi's troops intervened in the Commonwealth, Nemyryč served chiefly the Transylvanian ruler, but without committing himself sincerely or fully. On 26 March 1657, Nemyryč wrote to Bogusław Radziwiłł about the rumors that John Casimir had died: "If this is true, then there is hope in God that Poland will be calm soon." But he feared that the kingless nobility would flock to Rákóczi's camp, lured by his power and the hope of securing the aid of the Transylvanians, Turks, and Tatars against Muscovy. If that happened, the accords with the Swedish king ceding Great Poland and the Noŭharadok (Nowogródek) palatinate to Prince Bogusław would be void. Even if the Cossacks wanted to return to the Commonwealth "on the same basis as before" and if then "the Commonwealth came together again," the Commonwealth would claim the Noŭharadok palatinate. Declaring himself to be a loyal ally, Nemyryč advised Prince Bogusław to recruit soldiers (especially in France) and asked for authorization to negotiate in the prince's name with the Swedish king.[25]

In searching for new protectors, Nemyryč did not renounce service to Rákóczi. On 16 April 1657, when the Transylvanian-Cossack army was approaching Kazimierz, intending to attack Lublin and to take the fortress at Zamość, Nemyryč sent a letter to Jan Zamoyski from near Zawichost, where the Swedish army led by the king was encamped, calling for the surrender of the fortress. Zamość had been under siege since late February. The invaders hoped that a

[23] Szilágyi, *Erdély*, vol. 2 (1890), p. 54.
[24] *AJZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 158 and 269.
[25] Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Warsaw), Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie (hereafter AGAD AR), section 5, file 225, no. 10388[a].

personal appeal from Nemyryč, who knew the commander of the fortress, and his diplomatic skill would be more effective than cannons had been. In his letter to Zamoyski, Nemyryč emphasized the hopelessness of the situation: faced with invasion by "Swedish, Hungarian, Cossack, Moldavian, and Wallachian troops," Zamoyski had no way out, the more so since John Casimir is "outside the kingdom, as we are informed, and the Polish army dares not and cannot campaign, hence there is no hope of aid." A defeat is "sure by God's disposal," and the adversaries promise gracious terms of surrender: "And both His Majesty the King, my gracious Lord, and the Transylvanian Prince keep whatever promises they make," wrote Nemyryč. He must have realized that he was giving false information about the Polish troops and the king. The actual situation was well known to Zamoyski. Since his fortress was well fortified and abundantly stocked with ammunition and food, it is small wonder that Zamoyski rejected the offers made by Nemyryč and by Rákóczi himself. The commander of Zamość replied to Nemyryč with contempt, writing that he had expected nothing different from someone who stubbornly adhered to the invaders. He wondered only why Nemyryč had bothered to make such a proposal to a man whose loyalty to his king and country was so evident (a reference, no doubt, to the duration of the siege of Zamość). In spite of this, Zamoyski wrote, "you do not fail to try again" — which may mean that Nemyryč had made him a similar offer previously.[26]

Nemyryč was more successful in his negotiations with the defenders of Warsaw. On 16 June 1657, he demanded that the commander, Eliasz Łącki, and castellan, Jan Oborski, surrender the city to Transylvanian troops. Nemyryč tried to convince Łącki that, lacking an adequate garrison and gunpowder, Warsaw could not withstand a long siege, especially since no aid could be expected. Therefore, any resistance would be futile, reflecting only "that spirit due to which all of Poland has almost perished and is perishing." Nemyryč repeated the assurances given to Zamoyski about mild terms of surrender and consideration for the lives and property of the population, and even used the same expression about the troops allied against the Commonwealth. His letter to Oborski was similar in character. Hopes for foreign relief troops, Nemyryč wrote, "are fairy tales . . . with which

[26] Łukaszewicz, "Jerzy Niemierzyc," pp. 358–60. Two years later, it was Zamoyski whose support and protection Nemyryč was seeking.

a few unbalanced people are deluding the Commonwealth. . . . Much of Poland has perished while waiting with these empty hopes, when it was possible to behave differently and to pacify one's country." The Polish-Lithuanian army Nemyryč contemptuously dismissed as minuscule and composed largely of plebeians, and foreigners to boot ("there are hardly any soldiers of the noble estate left, most are Tatars, Serbians, and many other foreigners . . ."). Oborski did not answer Nemyryč at all, but Łącki, out of concern for the welfare of the besieged city, did. He cited his old friendship with Nemyryč, referred to his order from the king to defend Warsaw, expressed hope for Rákóczi's grace, and appealed that the capital be left in peace "following the example of other cities, such as Lviv, Sambir, and Przemyśl."[27] The castellan's appeal was a prelude to the capitulation that Nemyryč's persuasive letter had surely hastened. Warsaw lacked ammunition, food caches were mysteriously burnt down, and news about the approach of Swedish troops spread. These circumstances forced the besieged into negotiations, and talks began on June 17.

Negotiating on the Transylvanian side were Jurij Nemyryč, the Calvinist Michał Stanisławski, ensign of the Land of Halyč and colonel in the Transylvanian army, and János Kemény, commander of the Transylvanian troops. Nemyryč and Kemény both signed the Warsaw capitulation act. Its ten articles set stringent conditions on the besieged city, and the formulations were such that the victors could readily interpret them to their advantage.[28]

Nemyryč's correspondence with Zamoyski circulated throughout the Commonwealth, as evidenced by its many manuscript copies.[29] The letters not only deepened hostility toward Nemyryč, but also aroused sentiment against the Antitrinitarians. Nemyryč himself knew that, contrary to what he had written to Łącki and Oborski, the Swedish-Transylvanian cause was lost.

In the summer of 1657, Nemyryč, who had been in the Cossack camp so many times, came as a Swedish emissary to the council at Korsun' that was about to confirm Ivan Vyhovs'kyj as hetman. Nemyryč's official purpose in coming was to negotiate a Cossack-Swedish alliance against the Commonwealth and Muscovy. This time, however,

[27] Łukaszewicz, "Jerzy Niemierzyc," pp. 361-64.
[28] Cf. J. Wegner, *Warszawa w latach Potopu szwedzkiego, 1655–1657* (Wrocław, 1957), pp. 133–35 and 137.
[29] Cf. Tazbir, "Die Sozinianer," p. 23. Kot does not mention this correspondence at all, nor does he seem to know Fotinskij's work.

he was to remain with Vyhovs'kyj. Nemyryč knew the new Cossack hetman as a Ukrainian nobleman whose estate Vyhiv, in the county of Ovruč, bordered on his own. In joining Vyhovs'kyj's command, Nemyryč brought along the personal retinue with which he had served John Casimir and then Charles X.[30] On 2 August 1657, the Swedish diplomat Heinrich Sternbach reported to his king that Rákóczi had been defeated and that a portion of the Cossacks led by Nemyryč had left him. On 5 October 1657, Vyhovs'kyj empowered Nemyryč ("free baron at Rizany and Vyšomyr, subcamerarius of Kiev, starosta of Ovruč and Kremenčuk") to negotiate with the Swedes on his behalf. Accompanied by Ivan Kovalevs'kyj and Ivan Fedorovyč (Bohun), Nemyryč signed a Swedish-Ukrainian military alliance at Korsun' aimed against the Commonwealth and, eventually, against Muscovy.[31] Muscovy, alarmed by Nemyryč's expanding role in the Cossack camp, as evidenced by his nomination as colonel of the Zaporozhian troops and his reacquisition of his estates on the Left Bank, repeatedly demanded that this "German, Lutheran, and Jew . . . not be kept in the army."[32]

In spite of some resistance and external pressures, Nemyryč won Vyhovs'kyj and some of his officers over to the idea of establishing a Ruthenian Grand Duchy that would be connected with Lithuania and Poland only through the person of the monarch, a joint Diet, and foreign policy. The Duchy would have a separate army, administration, tribunal, mint, and system of schools. Its secular dignitaries and the Orthodox metropolitan of Kiev, together with three Orthodox bishops, would be members of the Senate. In December 1658, Vyhovs'kyj asked Chancellor Mikołaj Prażmowski to appoint Nemyryč chancellor of the newly created duchy, which in its system of government, modeled on the Commonwealth's, would make him nearly the first political authority. As commander of the mercenary troops (the only ones on which Vyhovs'kyj could rely), Nemyryč also concentrated military power in his hands. Hence, his signature appeared second only to the hetman's on the Hadjač agreement concluded 16 September 1658.[33]

On 23 April 1659, Chancellor Nemyryč made a long speech in the

[30] Fotinskij, "Jurij Nemirič," pp. 18–19.
[31] *AJZR*, pt. 3, vol. 6, pp. 323–24 and 332–34.
[32] Kot, *Jerzy Niemirycz*, pp. 42–43.
[33] The friction among the Cossack officers caused by that nomination were discussed by

Diet glorifying what the Hadjač agreement meant for the future of the Ukraine and the Commonwealth. The speech gained international renown, thanks to the propaganda of the court (e.g., it was published three times in German). Two months later, however, in a talk with the Austrian envoy Franz de Lisola, Nemyryč was sounding out the possibility of the Cossacks becoming allied with the Austrian Empire if the Commonwealth collapsed.[34]

Hated by Muscovy, Nemyryč was also unpopular in the Polish-Lithuanian camp, where his political turnabouts were well remembered (the oath obligatory for each Cossack now required that he "renounce in particular the protection of Muscovites and the Swedish king").[35] It was generally alleged that Nemyryč would have embraced Catholicism for the price of a cardinal's hat, and the proof given was that he had converted to Orthodoxy to become chancellor. Indeed, Nemyryč was obliged to convert because the Hadjač agreement accorded the right to hold office in the Ruthenian Grand Duchy solely to members of the Orthodox church, and stipulated that dissenters (especially Antitrinitarians) would have no access to the territory of the Duchy.

Regardless of his conversion, Nemyryč was generally suspected of having remained a crypto-Antitrinitarian. Bitter accusations of opportunism from his former coreligionists prompted Nemyryč to publish a pamphlet (later lost) in his own defense. There he voiced skepticism about basing faith on merely logical premises (as Antitrinitarians did), described Orthodox principles of faith as consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Holy Scripture, and, finally, called upon other Polish Brethren to follow in his footsteps, thus making things even worse. Antitrinitarians themselves, however, never believed that his conversion was anything other than a calculated step in his pursuit of career and property.

The Hadjač agreement was modeled on the federal systems of the Netherlands and Switzerland that Nemyryč had learned about on travels abroad, but it was built on quicksand. Historically, the agreement came at least twenty years too late to win favor among the common people, who now saw in it only another attempt to restore the nobles' rule in the Ukraine. Disorders occurred even on Nemyryč's

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the leader of Lithuanian dissenters, Jan Mierzeński; cf. his letter of 21 April 1659, to Prince Bogusław Radziwiłł, AGAD AR, section 5, file 201, pt. 1 (1641–1659), p. 188.

[34] Kot, *Jerzy Niemirycz*, pp. 52–53.

[35] Kot, *Jerzy Niemirycz*, p. 52.

private estates, due to the ruthlessness of his overseers. Aware of the popular antagonism, Nemyryč demanded from the Diet the right to recruit 10,000 German soldiers to defend Hetman Vyhovs'kyj, himself, and the policy set forth at Hadjač. In the summer of 1659, even before the recruitment of mercenaries had begun, a rebellion broke out among the Cossacks led by Tymiš Cjucjura and Vasyl Zolotarenko, who were forced to call on Muscovite troops for help. Vyhovs'kyj's forces were defeated, and his supporters in towns were slain. Less than a year after it was signed, the Hadjač agreement was in ruins.

Nemyryč initially escaped through the protection of a handful of mercenaries, but sometime at the end of July or beginning of August, he was killed by the Cossacks. On 14 October 1659, Jan Mierzeński reported to Hilary Połubiński, field secretary of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, that "the murder of Lord Nemyryč and Jurij Vyhovs'kyj, the hetman's brother, was due to Cjucjura, colonel of Perejaslav, who was in collusion with Muscovy."[36] Eleven Polish detachments stationed at Černjaxiv were reportedly butchered on September 2. Rebellions broke out everywhere, and efforts were made to capture Čyhyryn, but in vain. Mierziński's report expressed the fear that a period of unrest worse than that of ten years before was forthcoming, especially since Muscovy and Turkey would not remain neutral.

An account of Nemyryč's death is contained in a letter by Katarzyna Lubieniecka, who wrote that he received more than 70 slashes and before his death called out, "Lord Jesus, help me now!" Like other Antitrinitarians, Lubieniecka considered his manner of death to be a punishment from God. In their view Nemyryč was "a rebel against Jesus Christ" and "it did not help him that he became an Orthodox."[37] Among Catholics, sentiments were varied. Some wrote about his death with sadness, others (like Samuel Twardowski) pointed with vengeful satisfaction at the fate of a "turncoat." In Moscow there was rejoicing that "peasants murdered the greatest wrongdoer and heretic, Nemyryč, near Bykiv."[38]

[36] AGAD AR, section 5, file 201, pt. 2 (1659–1663), pp. 35–37.

[37] Lubieniecka wrote the letter in the autumn of 1659 to her exiled son, Stanisław, an Antitrinitarian who was a prominent historian and astronomer (University Library in Amsterdam, MS AY 174ᵃ). A similarly condemning judgment was made in *Historia Reformationis Polonicae* (Freistadt, 1685; republished in Warsaw, 1971), p. 256, by the same Lubieniecki: "when, after the end of the Swedish war, he [Nemyryč] sought the highest dignities in the new Ruthenian Grand Duchy and joined the Ruthenian party, the world, as is usually the case, did him in shamefully."

[38] Kot, *Jerzy Niemirycz,* p. 54, and Wacław Lipiński, "Dwie chwile z dziejów

The political and religious reversals in Jurij Nemyryč's life are known, but the motives that guided him remain obscure. We do not know how sincere his conversion to Orthodoxy was, or to what degree the desire to regain vast landholdings motivated him. Were his only lodestars ambition and careerism, or, recognizing a desperate situation, did he create a Ruthenian Grand Duchy in the framework of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, against the will of most of its inhabitants, and then strive to save it at all costs? These questions can be considered at another time, but the materials available to us now may never provide conclusive answers.

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porewolucyjnej Ukrainy," in W. Lipiński, ed., *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (Kiev [Cracow], 1912), p. 612. Considerable information about Jurij Nemyryč, as well as a reprint of his address at the Diet of Warsaw in support of the Treaty of Hadjač, can be found in the recently published anthology, *The Polish Brethren: Documentation on the History and Thought of Unitarianism in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and in the Diaspora, 1601–1685,* edited, translated, and interpreted by George Huntston Williams, 2 pts., Harvard Theological Studies, no. 30 (Missoula, Montana, 1980), 2: 501–514.

The Staging of Plays at the Kiev Mohyla Academy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

PAULINA LEWIN

At the turn of the eighteenth century, a school theater flourished at the Mohyla Academy in Kiev, which was then under Muscovite rule. The playwrights and directors of this school theater were professors; their students served as actors, technicians, and stagehands; the audience comprised students and invited guests, mostly Orthodox townsmen, clergy, and members of the local gentry.

The Kiev Mohyla Academy was created in the 1630s primarily to combat the attempts of the Roman Catholic church to influence the religious, cultural, and political life of the Ukraine, then under Polish rule. The Vatican, on the other hand, placed great hopes on the Jesuits, who in the time of Counter-Reformation proved to be excellent educators and propagandists. The Jesuit schools were among the best in Europe, and the arts they patronized were luminous and impressive. Their influence was felt everywhere in Europe, including Poland. For the Orthodox, the best way to combat the Jesuit influence seemed to be, and really was, to create schools of comparable quality. This meant adopting the Jesuits' programs to the extent that the differences in faith would allow. After the annexation of the Ukraine by Muscovy, the original motivation for the Kievan school ceased to exist, but the academy soon gained new purpose as it became a training ground for intellectuals needed by Muscovy.

This briefest of accounts about the establishment of the Kiev Academy indicates where we can look for sources of — or parallels to — its school theater. Finding such clues is important because direct documentation about this theater's staging techniques is almost nonexistent. Extant today are only some plays which were published from manuscripts by scholars of our century,[1] and we must hope that these sufficiently characterize the repertoire.

[1] Mainly by V. I. Rjezanov: see his anthology, *Drama ukrajins'ka,* vols. 1, 3–6 (Kiev, 1926–29).

Many West European Jesuit school theaters were well funded, and thus could use sophisticated equipment and sets like those of the Italian court theaters — the best at that time. The Kiev Academy could not afford such luxuries. But by using the available resources, and applying a bit of imagination, we can discover and reconstruct how the Kiev school theater functioned and what it was able to produce. In our discussion, let us keep in mind that the Baroque theater was by nature not a theater of intrigue. Rather, it was a theater of words, conceptual associations, and special stage effects, and this is why staging was the focus of the playwright's and director's best efforts.

Examination not only of the literature on West European staging of that time or somewhat earlier, but also of what the Kievans could have acquired from Moscow is needed. Some scholars may consider this approach inappropriate, since the leading role of Kievan scholars in Muscovy is generally dated from the late seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century. It is unquestionable that Kievans exerted an influence on schools, politics and court life during the reigns of Aleksej Mixailovič and his famous son, Peter. But the oldest extant, dated Kievan play was performed in honor of Aleksej Mixailovič, in 1673 (or 1674), after several spectacles had already taken place in the court theater in Moscow. The repertoire of the tsar's theater in the years 1673–1674 consisted of plays on the biblical subjects Esther, Tobias, and Judith, and a ballet called *Orpheus*; in 1675 it performed plays about St. George, Adam and Eve, Joseph, David and Goliath. So, despite the leading cultural role of Ukrainians at the time, it may well have been the tsar's theater that supplied the Kiev Academy with some of its staging equipment.

The first performers at the tsar's theater were Germans under the direction of Pastor Gregory. The latter may have worked with the school theater of the Collegium Carolinum in Dresden.[2] Gregory most probably was also familiar with the chapters dealing with theater architecture and stage technique in Joseph Furttenbach's *The Noble Mirror of Art,* published in 1663. Furttenbach, a German architect, sought to make his technique accessible to enterprises with limited means, which many school theaters were. He built a small theater in an orphan asylum, and a gymnasium in Munderkingen, presumably with

[2] See A. A. Mazon, "'Artakserksovo dejstvo' i repertuar pastora Gregori," *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoj literatury* 14 (1958): 357.

an auditorium that had a stage.[3] At the Kiev Academy, Furttenbach's techniques could well have become known through intermediaries other than Gregory.

Documents from the time tell us that Aleksej Mixailovič first learned about the "miracles" of the modern theater at least as early as 1659, when his minister described a spectacle he had seen at the court of Ferdinand, duke of Tuscany. The Russian envoy marveled at the six changes of scenery, as well as at how the stage lowered, how the sea appeared in waves, how there were fish, and how people were seated on the fish. He was awestruck that above the stage platform were the heavens, with clouds on which men sat, and that later the men came down from the clouds.[4]

Of course, these techniques were probably not as new to the professors in Kiev as they were to the Russian tsar. Many of these Kievans were educated abroad, where they had had the opportunity to see such spectacles in Italy, Germany, and, of course, Poland. They knew, at first or second hand (e.g., from the lectures on poetics of the Polish Jesuit M. K. Sarbiewski, delivered in the academic year 1626–27),[5] about the techniques explained in Furttenbach's book and in similar sources. The Kievans did not have to learn from the Muscovites; quite the contrary, they were the Muscovites' teachers. Still, documents from Moscow give us an indication of what equipment the Kiev school theater might have received from Moscow.

We know, for example, that at some performances of Aleksej Mixailovič's court theater, a curtain divided the stage horizontally, that is, front from back. When the curtain was pushed aside, the "large stage" emerged; otherwise, only the frontal "small stage" was visible to the audience. Framed and movable perspective paintings (*ramy perspektivnogo pisma*) were used for the coulisses and back drops. In this theater angels could descend from the heavens, rocks and trees could dance with Orpheus, and youths could be thrown into a fiery furnace and saved from it. Instructions survive of how to enlarge a human (e.g., Goliath) or allegorical figure with wooden arms and legs and a head of glued linen painted like a human face, with hair and beard of horse hair. One directive orders that for a scene in Paradise,

[3] See Bernard Hewitt, ed., *The Renaissance Stage: Documents of Serlio, Sabbattini and Furttenbach,* trans. A. Nicoll, J. H. McDowell, G. R. Kernodle (Miami, 1958), p. 181.

[4] See *Rannjaja russkaja dramaturgija. XVII — pervaja polovina XVIII v.* vol. 1: *Pervye p"esy russkogo teatra* (Moscow, 1972), p. 47.

[5] See M. K. Sarbiewski, *De perfecta poesi. O poezji doskonałej,* bk. 9 (Wrocław, 1954), pp. 231–34.

trees with wax apples and leaves be made by affixing colored cloth to the branches with copper wire. Angels' wings were made from glimmering satin stretched over whalebone (baleens), on which gold and silver paint were applied liberally.[6] Animals were sometimes made from dough; at other times, huge wooden animals or puppets were animated by wires or strings,[7] in adaptation of toys popular in Russia and the Ukraine.

During Peter I's reign, from 1703–1704 on, splendid celebrations of his military victories were staged. They were modeled on the West European *tableaux vivants* and street theaters for royal welcomes, primarily in the Low Countries,[8] which Peter knew well. These "triumphs were in great part directed and performed by professors and students of the Moscow Academy, which could then simply be called a branch of the Kievan school. From at least 1701, Moscow's school theater also performed many plays panegyrizing the tsar's reign and his victories.[9] The authors and directors of these plays were usually professors from the Ukraine, who reproduced the accomplishments of the Kievan theater.

What can we learn from the descriptions of Moscow's celebrations at that time? We find, for example, that in 1703, triumphal arches depicted allegorical figures: Peace, as a maiden (vo obraze devy); Truth, as a blindfolded maiden holding a sword and scales; Piety, as a maiden with a halo bearing a cornucopia full of flowers; Comfort, as a maiden wearing a wreath and carrying a bouquet of medicinal herbs; Honesty, as a maiden in a royal crown; and God's Care holding an olive wreath.[10] We even know the source of these depictions: the famous illustrated *Iconology* by Cesare Ripa, one of Peter's favorite books,[11] which from the end of the sixteenth century was influencing European painting, architecture, sculpture, and drawing, as well as theatrical costumes and the postures, attributes, and attitudes of

[6] See *Pervye p"esy russkogo teatra,* pp. 15–16.

[7] See O. Noskova, "Moskovskij svetskij teatr na rubeže XVII–XVIII vekov," in *Starinnyj spektakl' v Rossii* (Leningrad, 1928), pp. 285–86.

[8] About these, see George R. Kernodle, *From Art to Theatre: Form and Convention in the Renaissance* (Chicago, 1947), chapter 2, 2.

[9] See *Rannjaja russkaja dramaturgija,* vol. 3: *P"esy skolnyx teatrov Moskvy* (Moscow, 1974).

[10] See *Russkaja staropečatnaja literatura XVI–pervaja četvert' XVIII v.: Panegiričeskaja literatura petrovskogo vremeni* (Moscow, 1979), pp. 136–37.

[11] See A. Morozov, "Èmblematika barokko v literature i iskusstve petrovskogo vremeni," in *Problemy literaturnogo razvitija v Rossii pervoj treti XVIII v.* (= *Sbornik XVIII vek,* vol. 9) (Leningrad, 1974), p. 223.

allegorical stage characters. Professors at the Kiev and Moscow academies knew other modern books on iconology, emblems, and symbolic images.[12] And even their students were familiar with the name Jacobus Massenius, whose *Speculum imaginum veritatis occultae, exhibens symbola, emblemata . . .* (Coloniae, 1650) was referred to in their poetics classes.

Among the most important Ukrainians to appear in Muscovy was Dimitrij Tuptalo. A student at the Kiev school from 1662 to 1665, in 1702 he became the metropolitan of Rostov; there the devoted educator established and promoted a school. The year Tuptalo came to Rostov or soon after, one of his now missing plays, *The Penitent* (*Kajuščijsja hrešnik*), was performed. A memoirist from the late eighteenth century describing this performance wrote that the sinner appeared in a black dress boldly inscribed with the names of the deadly sins. The inscriptions fell off during the performance and the dress changed from black to white. The allegorical figure of Conscience was dressed in white, wore a flower wreath in her hair, and had a mirror, a prop often used in Baroque art to symbolize the human need for reflection and self-criticism. At the appropriate moment, the left side of the stage revealed the gates of Hell, shaped like the head of a monster (the medieval Christian tradition of painting Hell as the biblical sea monster Leviathan had inspired both medieval and Baroque stage directors). Its monstrous mouth opened and shut, and fire appeared. Another fire appeared from the Heavens when Conscience, Hope, and Justice were ready to crown the praying penitent. At the same time, the orchestra played loudly, the choir sang, clouds came down from the Heavens, and many singing angels appeared. As the penitent died, his soul — a dummy made of white cotton wool or plaster — was pulled up into Heaven, where the angels received it.[13]

Were we to try to stage a Ukrainian play that was performed at the Kiev Academy in 1698, we would be obliged to consult all available sources to learn how to make the scenery, how to change it, and how to produce the play's "miraculous" illusions. Let us do this for one surviving play, *The Kingdom of Human Nature Destroyed by Temptation and Saved by Christ's Benevolence,*[14] which depicts events from

[12] Morozov, "Èmblematika barokko," pp. 224–26.
[13] See *Rannjaja russkaja dramaturgija*, vol. 2: *Russkaja dramaturgija poslednej četverti XVII i načala XVIII v.* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 336–37.
[14] *Carstvo Natury Ljudskoj, prelestyju, eju že smert' carstvova v nas nepohrěšyv-*

the Old Testament, the Gospel, and other Christian religious sources. The play is a mix, or, rather, a deliberate combination of scenes with allegorical figures and scenes from the Bible with characters such as Moses, Aaron, and Pharaoh, together with angels and devils.

In accordance with theories taught in classes on poetics, the performance opened with a Prologue. Traditionally, this monologue was spoken by the professor of poetics or rhetoric whose students were performing or, sometimes, by a graduate student. The Prologue briefly (in 24 lines) explains the subject of the play and, following a traditional custom, ends with the request that the spectators be attentive. As was usually the case, the prologue was recited from the proscenium.

Front stage curtains were not commonly used in school theaters at the time, and we have no indication that one was used for this performance. Usually the settings for the scenes immediately following the prologue were visible to the audience from the outset, but only the proscenium was fully lighted. Stage handbooks of the time, as well as later school lectures on poetics, strongly recommended artificial lighting. Sarbiewski, for example, wrote:

it is known from experience that the settings, costumes, machines, and scenery make a better impression when illuminated by artificial lights. . . . On the other hand, by artificial lights, some defects and inadequacies of the machinery can be hidden. In addition, the very kind of unusual lighting inspires the spectators with pious awe. Care must be taken to make the shafts of light fall on the stage where the action takes place and to hide the source of light.[15]

From extant bills we know that at the time of Aleksej Mixailovič, tallow candles in small bast boxes and in wooden and copper candlesticks were used. In Peter's time, candles placed in lanterns illuminated the stage and the auditorium.[16] West European school theaters used oil lamps. Furttenbach described their placement:

At the front of the stage oil lamps are set 3 [or 2 ½] feet apart on the floor behind a ¾ foot board. . . . From this hidden position they send light only over the scene. Behind the side walls of the proscenium, next to the scene opening oil lamps are placed in iron rings one above the other 2 feet apart up to the heavens. Behind these lamps are placed glittering pieces of gold tinsel.

šymy razorennoe, blahodatiju že Xrysta Cara slavy, ternovym věncem uvjadennoho, paky sostavlennoe y věnčannoe, smutnym že dějstvom v kyevskyx Atynax, pod vlastyju presvětlaho tryvěnčannaho suščyx, ot blahorodnyx rosyjskyx mladencov yzvěščennoe. Roku vonže Xrystos Car slavŷ razoryvyj adovo carstvo 1698. For the text, see Rjezanov, *Drama ukrajins'ka,* 3: 109–149.

[15] Sarbiewski, *De perfecta poesi,* p. 231.

[16] See Noskova, "Moskovskij svetskij teatr," p. 273.

Other lamps are placed behind the clouds . . . sending down a glow like day. Also, in the rear pit 50 oil lamps should be placed, each filled with ¼ pounds of oil.[17]

The limited means of the Kiev Academy probably did not permit all these expensive items, but the major instructions could be followed, the more so since Furttenbach himself explained how economical the lamps were: "In practice, such an oil lamp has often given a good light as long as twelve hours with ¼ pound of . . . oil, for water is continually poured in to raise the oil and the floating wick until the last drop of oil is burned and only water is left. This saves considerable trouble and expense." He added that "for quite small scenes, to save costs" he used "no oil lamps but only good clean slowly burning candles."[18] To intensify the lights, he recommended that a piece of mica be fastened behind the oil lamps or behind the candles. Such reflectors, as he called them, permitted the direction and concentration of the lights as needed. Earlier, Sebastiano Serlio had recommended that a barber's brass basin be placed behind a torch.[19] I believe that the Kiev students produced and used not only the system of lamps or candles, but also a more elaborate standing light box. As described by Furttenbach, this was a lantern of white tin shaped like a perspective box and covered with marked gold tinsel, 8 inches (⅔ foot) wide at the front and 9 inches (¾ foot) high. A candle within a ring stood at the center. The lantern could be placed on a table or on the floor, but its principal use, according to Furttenbach, was "at the rear pit (at the inner stage), where it is hung by a sleeve at the back . . . and will serve to light the royal throne or the sea,"[20] the scenery needed for *The Kingdom of Human Nature* in 1698.

The authors of all books on stage technique of the time emphasized the danger of fire. Nicola Sabbattini, for example, cautioned that "plenty of water should be ready above the beams or the heavens and below the stage. . . ."[21] Sabbattini described how to control the lights on stage with cylinders of soldered tin open at the top and fixed on cords: "you adjust each cylinder over its lamp [whether oil or candle

17 J. Furttenbach, "The Noble Mirror of Art," trans. G. R. Kernodle, in *Renaissance Stage,* pp. 211–12.
18 Furttenbach, "Noble Mirror," p. 236.
19 Sebastiano Serlio, an Italian theoretician (1475–1554), author of *Seven Books of Architecture.*
20 Furttenbach, "Noble Mirror," pp. 237–38.
21 Nicola Sabbattini, "Practica di Fabricar Scene e Machine ne' Teatri" (1638), trans. J. H. McDowell, in *Renaissance Stage,* p. 98.

— P.L.] . . . . in such a manner that by one motion at the side of the stage, the cords with the cylinders descend over the lamps and darken them. When the cords are again raised to their places the stage is illuminated."[22] Each school, including that at Kiev, had access to unlimited manpower. Students were eager to take part in the performance and to work the props and simple machines. Because the lighting system illuminated some parts of the stage while others remained in semidarkness a front curtain was not even needed. Moreover, the control of light fascinated the contemporary audience no less, perhaps even more, than the content of the play they were seeing.

How was the stage platform built, and what kind of scenery was needed? In Sarbiewski's lectures on poetics, we learn that the stage (*theatrum ipsum*) was quadrilateral. The narrowest side was the back wall, which faced the spectators, and two side walls widened out toward the audience. The platform not only became wider but lowered in the same direction, and intersecting lines were drawn on it to show the actors how they should move.[23] As mentioned, the Russian sources tell us how inner curtains were used for more contained scenes. Sometimes shutters painted in perspective and movable to the sides of the stage were used instead. The resulting "inner stage" could be an extension of the front stage, or could be "discovered" as a place far away from that being depicted on the front stage. The inner stage was also often used as the rear pit. It had a loose floor, and its back wall was constructed from boards with gaps permitting the operation of various machines. Especially important for our play were the so-called cloud and sea machines. The stage could have one, two, or sometimes three levels. The highest level — the heavens — was sometimes a suspended mobile platform or balcony, but usually it was represented by hanging clouds.[24]

The Kiev school theater used the *telari* or *perjaktoj* described by Sarbiewski and other sources, including Muscovite ones. They worked together with the back or inner shutters to change the side scenery. Usually four-sided (but sometimes five-, three-, or even two-sided) prisms, they had thin frames on which canvas painted in perspective was stretched. Affixed pivots allowed them to be turned. Furttenbach noted that these *perjaktoj* could be made by any carpenter or cabinet

[22] Sabbatini, "Practica di Fabricar Scene," pp. 111–12.
[23] See Sarbiewski, *De Perfecta poesi,* pp. 231–32.
[24] See, e.g., Sabbattini, "Practica di Fabricar Scene," p. 47. "How the heavens are made."

maker.[25] In any case, the paintings and pivots could be brought to Kiev from Moscow.

The first act of our play required the settings of Paradise, the Heavens, Hell, and a road outside Paradise; sometimes all were in use simultaneously. The scene opens with an argument between faithful and rebellious angels. During the quarrel, angels, fluttering glimmering wings,[26] cross back and forth between Lucifer and Michael; undoubtedly, they rehearsed the ballet-like movements by following the lines drawn on the stage floor.

Orthodox doctrine did not permit God Almighty and Christ to be shown "in person," so the school and other theaters used icons instead. When Lucifer calls out to the angels on stage and the spectators in the auditorium, "Look, all you, the high mountain above the stars where I will place my golden throne side by side with Almighty God himself (Uzrite vsi se bo,/ I prestol pozlaščennij na horě visocě,/ Verx zvězd postanovlju pri samaho bocě/ Boha sil Savaofa)," we can suppose that an icon had been placed among the clouds and stars. There are no indications when the angels disappeared, or where. The action of the first scene probably took place at the rear of the stage, that is, on the inner stage; there the scenery — for example, low-hanging wavy clouds — depicted the lower levels of Heaven, where angels were believed to have their place.

After the first scene, the inner stage was shut by half-shutters or a curtain, leaving in view the icon and the high clouds which covered the entire ceiling of the large stage. The next four scenes used the settings of Paradise and Hell. Paradise, on the front stage from the outset, had trees with wax apples, real branches, dummy or puppet animals, and artificial flowers.

Now only the lighting had to be controlled so as to brighten the front stage; the inner shutters or curtain could then add an appropriate perspective to the whole. We first see — midstage, obviously — a throne painted in gold and covered with rich tapestry.[27] An allegorical figure of Omnipotent Power (Vsemohuščaja Syla) sits there. In a prolonged and high-spirited monologue (57 thirteen-syllable lines), she recalls the seven days of creation and calls on Human Nature to reign in Eden. An allegorical figure of the latter appears, and action

[25] See Furttenbach, "Noble Mirror," p. 210.
[26] See p. 323, above.
[27] See the description of a magnificent throne by Furttenbach, "Noble Mirror," pp. 231–32. In Kiev the throne was probably much more modest.

accompanies their dialogue: Human Nature shyly approaches the throne, encouraged by Omnipotent Power, who rises to take her hand and lead her. Human Nature attends to and kisses the feet of Omnipotent Power, and is placed on the throne. Omnipotent Power calls upon Heaven to crown Human Nature, and then, the stage directions say, "Manus benedicit de coelis" — a hand, symbolizing Providence, emerges from the clouds and blesses Human Nature.

Many detailed descriptions of the time explained how the clouds were made and how the hand could be made to appear. Close to the ceiling between the sections of the Heaven, thin flowing strips of white, pink, and purplish cloth were lowered. These could be formed into new patterns by means of ropes, pulleys, and levers. In addition to the usual cloud machine, special devices were used to bring down heavenly beings, to disclose a figure in a nimbus, or to reveal the hand of Providence. Sarbiewski describes one such device that could readily have been used in Kiev. It was essentially a pole. Attached to one end, directed toward the stage, was the prop or actor that had to be lowered; to the other end a weight was fastened. The pole passed through gaps in the rear wall and was tied to a rope hanging through a pulley. The part of the rope that was to reach the stage had to be hidden, for instance, by a cloud. In our play, the hand of Providence could have emerged in this way, to appear in a shaft of light produced by the lantern. Several students were usually trained to control the ropes and the lantern from behind the shutters or curtain that formed the inner stage.

The appearance of the hand of Providence was accompanied by a voice from Heaven — a device popular for its ability to awe the audience. The allegorical figures of Will and Delight appeared on stage, and in their presence Omnipotent Power showed her flowering Kingdom to Human Nature, with a warning about the dangerous fruit of the Tree of Knowledge.

One part of the stage must have represented Hell. Where was it? I suppose the best place for the set would have been in the rear,[28] where earlier the angels had quarreled. If this were the case, the shutters or curtain were again drawn to the sides, letting the spectators see the props representing Hell — for instance, the Leviathan's mouth could have been its gates. On this inner stage, the allegorical figures of the Malice of Lucifer and her servant, Temptation, plotted mischief. The

28 See Sabbattini, "Practica di Fabricar Scene," p. 126.

audience watched them at the same time that they saw Human Nature in her Paradise Kingdom on the front stage.

When Temptation crossed the boundary of the inner stage to enter Paradise, the rear shutters could close again behind her. Temptation's first speech in the next scene suggests that she walks around admiring the plants and paying special attention to the fruit on the Tree of Knowledge. She pretends not to see Human Nature on her throne. Human Nature begins a dialogue by asking the intruder her identity. Present on stage are Human Nature's maids of honor — Will and Delight. At the end of the scene, when they enter into the dialogue, the pantomime of a game with an apple simultaneously shows the climax of the act of temptation. The scene ends with a voice of reproach emanating from Heaven.

The next scene, the so-called Trial in Paradise, takes place against the same scenery. But now special effects were required, for lightning and thunder were called forth from the Heavens by the allegorical figure of the Anger of God. Furttenbach's book gave detailed but simple directions about "How . . . lightning is made." He wrote:

> In the palm of the right hand, in a well shaped piece of tin to keep the hand from being burned is put a quantity about the size of a hazelnut of colofonio (Greek pitch). This is a fine meallike powder . . . sifted through a hair sieve. A lighted wax candle is held between the four fingers of the same hand, so that the flame is scarcely a half inch from the colofonio. The whole arm is extended and the meal is thrown through the light. It makes a long bright flame in the air like lightning. This flame can be used from under the stage to show Hell, or above between the clouds to represent lightning.[29]

For thunder, Sabbattini (like Furttenbach and others) explained:

> it requires only a channel made of ordinary boards long enough to give duration to the thunder desired . . . it must be firmly placed above the heavens and within it some steps ½ a foot high must be made. . . . When we want to imitate thunder a man . . . must take two or three iron or stone balls . . . and must release them into the [slightly inclined — P.L.] channel one after the other.[30]

The next *scena muta* is a pantomime, accompanied with one short speech by the allegorical figure of Captivity as she puts manacles on Human Nature. The scene takes place in Hell, again on the inner stage. The shutters are opened again and the front lights are dimmed or stifled. The stage directions say that Vulcan, the ancient God of ironworks and fire, is forging chains and handcuffs. Thus, the audience

[29] Furttenbach, "Noble Mirror," p. 229.
[30] Sabbattini, "Practica di Fabricar Scene," p. 172.

must see a smithy at work and the grates of the dark cell on stage, as Captivity imprisons Human Nature.

Next, a secondary allegory — so to speak — of Human Nature, the Lament of Human Nature, roams a road situated on the proscenium. Now, I suppose, the spectators had in view the entire large stage, fully illuminated: Hell in the rear, Paradise at the front, the road on the proscenium, and, above, at least two levels of clouds. These settings transmitted the main ideas of the play — how much was given to mankind by the act of creation and where sin has brought it — very well. The figure of Lament bemoans her fate, and the choir of angels in Heaven consoles her with lyrical recitation or song. Visible on the higher level was the icon of God, and suspended on the lower, from a moveable platform (by pulley and ropes), or, much simpler, on the steps and the tops of ladders hidden by clouds and at the back, were angels.

In the next scene, the speeches by Malice of Lucifer thanking Temptation suggest that the attention of the audience again turned toward Hell on the inner stage, back to the road, on the proscenium, where the allegorical figures of Despair, Faith, Hope, and Love meet, perhaps at the gates of Paradise, depicted by a typically Baroque stage arch[31] decked with green branches. The last three figures display their standard attributes: a cross, an anchor, and an olive branch, with which they fight and chase out Despair. They then walk to the rear of the stage, open the dungeon, and free Human Nature. This happy finale to act one is accompanied by a choir of angels singing in the Heavens.

Act two, extant in part, provided even better opportunities for awing the audience with special effects. If I were the director of a performance in Kiev in 1698, I would have liked to see it begin as follows: On the road (the proscenium), in full light, Malice of Lucifer vents her disappointment and calls on Captivity to put Human Nature, now personified as the Jewish people, into the hands of cruel Pharaoh. In the meantime, changes are taking place in other parts of the fully open but dimly lighted stage. As Kernodle states, "The object was to create a great effect of wonder in the audience that the scenes could be transformed so suddenly before their very eyes — or while they were momentarily distracted."[32] To transform Paradise into Pharaoh's pal-

[31] See Kernodle, *From Art to Theatre,* passim.
[32] G. Kernodle, in the introduction to *Renaissance Stage,* p. 9.

ace, where the second and fourth scenes take place, probably the simplest two-sided *telari* (*perjaktoj*) were used, so that the painted palace columns on one side were switched for the paradise landscape on the other. The throne remained where it was, but the plants and dummy or puppet animals were removed by the student stagehands. Also, some carpets and tapestry could have quickly replaced some of the props of Paradise.

For the second scene the rear pit (or inner stage) had to be shut, so the shutters or curtain of act one were replaced by a transparent, easily removable screen. The upper clouds and the icon remained where they were. At the beginning of this scene the sleeping Pharaoh has a dream which is explained to him by an allegorical figure of Fortune. Probably no bed was used, for it would have interfered with subsequent parts of the performance — in fact, to simplify things, Pharaoh could have had the dream while dozing on his throne.[33] The dream, appearing behind the transparent screen as so-called *umbrae* (shadows), a stage device popular at the time, showed a group of Jews being led off by Captivity. When Fortune and the shadows vanish, attendants enter and Pharaoh tells them about his dream and Fortune's promise. When they have discussed the phenomenon, Captivity comes onstage with the Jews. A pantomime of the Egyptians tying the Jews and leading them away ends the scene.

At this point the back screen was removed. At the back of the stage Moses appeared in the famous scene with the burning bush. The scene was so popular in school theaters that Furttenbach gave a very detailed description of its quite simple technique:

an Italian *parisol* [similar to a beach umbrella — P.L.] could be used . . . the twelve lather sections are gilded and painted in figured streams like flames of fire issuing from a central point like the rays of the sun. When the knob is pushed up, the flames spread out like a flaring fire that leaps around. When the *parisol* is closed the fire seems to be dying down and about to go out . . . a hole 1 foot square closed with a little door is cut in the wall at the rear of the inner stage about 4 feet from the floor. Through this hole is thrust the closed *parisol*. A man concealed behind the wall works it continuously by pushing and pulling the knob and sometimes turning it round from side to side. In the meantime two perspective lanterns . . . are placed in the inner stage in order

[33] Similar staging was used in Dimitrij Tuptalo's Christmas play performed in northern Rostov in 1702. There Herod orders his attendants to leave him because he wishes to doze on his throne ("Vel'možy i vy, voy! vsvojasy yděte./ Xošču malo usnuty, sedjaščy na frone"), and a scene depicting his dream follows. See Rjezanov, *Drama ukrajins'ka,* 4: 134.

to make the opening golden flames seem like a strong fire, as if the bush were burning without being consumed.[34]

The backdrop of a landscape painted in perspective could be added, as well as some dummies or puppets of lambs pastured by Moses, and some greenery — all already used for Paradise in act one. Since one of the requirements of a deacon or priest in the Orthodox church was that he have a strong low voice, it was not difficult for the Kiev theological school to find someone to simulate God's voice coming from the burning bush.

The most spectacular scene, and the most difficult to produce, was the fourth, in which Moses and Aaron confront Pharaoh. There the staging had to show the transformation of staffs into snakes, at least some of the plagues, the release of the Jews, their pursuit, the parting of the sea, and the drowning of the Egyptians. How could all this be managed within the limited budget of the Kiev school theater? I believe that in the first half of the scene, the transparent screen was used again to show the transformation of the staffs and Moses' snake devouring the Egyptian ones, done by means of simple ropes moved behind the screen.

A note in the text says: "Moses and Aaron raise their arms to Heaven, the boys fall dead. From Heaven come lightning, thunder, hail, and reptiles." Furttenbach again gives instructions on "how to produce rain and hail . . . dripping [liquid or any other substances — P.L.] through many holes bored through the upper floor."[35] In the meantime the screen is removed again and new scenery appears. At the very back lies the sea and nearer to the front stand the beleaguered Jews. Sea scenes were considered the most exciting parts of Baroque performances, as is evident even in the report that the Russian envoy had sent to the tsar. The stage manuals all gave technical advice about how to achieve the best, most striking effects. Furttenbach, for example, designed four machines to make various waves of the sea.[36] The simplest instructions came from a source very close to home — Sarbiewski's lectures on poetics. He recommended that the floor boards of the stage platform (in our case, in the rear pit) be loosened on at least one side, so they could be slightly raised and lowered. To the bottom of the boards were fastened pieces of pleated cloth, supposedly blue and gray, which were laced with gold and silver thread for a glittering effect.[37] The drowning

[34] Furttenbach, "Noble Mirror," pp. 233–34.
[35] Furttenbach, "Noble Mirror," pp. 231.
[36] Furttenbach, "Noble Mirror," pp. 239–45.
[37] See Sarbiewski, *De perfecta poesi,* p. 232.

Egyptians could hide under these boards, in the hollow space between the stage platform and the auditorium.

The second act's fifth scene and the extant part of its sixth scene are again allegorical, so they could be performed without special effects. On the basis of the Prologue, the title, and many analogues, the Ukrainian scholar Rjezanov assumed that the two acts were followed by scenes from the New Testament — that is, events in Christ's life, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection.[38] But since we do not have the text in its entirety, our discussion of the staging of this example of the Kiev school theater must conclude here.

Harvard University

[38] See Rjezanov, *Drama ukrajins'ka,* 3: 16–17.

DOCUMENTS

Ukrainian Hetmans' *Universaly* (1678–1727) at the Lilly Library of Indiana University*

BOHDAN A. STRUMINSKY

Like many institutions of the Ukrainian Hetmanate created by Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj, the diplomatics of the new state imitated those of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from which the Hetmanate had seceded. The public decrees of the hetman were called *universaly,* as were the circular letters issued by the Polish kings, some officials, and the Diet; less frequently, these documents were also referred to as *pysan'ja.*

The form of the *universaly* is rather simple when compared with the Western medieval tradition from which they ultimately stem. The sign of the cross replaces the invocation of God's name, and is followed by the intitulation of the hetman. The *inscriptio* may address all readers or listeners (as in Xmel'nyc'kyj's universal of 24 June 1657: *vsîm" vobec y koždomu zosobna*[1] = Polish *wszem wobec i każdemu z osobna* = Latin *universis et singulis,* whence comes the Polish term *uniwersał*), or only a specific circle of people in a certain regiment (*polk*), company (*sotnja*), town or village (as in the case of the three documents published here). Xmel'nyc'kyj's *universaly* sometimes still contained the traditional corroboration (e.g., *a dlja lîpšoe tverdosty touju aprobacŷju zapysov" roukoju našeju podpysavšy pečat' voyskovouju pryložyt' rozkazalysmo,* 'and having signed with our own

* I owe a debt of gratitude to Edward Kasinec, librarian of the University of California (Berkeley), for having drawn my attention to the existence of these materials and for his organizational help; to Ms. Saundra Taylor, curator of manuscripts at the Lilly Library, for her cooperation in obtaining photocopies and information on Allen's collection; and to Omeljan Pritsak and Frank E. Sysyn, professor and assistant professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University, as well as Dr. George Gajecky and Dr. Zenon E. Kohut, specialists in the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks, for having critically read this article before its publication.

1 Frank E. Sysyn, "Documents of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 4 (December 1978): 523.

hand this approval of records for better assurance, we have ordered the military seal affixed,' from the *universal* of 24 June 1657), but later *universaly* dispensed with it (as in our three examples below). The eschatocol gives the location and date. Xmel'nyc'kyj's *universaly* have his full signature and the formula *rouka vlasna* (= Polish *ręką własną* = Latin *manu propria*), but the *universaly* of later hetmans introduced the formula *zvŷš" menovannŷj hetman"*, 'the above-mentioned hetman'[2] without repetition of the hetman's name. The *universaly* were always confirmed by the Zaporozhian Host's seal, the figure of a Cossack shouldering a musket, that varied in size and detail.[3]

Most of the extant *universaly* pertain to private matters (e.g., land grants with service peasants, special legal protection for some distinguished officers, issue of liquor licenses). Although their number runs into thousands, only a few *universaly* are available in scattered publications. And only in the case of those issued by Hetman Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj has any effort been made to collect and publish all of them together.[4]

[2] In publishing four *universaly* of Ivan Mazepa, I misread this formula: Bohdan Strumins'kyj, "Mazepiana in the Harvard Manuscript Collection (1691–1709)," *Harvard Library Bulletin* 28, no. 1 (January 1980): 66, 68, 69, 71, 73, 75, 78. Some other regrettable errors appeared in that publication. In the first three *universaly* of 1691–1695, the tsarist title is wrongly given in the singular, for in 1682–1696 there were two tsars in Moscow; even worse, in the first document some exclusively tsarist titles were ascribed to Mazepa. The correct readings are: *Presvîtlîjšyx y Deržavnîjšyx Velykyx Hosoudarej Yx" Carskoho Presvîtloho Velyčestva Vojska Zaporozkoho Hetman* 'Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of Their Tsarist Most Illustrious Majesties, the Most Illustrious and Statesmanly Great Lords' (p. 66); "of the same Most Illustrious Tsarist Majesties" (pp. 66 and 69); "The Seal of the Little Rus' Zaporozhian Host of Their Most Illustrious Tsarist Majesties" (p. 68); "Their Tsarist Most Illustrious Majesties' Zaporozhian Host" (pp. 69, 73). There is also a minor error in one word on p. 73: it should read ѡктоврія.

[3] On the diplomatics of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj's *universaly*, see Ivan Kryp"jakevyč, "Studiji nad deržavoju Xmel'nyc'koho. V. Het'mans'ki universaly," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Ševčenka* (hereafter *Zapysky NTŠ*) 147 (1927): 55–76; and *Dokumenty Bohdana Xmel'nyc'koho, 1648–1657,* comp. I. Kryp"jakevyč and I. Butyč (Kiev, 1961), pp. 16–17; on those of the later hetmans, see V. A. Djadyčenko, *Narysy suspil'no-polityčnoho ustroju Livoberežnoji Ukrajiny kincja XVII–počatku XVIII st.* (Kiev, 1959), pp. 136–138. On the seals affixed to the hetmans' documents, see Marija Slabčenko, *Materialy po malorusskoj sfragistike* (Odessa, 1912); I. Kryp"jakevyč, "Z kozac'koji sfragistyky," *Zapysky NTŠ* 123–124 (1917): 1–16; E. I. Kamenceva, "Dve ukrainskie pečati XVIII v. iz sobranija GIM," *Numizmatika i sfragistika* (Kiev), 1963, no. 1, pp. 203–205; E. I. Drakoxrust, "K istorii vojskovyx pečatej Levoberežnoj Ukrainy XVII–XVIII vv. (Po materialam Otdela pis'mennyx istočnikov i Otdela numizmatiki Gosudarstvennogo istoričeskogo muzeja)," *Numizmatičeskij sbornik,* pt. 4, fasc. 1 (Moscow, 1971), pp. 3–23 and table 32; and V. H. Fomenko, "Vijs'kovi pečatky zaporožciv," in *Istoryčni džerela ta jix vykorystannja,* vol. 7 (Kiev, 1972), pp. 152–160.

[4] Kryp"jakevyč and Butyč, *Dokumenty Bohdana Xmel'nyc'koho*. Before the revo-

The three *universaly* published below belong to the collection acquired by the Lilly Library of Indiana University in the spring of 1976 from the estate of the late British historian, businessman, and diplomat (in Beirut and Ankara, 1943–47), William Edward David Allen (1901–1976).[5] Allen's main historical interests were the Caucasus, Russia, and Turkey,[6] but he also wrote a book entitled *The Ukraine: A History* (Cambridge, 1940; New York, 1963), which was dedicated "To N.M., half Ukrainian, half angel," most likely to Natalija Maksimovna Koskovskaja, his future third wife. These historical interests were also reflected in Allen's collection of more than 20,000 books, periodicals, and manuscripts. Among the manuscripts were items representing Georgia, Russia, the Ukraine, Poland, Turkey, and the world of Islam, as well as a 1420 manuscript copy of the *Travels of Marco Polo*. The collection was brought to Bloomington, Indiana, from Ireland, where it had been housed at his residence, Whitechurch House at Cappagh, Waterford county, province of Munster.

All three of the *universaly* at the Lilly Library bear the initials JS in pencil, and the numbers 48, 50, and 51, respectively, which suggests that the decrees constituted part of a separate collection. All three documents were known to some historians in the Ukraine (see below), but they were not published in full or necessarily from the originals. Now, access to the originals allows us to present not only the contents of the documents, but also their diplomatic and paleographic form.

1.

The earliest *universal* in the Allen collection was issued by Hetman Ivan Samojlovyč on 13 April 1678. It belongs to the category of

lution 25 *universaly* issued by hetmans from 1651 to 1677 were published in *Akty, otnosjaščiesja k istorii Južnoj i Zapadnoj Rossii* (hereafter *AJZR*), vols. 3–4 (St. Petersburg, 1861–63), 7–9 (1872–77), 11–13 (1879–84); 110 dating from 1648 to 1699 appeared in *Akty, otnosjaščiesja k istorii Zapadnoj Rossii*, vol. 5 (St. Petersburg, 1853). An annotated index of 374 hetmans' *universaly* (plus some similar documents by Russian administrators of the Hetmanate) from 1648 to 1761, compiled on the basis of archives of the Imperial Archaeographical Commission, was published by M. G. Kurdjumov in *Letopis' zanjatij Imperatorskoj arxeografičeskoj kommissii za 1904 god*, no. 17 (St. Petersburg, 1907), pp. 34–95.

[5] A biographical sketch of Allen can be found in *Thom's Directory of Ireland for the Year 1958* (Dublin, 1958), p. 38.

[6] W. E. D. Allen wrote these books: *A History of the Georgian People* (London, 1932); *The Russian Campaigns in 1941–43* (New York, 1944); *The Russian Campaigns of 1944–45* (New York, 1946); *Caucasian Battlefields* (Cambridge, 1953); *Problems of Turkish Power in the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1963); *Russian Embassies to the*

universaly on military and administrative affairs, of which "only an insignificant portion is now extant."[7]

The recipient of the *universal,* Fedir Movčan, was a social upstart in comparison with the descendants of the established Cossack clans. He owed his elevation to Hetman Petro Dorošenko who, tired of anarchic tendencies in the Cossack military democracy, had organized regiments of lower-class mercenaries, subject to military discipline — *oxočekomonni,* 'voluntary cavalrymen,' or *serdenjata,* from Turkish *serdengečti,* 'troops selected for a desperate enterprise,' or, literally, '[somebody who] went out of his head.'[8] Movčan became a colonel of one such regiment. By 18 August 1675, he had crossed over to the Left Bank of the Dnieper and joined Dorošenko's rival, the hetman of the Left-Bank Ukraine, Samojlovyč.[9] He rendered Samojlovyč service by talking other *serdenjata* into switching over to him.[10] He was referred to as "colonel of the voluntary cavalry" (*polkovnyk" oxotnŷj konnŷj*) in Samojlovyč's army, but lost that position by 27 September 1676.[11]

In 1677 Fedir Movčan became an aide-de-camp (*osaul*) of the Pryluky regiment.[12] When in August of that year the Turks besieged Čyhyryn, which was garrisoned with Muscovites and Samojlovyč's Cossacks, a counter-offensive mounted by Hetman Samojlovyč and the Muscovite commander Romodanovskij forced the Turks to retreat. The Pryluky regiment, led by Fedir Movčan, also participated in the successful campaign. A laudatory scroll of Tsar Fedor Alekseevič on 25 November 1678 mentioned Movčan specifically "and all officers and fellows of your regiment" as having "stood firmly and

Georgian Kings, 1589–1605, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1970, 1972). He also wrote a number of articles on Caucasian history.

7 Djadyčenko, *Narysy,* p. 139.

8 Soon after Movčan betrayed Dorošenko, the *serdenjata* were disbanded together with other mercenary ("voluntary") units. In 1687 "voluntary" troops were reestablished, this time in the form of both cavalry (*kompanijci*) and infantry (*serdjuky*); the latter term represented a new quasi-diminutive from *serdenjata* (cf. *porosjuky* versus *porosjata* 'piglets', etc.). For the differences between voluntary units of the seventeenth and of the eighteenth century, see I. Kryp"jakevyč, *Istorija ukrajins'koho vijs'ka* (Lviv, 1936), pp. 257–58; O. P. Apanovyč, *Zbrojni syly Ukrajiny peršoji polovyny XVIII st.* (Kiev, 1969), p. 97.

9 *AJZR,* 12 (1882): 216.

10 V. Antonovič, "Priluckij polkovoj asaul Mixajlo Movčan i ego zapisnaja kniga," *Kievskaja starina* 11 (January 1885): 62.

11 *AJZR,* 12 (1882): 752.

12 A. Lazarevskij, *Priluckij polk,* p. 12, supplement to *Kievskaja starina,* vol. 26 (May 1900).

valiantly" against the Turks in 1677[13] — although the official colonel of Pryluky at that time was Ivan Macenko.[14] Afterwards Hetman Samojlovyč persuaded Macenko to resign in favor of Movčan,[15] and Movčan's formal appointment as colonel followed at a time when the Turks were preparing a new raid on Čyhyryn. They besieged it in July 1678, and conquered the symbolic Cossack capital towards the end of August. Movčan participated in this second, less successful, Čyhyryn campaign, too.[16] In 1679 he resigned from his office for unknown reasons.[17]

Historians have sometimes confused another Fedir Movčan (Lukijan's son), colonel of Starodub, with our Fedir Movčan.[18] This colonel of Starodub was killed in the second Čyhyryn campaign sometimes between 27 July and 30 August 1678.[19]

Our *universal* was known to the Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Antonovyč from a copy inscribed in the notebook of Fedir Movčan's (the ex-mercenary colonel's) son, Myxajlo, aide-de-camp of the Pryluky Regiment, on leaf 95 verso. In an excerpt quoted by Antonovyč, one word is distorted: he gives извеняся rather than зреклъся.[20]

13 *Sobranie gosudarstvennyx gramot i dogovorov,* vol. 4 (Moscow, 1828), no. 113. Antonovyč (Antonovič, "Priluckij polkovoj asaul," p. 62) erroneously interpreted this charter as relating to Movčan's participation in the Čyhyryn campaign of 1678.

14 George Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate,* 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), 1: 251.

15 Antonovič, "Priluckij polkovoj asaul," p. 62; cf. Gajecky, *Cossack Administration,* 1: 251. According to Antonovyč this happened "after" Dorošenko's capitulation to Samojlovyč in September 1676, but, in fact, Macenko was still colonel in 1677–78.

16 Nikolaj Kostomarov, *Istoričeskie monografii i issledovanija,* vol. 15: *Ruina* (St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1882), p. 574.

17 Antonovič, "Priluckij polkovoj asaul," p. 62.

18 A. Lazarevskij, *Opisanie staroj Malorossii,* vol. 1 (Kiev, 1888), pp. 19–20, 256; Vadim L. Modzalevskij, *Malorossijskij rodoslovnik,* vol. 3 (Kiev, 1912), pp. 560–61; Gajecky, *Cossack Administration,* 2: 755.

19 Both Movčans, as colonels in charge of different regiments, are mentioned in a military financial report of 27 July 1678: Viktor Romanovs'kyj, "Dokument do istoriji deržavnoho skarbu davn'oji Het'manščyny," *Ukrajins'kyj arxeohrafičnyj zbirnyk,* vol. 3 (Kiev, 1930), p. 11. This contradicts a document cited at second hand by Lazarevskij, *Opisanie,* p. 20, according to which Fedir Lukijanovyč Movčan had died by 26 June 1678. Since the Čyhyryn campaign ended on 30 August 1678, this date is a *terminus ad quem* for Fedir Lukijanovyč Movčan's death.

Another proof of the existence at that time of two colonels named Fedir Movčan comes from the tsar's chancelleries; on the same day, 25 November 1678, when the tsar's laudatory scroll addressed Fedir Movčan, colonel of Pryluky, as a living person (see fn. 13), Hetman Samojlovyč's envoy presented a report to the tsar stating that the Fedir Movčan who was colonel of Starodub, "having shed his blood, ended his life" in the battle in which Čyhyryn was destroyed; in response, the tsar ordered that Fedir's name be inscribed in a commemorative prayer book (*sinodik* or *pomjanik*); *AJZR,* 13 (1884): 719.

20 Antonovič, "Priluckij polkovoj asaul," p. 62.

After Myxajlo Movčan's death, his notebook was continued by his grandson Andrij Mazaraki (the surname is that of a Greek family which joined the Ukrainian Cossacks), and then remained in the Mazaraki family until Antonovyč's times. Antonovyč received the notebook from Arkadij Fedorovyč Mazaraki, a landowner in the Poltava province. In the early twentieth century the Mazaraki family was still flourishing in the Poltava province and southern Ukraine, where it had estates.[21]

Since Fedir and Myxajlo Movčan did not have male descendants, the family archives from which our original comes are presumably those of the Mazarakis, but not the branch from which Arkadij Fedorovyč Mazaraki descended, because he had only a copy.

The *universal* about Fedir Movčan appears below.

TEXT

JS No.48
1678 +

Іѡанъ Самойловичъ Гетманъ з Войскомъ
Єго Цр̃ского Пресвѣтлого Вл̃чства Запорозким

Ѡзнаймȣемъ симъ Нашыімъ Писанемъ Паномъ Ѡвозномȣ, Сȣдѣ и
Асаȣлови Полковыімъ, также Сотником Атаманомъ Городовыімъ
и Сѣлскимъ и всемȣ Старшомȣ и менъшомȣ полкȣ прилȣцкого
товариствȣ, тȣтже Войтомъ и всѣмъ посполитим людемъ втом
полкȣ мешкаючыімъ ѡбывателемъ. Поневажъ Панъ Іванъ Мацен=
ко. бывшый Полковникъ Вашъ Прилȣцкий. доброволне зреклъ=
ся Своего Старшынъства, и зашное намъ подяковалъ; А
Старшына Вашогож полкȣ, тȣт вбатȣринѣ бȣвшая зтоварыі=
ствомъ певныімъ, запозволенем нашыімъ згодливыми Голосами
своими натой полковницкий ȣрядъ Пана Ѳедора Мовчана ѡбво=
лали, и над Себе вынесли: Тедыі и мыі Єго Пана Мовчана
зная чыі быти вВойскȣ запорозком заслȣжоного, годного и
до Дѣлностей Рыцерскихъ способного мȣжа, цале натом Стар=
шыінъствѣ потвержаемъ. Где ѡразъ Сей нашъ Ȣнѣверсалъ Ємȣ
помененномȣ Пн̃ȣ Полковникови Прилȣцкомȣ подавшыі, мѣти хо=
чемъ и приказȣемъ абыі ѡномȣ все Старшое и меншое полкȣ

[21] Modzalevskij, *Malorossijskij rodoslovnik*, 3: 268–86; *Encyklopedija ukrajinoznavstva*: *Slovnykova častyna*, vol. 4 (Munich, 1955), p. 1430.

прилȣцкого Товарыство, належитое пошанованъе, и во всем поволное послȣшенъство штдавали: Ѕнаѧоуы штомъ иж Ѡнъ помененъный пн҃ъ Полковникъ всѧкого доброго, и послȣшного миловати, а спротивного и непослȣшного подлȣгъ слȣшности, и ѕаслȣгы кождого карати маетъ; натое Власт(ь) совершенънȣѧо шномȣ даемъ. вБатȣринѣ гі҃ Априлѧ ах҃ои Рокȣ.

Ѕвышменованный Гетман
 Рȣка Власна

печать малои россіи воиска его
царского пресвѣтлого величества
ѕапороѕкого

TRANSLATION

JS No. 48 †

(1) Joan Samojlovyč, Hetman with the Zaporozhian Host
(2) of His Most Illustrious Tsarist Majesty

(3) This is what we announce herewith, with our message, to Messieurs Regimental Quartermaster, Judge, and Aide-de-Camp[22] as well as captains, town and village lieutenants, (4) and all senior and junior fellows of the Pryluky Regiment together with elders and all common (5) people who are citizens and residents of this regiment: Since Sir Ivan Macenko, your former Colonel of Pryluky, (6) voluntarily resigned his officership and thanked us for it and since the officers of your regiment who were here, at Baturyn,[23] (7) with some fellows have acclaimed and raised above themselves by unanimous votes and with our consent Fedir Movčan to this position of colonel, (8) therefore also we, knowing him, Sir Movčan, as a man of merit in the Zaporozhian Host, worthy and capable of (9) chivalrous virtues, fully confirm him in this officership. While passing to him, the said Sir (10) Colonel of Pryluky, this decree of ours, we want and order all senior and junior fellows of the Pryluky Regiment (11) to pay him due respect and dutiful obedience in everything, knowing that the said (12) Sir Colonel ought to love all the good and obedient ones and punish the defiant and disobedient ones according to justice and merit. (13) For this we give him a complete authority. At Baturyn on April 13, in the year 1678.

[22] In 1678, the Pryluky regimental officers were Myxajlo Nyz'kohljad (quartermaster), Lazar Horlenko (judge), and Ivan Nis (aide-de-camp); Gajecky, *Cossack Administration,* 1: 253–54, 257.
[23] The capital of the Left-Bank Hetmanate in the years 1669–1708 and 1750–64, now a village in the Černihiv oblast of the Ukrainian SSR.

(14) The above-mentioned Hetman
(15) in his own hand

Seal of the Little Rus' Zaporozhian Host of His Tsarist Most Illustrious Majesty

2.

The other two *universaly* published here were issued to the same person, (O)darija, daughter of Kostjantyn Holub, general *bunčuk* (horse-tail sign) bearer (1678–87) under Hetman Samojlovyč, and widow of Ivan D. Djakivs'kyj, captain of Krolevec' (in the Nižyn regiment) in 1708–1709. These two documents were known to the historian of the Hetmanate, Oleksander Lazarevs'kyj, who quoted excerpts from them,[24] without identifying his sources. But in quoting two other *universaly* concerning the same Djakivs'kyj family (issued by Hetman Mazepa, on 3 December 1701 and by Hetman Apostol in October 1728), Lazarevs'kyj mentioned the family archives of B. Pl. Antonovyč of Kerč (Crimea), descendant of the Djakivs'kyjs in the female line, as the source of the former and the archives of the General Chancellery of the Hetmanate (no. 1388) as that of the latter.[25] Probably our two *universaly* were accessible to him from the same sources. But it is dubious that the General Chancellery archives would have anything more than a copy of a *universal*.

Lazarevs'kyj explained the generosity of Hetman Ivan Skoropads'kyj, the issuer of the *universal* for Madame Djakivs'ka, by her being the stepdaughter of the hetman's wife, Nastasija Markivna, that is, the daughter of Nastasija's first husband, Kostjantyn Holub.[26]

Hetman Skoropads'kyj's *universal* bears the following note on the outside:

ѹнѣверсалъ ѥаснєвелможного Пн҃а Гетмана Скоропадского на село алтынiовкѹ данний. вРокѵ 1709 Nѥабрѥа [sic] 9 днѥа

A decree by the Illustrious Lord Hetman Skoropads'kyj for the village of Altynivka[27] of 1709, November 9.

Two numbers are added: no. 2 and no. 19.

[24] Lazarevskij, *Opisanie,* vol. 2 (1893), pp. 374, 413, 414.
[25] Lazarevskij, *Opisanie,* 2: 373 and 414.
[26] Lazarevskij, *Opisanie,* 2: 374, 385.
[27] Altynivka is now in Krolevec' county of the Sumy oblast in the Ukrainian SSR.

Here is the text of this *universal*:

TEXT

JS No.50

+

Пресвѣтлѣйшого и Державнѣйшого Великого Гсдрѧ Нашего
Єго Црского Свщеннѣйшого Величества Войска Запорожского
Шбоихъ Сторонъ Днепра Гетманъ ІОАННЪ Скоропадский.

Панꙋ Полковникови Войска Єго Црского Пресвѣтлого Величества
Запорожского Нѣжинскомꙋ зъ Старшиною Полковою, а особливе
Пнꙋ Сотникꙋ Кролевецкомꙋ, Атаманови Городовомꙋ, и Войтови
тамошнемꙋ, и Кождомꙋ зъособна, Комꙋбыіколвекъ отомъ вѣдати
належало, Ознаймꙋемъ Сыімъ Нашимъ Ѹнѣверсаломъ, ижъ Респекъ=
тꙋючи Мы Гетманъ на значние Покойного Пана Івана Дѧковъ=
ского бывшого Сотника Кролевецкого въ Войскꙋ запорожскомъ
ронение заслуги и прислуги, а барзѣй теперъ взꙗвши Овдовѣ=
лꙋю Жонꙋ Небожчиковъскꙋ Панюю Одарїю Дѧковъскꙋю въ
Особливꙋю Нашꙋ Гетманскꙋю оборонꙋ, и протекъцїю надаемъ
оной Селце Алтыіновкꙋ Прозыіваемое Длꙗ въспартꙗ Домꙋ Єи,
позволꙗючи от тамошнихъ посполитихъ людей всꙗкіе повин=
ности и послꙋшенства штбыірати; Зачимъ вѣдаючи отаковой
волѣ Нашой Ꙗкъ Панъ Полковникъ Самъ Нѣжинский, такъ и Пнъ
Сотникъ Кролевецкий, Атаманъ Городовыій, и Войтъ тамошний,
и нихто зъ Войсковыіхъ, и посполитихъ всꙗкого чинꙋ людей,
абыі неважилъсꙗ, Єй Паней Дѧковской въ Владѣнію того Сел=
цꙗ, и въ штбыіраню шт посполитихъ тамошнихъ людей повин=
ности и послꙋшенства, чинити перепони прикрости и перенага=
банꙗ: Войтъ зась зо всѣми посполитими людми помꙗнꙋтого
Селцꙗ, абыі безъ жадной Спреки всꙗкое штдавали послꙋшенство
и належитꙋю повинность; мѣти хочемъ и Рейментарско приказꙋ=
емъ.

Данъ въГлꙋховѣ Ноеврꙗ Ѳ Рокꙋ аѰѲгш
Звыішъменованный Гетман
Рꙋкою Власною 1709

JS No. 50 †

(1–2) Joan Skoropads'kyj, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of both sides

of the Dnieper,[28] of Our Most Illustrious and Potent Great Lord, His Tsarist Sacrosanct Majesty.

(3) To Sir Colonel of Nižyn[29] of the Zaporozhian Host of His Tsarist Most Illustrious Majesty with the regimental officers and in particular to Sir Captain (4) of Krolevec',[30] the town lieutenant and the local elder, and everyone individually who should know this, (5) we announce with this decree of ours that we, the Hetman, considering the substantial merits and services rendered to the Zaporozhian Host by the late Sir Ivan Djakivs'kyj, former (6) Captain of Krolevec' and now in particular, taking his widowed wife, (7) Madame Odarija Djakivs'ka, under our special Hetman's defense and protection,[31] we grant her the hamlet called Altynivka (8) as a support of her house and allow her to exact all kinds of duties and obedience from the local common people. (9) Therefore, knowing this will of ours, neither Sir Colonel of Nižyn himself nor the local elder and none of the military and common men of any rank should dare (11) to cause her, Madame Djakivs'ka, any obstacle, nuisance or harassment in holding that hamlet and in exacting duties and obedience from the local common people. And we want and order as a commander-in-chief that the elder with all the common people of the said hamlet (12) should pay all obedience and perform the required duties without any defiance.
(13) Given at Hluxiv[32] on November 9 in the year 1709.
The above-mentioned Hetman
(14) in his own hand

Seal of the Little Rus' Zaporozhian Host of His
Tsarist Most Illustrious Majesty

[28] The title "Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host of both sides of the Dnieper" (cf. also the next *universal,* issued by Apostol) reflected the traditional aspirations of the eastern Ukrainian hetmans to take under their control the Polish or Turk-dominated Right-bank Cossacks (the title was used in this sense by Samojlovyč and Mazepa in some of their *universaly*). In 1709 the hetman's authority technically extended to the western bank of the Dnieper, namely, to Kiev and the sparsely populated lower reaches of the river. Under the treaty of Prut of 1711, Russia, the protector of the Hetmanate, formally renounced claims to the Polish Right-Bank Ukraine and by 1714 the last Cossacks there were transferred to the Hetmanate. In spite of this, Ukrainian hetmans retained the symbolic claim to the Right Bank in their official title.

[29] At that time the colonel of Nižyn was Lukijan I. Žurakivs'kyj (Gajecky, *Cossack Administration,* 1: 134–35).

[30] The captain of Krolevec' was Fedir Stožko at that time (Gajecky, *Cossack Administration,* 1: 178).

[31] For the meaning of this legal term, instituted by Hetman Mazepa, cf. Strumins'kyj, "Mazepiana," pp. 66 and 68.

[32] Hluxiv became the new capital of the Hetmanate after the destruction of Baturyn by Russians in October 1708.

3.

The third *universal,* issued by Hetman Danylo Apostol on 13 December 1727, was due to conflicts between Madame Djakivs'ka and the peasants of Altynivka. In November 1727, soon after the restoration of the hetmancy on October 1 by Tsar Peter II, successor to Peter I, who had abolished it in 1724, the peasants of Altynivka lodged a complaint against Madame Djakivs'ka with the new hetman, Danylo Apostol: "under the late Hetman Skoropads'kyj, after the Swedish incursion [of 1708–1709] and for an unknown reason, our village was given over in subjugation to Madame Djakivs'ka"; "when we became subjects of Madame Djakivs'ka there were 50 well-to-do people in our village . . . and now 20 paupers remain. . . . We tearfully ask you to save us from such misery and to take our village of Altynivka as your leasehold."[33] The hetman then issued a *universal* warning Madame Djakivs'ka "to eliminate excessive taxes and impositions" or the property would be taken away from her.[34] But, perhaps to counterbalance the excessive expectations of the peasants, the hetman also issued the *universal* below, ordering them to discharge their duties to the village's holder (it also refers to the second *universal* published above). Later, in October 1728, he issued still another *universal* confirming Madame Djakivs'ka's rights to Altynivka.[35]

Here is the *universal* of 13 December 1727:

TEXT

JS No.51 #

Єго Імператорского Величества Войска Запорожского Ѡбоихъ сторонь Днепра Гетманъ Данiилъ Апостолъ

Тебѣ Войтовѣ села Алтиновки зъ посполитими людми Симъ Нш̃имъ ознаймȣемъ ȣнѣверсаломъ ижъ сȣплѣковала до Насъ Пн̃ѣ Дарїꙗ Голȣбовна Іванова Дꙗковскаꙗ ȣскаржаючись Что вы належитого Єи послȣшенства неотдаете, а при сȣплѣце презен=
товала Намъ Антецессора Нш̃ого Бывшого Гетмана Пн̃а Скоро=
падского ȣнѣверсалъ; въ которомъ ȣпоминаетъ надаючи Єй селце Алтиновку всꙗкие повинности и послушенства отбѣрати.

[33] Lazarevskij, *Opisanie,* 2: 413–14.
[34] Lazarevskij, *Opisanie,* 2: 414.
[35] Lazarevskij, *Opisanie,* 2: 414.

Мы прето стосуючись до ꙋнѣверсалу Антецессора Нш҃ого, при=
каꙁꙋемъ дабысте по прежнемꙋ єй Пн҃ей Дꙗковской оддавали
обикновенное послушенство и повиновенїе беꙁ противности до
далшой волѣ и ꙋкаꙁꙋ Нш҃ого. Данъ въ Глꙋховѣ Декабра = 13 днꙗ
Рокꙋ 1727гѡ

Ꙁвишменованний Гетман
Рꙋкою власною

TRANSLATION

JS No. 51

(1) Danyjil Apostol, Hetman of His Imperial[36] Majesty's Zaporozhian Host
(2) of both sides of the Dnieper

(3) We announce with this decree of ours to you, the elder of the village of Altynivka with the common people, (4) that Madame Darija, née Holub, wife of Ivan Djakivs'kyj, applied to us (5) complaining that you fail to pay her due ob(6)edience and with her application she presented to us (7) a decree of our predecessor, the former hetman, Lord Skoropads'kyj, in which (8) he reminds her of the exaction of all kinds of duties and obedience while granting her the hamlet of Altynivka. (9) Therefore we, complying with the decree of our pre(10)decessor, order you to give her, Madame Djakivs'ka, (11) the usual obedience and subordination without def(12)iance in the old way, until our further will and notice. Given at Hluxiv on December (13) 13 in the year 1727.


(14) The above-mentioned Hetman
(15) in his own hand.

Seal of the Little Rus' Zaporozhian Host
of His Tsarist Most Illustrious Majesty


[36] The title "Emperor" (*Imperator*) was officially adopted by Peter I on 22 October 1721. This *universal* uses it in the intitulation, but its seal retains the old title.




The *Universal* of Hetman Samojlovyč, 1678



The *Universal* of Hetman Skoropads'kyj, 1709



The *Universal* of Hetman Apostol, 1727



Seals from the *universaly* of Hetmans (from top to bottom) Samojlovyč, Skoropads'kyj, and Apostol

NOTES AND COMMENT

A Note on the Relationship of the Byxovec Chronicle to the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle

GEORGE A. PERFECKY

The sixteenth-century Byxovec Chronicle, a major source for the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to 1506,[1] is of particular interest for Ukrainian studies because its only demonstrably direct source is the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle. The unique manuscript of this important work was discovered on the estate of its owner, Aleksandr Byxovec, in 1830 and published in full by Teodor Narbutt in 1846; subsequently, the manuscript disappeared. In 1907, the Byxovec Chronicle was republished with the other "zapadno-russkie letopisi" in volume 17 of the *Polnoe sobranie russkix letopisej (PSRL)*; now a new edition, more faithful to Narbutt's original publication, has appeared in volume 32 (1975) of the *PSRL,* pp. 128–173. Its editor, N. N. Ulaščik, had already published a Russian translation of the Byxovec Chronicle, with an extensive introduction.[2]

The chief sources of the Byxovec Chronicle were Belorussian chronicles very similar to those published in *PSRL,* volume 17, along with Polish materials very similar to Stryjkowski's *Kronika* (1582). The Byxovec Chronicle's final author, presumably about 1565, according to Ulaščik, wrote essentially in Belorussian, with the sort of admixture of Church Slavonic, Ukrainian, and Polish elements we find in varying degrees in other "Lithuanian" or "West Russian" historical works. However, the Byxovec Chronicle has come down to us in a late sixteenth- or early seventeenth-century copy written in an inconsistent Polish orthography using the Roman alphabet. A careful study of the language of the whole work might well reveal various layers of composition. We will deal here only with the passages which Ulaščik labels as borrowed from the Hypatian Chronicle.

[1] The entry is dated 1507, but the text breaks off abruptly in a description of the victorious battle against the Turks at Kleck in 1506.
[2] N. N. Ulaščik, *Xronika Byxovca* (Moscow, 1966).

The text in question is a single passage of about 1,300 words in the Byxovec Chronicle (pp. 132–133; *PSRL,* vol. 32); it corresponds to two separate passages in the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle describing events of 1252–1253 (cols. 815–818; *PSRL,* vol. 2) and 1262–1263 (cols. 858–861).[3] Ulaščik believes that the Hypatian Chronicle — or, rather, the Hypatian text of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle — is the source for the Byxovec Chronicle, and that the many differences are merely a matter of the author's replacing obsolete words and phrases with more contemporary forms.[4] However, the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle is known primarily in *two* variants, one being the Hypatian copy (H) of about 1425 and the other the Xlebnikov copy (X) of about 1570.[5] Keeping in mind the overall uniformity of the Byxovec Chronicle, and the fact that a sixteenth-century copyist would have up-dated any text he was copying, can we affirm or negate the hypothesis that our author had before him the Hypatian variant of the passages he took from the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle? Even though very few differences between H and X in these passages can be regarded as significant, we submit that the text used for the Byxovec Chronicle was indeed different.

First, there seem to be two substantive agreements of H and Byxovec (B) against X, along with two cases that may be accidental.[6] Like B, H 816.26 has the singular *sosud,* but X has the plural *sъsudy.*

[3] The passages in the Byxovec Chronicle that follow this single passage are also based on information from the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, but the events are retold in the chronicler's own language.

[4] Ulaščik, *Xronika Byxovca,* p. 16.

[5] The seventeenth-century Pogodin manuscript is a direct copy of X and thus offers no independent data. In any case, it was surely written later than the lost copy of the Byxovec Chronicle, not to speak of the presumed original of the 1560s, and therefore could not have served as a source.

[6] There are, of course, numerous cases of the type we call accidental; these could easily have arisen independently at any stage of the process of up-dating the older text and therefore are not probative. Such, for example, are older *sly* H 815.18 vs. newer *posly/posły* XB, or newer *rižani* H 816.19 vs. older *rižane/ ryżanie* XB, or yet newer *v tyxъ* H 859.14 = *w tych* B vs. older *v těx* X. Nor are the spelling differences probative, as, for example, in the preposition *kъ* X vs. *ko* HB, or the prefix in H 817.16 *sožigaše* = *sożyhal* B (with routine elimination of the obsolete imperfect form) vs. *žьžigaše* X. A mechanical tabulation of this sort of casual difference predictably produces a longer list uniting B and X against H, simply because the archaic language of H contained many details unacceptable to later scribes (although it also shows innovations not reflected in XB). For example, though the imperfect was surely obsolete by 1425, H consistently retains the desinence in *dumašetь* 860.10, while XB deletes it: *dumaše/dumasze.* XB generally prefer Slavonicized forms to H's frequent native East Slavic, as in *poganěě* H 815.23 vs. *poganya* X = *pohanyia* B, or *černьcě* H 859.7 vs. *černьci/czerncy* XB.

H 858.14 *gorděti velmi* = B *hordyty welmi*, but in X *grъděti veliky* shows a peculiar replacement for the old adverb. Also probable is H 815.18 *reka* = B *reka* vs. X *reč(e)*. Much less certain is H 816.23 *taině* = B *tayne*, vs. X *vtaině*.

B goes with X against H only in a single substantive case: H 861.17 has merely *s radostьju*, while X adds the adjective *velikoju* in agreement with B *z radostiju welikoiu*. Otherwise B shares with X a number of readings which probably represent innovations that are less cogent evidence of a shared textual tradition. An example is H 817.16 *javě* vs. B *jawno*, X *javno*. Different reflexes of old forms are not easy to evaluate. Thus H 854.3 *mniskii* is an expected colloquial form, but the forms *mnišeskyi* of X and *mniszeski* of B are normal Church Slavonic. H *uslyšav* could be an independent development, while the unprefixed *slyšav/słyszaw* of X and B, respectively, could be original. H *ubivъ* contrasts with XB *ubi*, but the context allows either form and variations of this type are common. The old spelling *piskupъ* (H 816.22, 817.17) would automatically be replaced by *biskup* in the newer tradition.

This evidence suffices, we submit, to suggest that the compiler of the Byxovec Chronicle did *not* have the Hypatian or the Xlebnikov copies of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle at his disposal. Instead he probably had a copy — or else excerpts derived ultimately from a copy — of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle that differed slightly from the two traditions we know.[7] Ulaščik, and also some other Soviet scholars, are thus imprecise when they refer to this source as the Hypatian Chronicle. We must specify that it was some unknown version of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle.

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[7] The Ukrainian background of this copy may well have been apparent from its orthography, for the occurrence of *i* for older *ě* (e.g., *imijut, sobi, otwiszczawszy, tila*) rather than the usual *e* (e.g., *nemcy, sobie, les, k pape*) seems to be relatively frequent in this section of the Byxovec Chronicle. However, *i* also occurs for *ě* elsewhere (e.g., *ditey, viru, misiaca*) in passages not derived from the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, and this is one of the questions that should be investigated for the whole chronicle.

The Origin of Taras Triasylo

GEORGE GAJECKY

Taras Fedorovych Triasylo, leader of the successful anti-Polish Cossack insurrection in 1630, holds a place in the pantheon of Ukrainian Cossack heroes. Yet scholars know very little about this man or his origins. For the most part, they have noted only that Triasylo was unable to hold on to the hetmancy of the Zaporozhian Cossacks for any length of time, although he commanded several Cossack expeditions from 1618 through the 1630s.[1]

In doing research for a book on the Cossack ruling class of the Hetmanate,[2] I have come across an extraordinary account of the Tarasevych family, which claimed descent from Hetman Triasylo. This account, commemorating one of the family's deceased members, appeared in a provincial periodical in 1853.[3] Based on an eighteenth-century family manuscript,[4] it describes a land grant in 1647 by King Władysław of Poland to the brothers and sons of Triasylo. The grant states that Hetman Triasylo was a Crimean Tatar ("proizshedshim iz Krimskoi ordy") known as "Murzak Isain," which probably meant murza Ḥasan. When Triasylo left the Crimea and joined the Cossacks is not made clear, but it is stated that he became of the Orthodox faith ("grecheskoi viry") and took the name Abram Tarassa.[5] The document lists the campaigns in which Triasylo took part, changes the name

[1] Ivan Kamanin, "K voprosu o kozachestve do Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo," *Chteniia Istoricheskogo obshchestva Nestora Letopistsa* 8 (1894): 57–115; Stepan Rudnyts'kyi, "Ukrains'ki kozaky v 1625–1630 r.," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (hereafter *Zapysky NTSh*), 31/32 (1899): 1–76; Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi,* vol. 8, pt. 1 (New York, 1956), pp. 98–124; Mykhailo Antonovych, "Pereiaslavs'ka kampaniia 1630 r.," *Pratsi Ukrains'koho istorychno-filolohichnoho tovarystva v Prazi* 5 (1944): 5–41.

[2] George Gajecky, *The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate,* 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1978). The Tarasevych family is mentioned on pp. 134, 141, 142, 149, 234, 283.

[3] Pavel Ohievs'kii, "Stoletnii starets Ioann Andreevich Tarasevich," *Chernigovskiie gubernskiie vedomosti,* 1853, no. 18/19, pp. 141–68.

[4] Written by the Cossack Military Fellow of the Kiev Regiment, Andrii Fedorovych Tarasevych, in the late eighteenth century. Ohievs'kii, "Stoletnii starets," p. 149.

[5] Ohievs'kii, "Stoletnii starets," p. 146–47.

of Triasylo's descendants from Tarassa to Tarasevych, and grants them a noble coat of arms.

One scholar of the Cossack nobility, Oleksander Lazarevs'kyi, dismissed this document as a falsification, saying that the addressees lived at the beginning of the eighteenth century and were concerned primarily with confirming their estates.[6] Nevertheless, this information about Taras Triasylo, based on oral and written family tradition, should not be dismissed out of hand, especially since it seems to be corroborated by an Italian source from the first quarter of the seventeenth century.

Many Cossacks participated in the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) on the Habsburg and, later, the French side. One such Cossack brigade, numbering 2,000 men, came from the Ukraine to Vienna in the summer of 1620. Its commander was a "valorous captain Assan Trasso."[7] The information appears in a report by a Roman envoy of the Papal Curia in Vienna that was published by Athanasius Welykyi in his voluminous *Letters of the Nuncios* (see the appendix, p. 000, for the text of the document).[8] This same "Assan Trasso," obviously a corrupted form, can be read as Hussein or Isein Tarassa, which coincides with the name Triasylo adopted after baptism.[9] The name "Assan Trasso" was unusual for a Cossack leader. But if it was a corruption of Ḥasan Tarassa, the name that Triasylo used, then it is the first documented information of Triasylo's leadership abilities and lends credibility to the family tradition of the Tarasevyches. It is also significant that most of the contemporary Polish, Latin, and Muscovite documents call the Cossack chief Taras or Tarasa rather than Triasylo or Taras Fedorovych.[10]

The information on Triasylo's origins given in the provincial publication was not challenged by Lazarevs'kyi. He questioned only the land grants which the Tarasevych family claimed were given to them by the

[6] Aleksandr Lazarevskii, *Opisanie staroi Malorossii*, vol. 2: *Polk Nezhinskoi* (Kiev, 1897), p. 43.

[7] George Gajecky and Alexander Baran, *The Cossacks in the Thirty Years' War*, vol. 1 (Rome, 1969), p. 44, fn. 4.

[8] Athanasius Welykyi, ed. *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicarum Historiam Ucrainae Illustrantes, 1550–1850*, vol. 3 (Rome, 1959), pp. 257–58.

[9] Oleksander Ohloblyn, ed., *Istoriia Rusiv* (New York, 1956), p. 73. "Taras Triasylo, iakyi ne vzhyvav opislia tsei nazvy" (i.e., after being elected hetman — GG).

[10] See the works by Hrushevs'kyi, Antonovych, and Rudnyts'kyi cited in fn. 1, and Oleh Tselevych, "Uchast' kozakiv v Smolenskii viini 1633–1634 rr.," *Zapysky NTSh* 28 (1899): 1–72. The Polish general Koniecpolski also calls him Tarasa in his description of the campaign of 1630. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia*, 8: 71, 114–15.

Polish Crown before Khmel'nyts'kyi's uprising. In general, Lazarevs'kyi was prone to ridicule the pretensions of late eighteenth-century Cossack nobility, which claimed descent from hetmans, foreign nobility, or even royalty.[11] Thus, the legend of Triasylo's Crimean descent remains, reinforced by the information from the Italian source.

Triasylo participated in several campaigns of Sahaidachnyi and his successors,[12] and served as co-commander of the Cossack third Crimean campaign in 1629.[13] He proved his military skill by defeating the Polish army under Koniecpolski at Pereiaslav.[14] Later, during the Smolensk war, Triasylo commanded large Cossack detachments against the Muscovites and distinguished himself at the battle of Shchelkanovo (28 March 1634).[15] The last information on Triasylo dates from 14 December 1637, when Triasylo led a group of Cossacks into the Muscovite dominions during the Ostrianyn insurrection.[16]

Although he was a good general and skillful tactician, Triasylo was unable to consolidate his position as hetman, and he usually served the Cossack Host in a subordinate position. His origin as a Crimean Tatar might well have been the stumbling block that prevented Taras Triasylo from being accepted by the Cossacks as their leader.

Harvard University

APPENDIX

Roma. 25.VII.1620.
Sabato 25, detto. A.S.V. Avvisi, vol. 132, folio 175–77.

Di Vienna con lettere de 4 stante avisano del nuovo bastione che si era principiato fuori della porta di castello. Che ivi erano arrivati M/2 Cosacchi de 3/M che si trovanano in viaggio per quella volta, et nel passar per l'Ungheria havevano combattuto con quelli popoli con morte di buen numero de questi, et 100 de quelli oltre molti feriti, de quali ne fossero altri M/5 dalla parte de Mar Maggiore alli confini d'Ungheria passati sotto de commando di en

[11] For example, the Iskra family claimed descent from Hetman Iakiv Ostrianyn, the Kapnist family from Venetian doges, the Dunin-Borkovs'kyi family from Danish royalty, and the Kozhukhivs'kyi-Ferensbach family from Swedish lords.
[12] Ohievs'kii, "Stoletnii starets," p. 146.
[13] Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia,* 8: 62; Antonovych, "Pereiaslavs'ka kampaniia," pp. 10, 33.
[14] Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia,* 8: 111–19.
[15] Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia,* 8: 202; Antonovych, "Pereiaslavs'ka kampaniia," pp. 35–36; Tselevych, "Uchast' kozakiv," p. 25.
[16] Antonovych, "Pereiaslavs'ka kampaniia," p. 36.

capitano di molto valore nominato Assan Trasso per andare in servitio dell Imperatore. . . .

/We were advised from Vienna on July 4 that 2,000 Cossacks arrived there from the original 3,000 that had set out, but while crossing Hungary they had to fight these people and lost many, including 100 severely wounded. There are 5,000 other Cossacks on the Hungarian border who placed themselves under the valorous captain Assan Trasso to enter the emperor's service/.

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DISCUSSION

Observations on the Problem of "Historical" and "Non-historical" Nations

IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY

There is a problem which I wish to raise in connection with George G. Grabowicz's comprehensive, erudite, and penetrating analysis of *A History of Ukrainian Literature* by the late Dmytro Čyževs'kyj ("Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* vol. 1, no. 4). In that review Professor Grabowicz denied the validity of the distinction between "historical" and "non-historical" nations made by many scholars, including Čyževs'kyj. He stated: "the differentiation, and, necessarily, evaluation of nations according to superior and inferior, historical and non-historical, complete and incomplete, is in the realm not of scholarship but of, say, political propaganda" (p. 510).

I beg to disagree. Leaving aside for the present the question of superiority and inferiority, I consider the concepts of historicity and non-historicity — or, alternatively, of completeness and incompleteness — of nations legitimate categories of historical cognition. They are relevant in the context of East European and particularly Ukrainian history.

Professor Grabowicz approaches the problem from the perspective of literary history. My chief concern is the broader socio-political connotations of historicity and non-historicity. But, following Grabowicz's lead, I will begin the discussion with some remarks about the literary aspect.

Grabowicz insists that the literature of each nation should be studied in terms of that nation's unique cultural experience and not through the application of extraneous criteria. He pointedly asks "why a literature expressing one culture, one set of historical experiences and influences, should be a yardstick for another" (p. 511). Rejecting Čyževs'kyj's characterization of Ukrainian literature as the "incomplete literature of an incomplete nation," Grabowicz cites the example of Oriental literatures — Persian, Turkish, Chinese —which nobody calls incomplete although they lack certain genres found in West European literatures. He adds: "Theoretically, one could reverse the process and claim that a Western literature, say, French, is 'incomplete' because it

does not have a feature, a genre of a non-Western literature, for example the Ukrainian *duma*" (p. 511).

But the relationship of Ukrainian literature to other European literatures is not the same as that of Turkish, Persian, or Chinese literature. The latter are products of altogether different cultural traditions and Western criteria are, indeed, inapplicable to them. There exists, however, a European cultural community, based on the shared heritage of classical antiquity and Christianity and strengthened by centuries of intensive cultural-literary exchange. The Ukraine is undeniably a member of the European cultural community, albeit a somewhat marginal one. This impels us to apply to Ukrainian literature the common European standards and criteria. A Ukrainian literary critic defined this position in terms opposite to those proposed by Grabowicz:

> To criticize means to compare; we compare two magnitudes to assess their value. For decades our literature, and for centuries our whole national life, could not afford comparisons. Like a growing child, struggling for sheer physical survival, we considered ourselves a self-subsistent value. Nowadays, no one among us can doubt any longer that the spiritual strength of a people must be measured by the same procedure as the spiritual (and physical) strength of an individual: by setting it off against the strength of those whose measure is already known. . . . Just as the entire future of our nation depends on its relations with the peoples and states of Europe, so the development of our literature is bound with the literatures of the [other] European peoples — the smaller and the larger, those near us and those distant, those neighboring and related, those hostile and those friendly.[1]

The genres and features of any European national literature are hardly ever peculiar to that one literature alone. As a rule, they are widely distributed throughout the entire world of European culture (including its overseas offshoots), and they appear within a national literature not as something absolutely unique, but rather as original variations on a common theme. Now, if certain genres or features are conspicuously missing or underdeveloped in a nation's literature, a sense of incompleteness is difficult to avoid. Such a deficiency is often keenly felt by the members of that nation themselves. For instance, most European literatures possess a medieval epic tradition, but some do not; Czech literature is among the latter. This circumstance induced Vaclav Hánka to perpetrate his notorious forgeries: he wished to supply his countrymen with the medieval epic that history had denied them.

The incompleteness of a literature becomes particularly glaring when its missing features have been, so to say, transplanted to neighboring literatures. Let us use a Ukrainian example. It is commonly accepted that classicism is but poorly developed in Ukrainian literature, being represented mostly by the "low" genre of travesty. This does not mean, however, that classicism was unknown in the Ukraine. Writers of Ukrainian background made signal

[1] Mykhailo Rudnyts'kyi, *Vid Myrnoho do Khvyl'ovoho* (Lviv, 1936), pp. 9–10, 11.

contributions to Russian classicism: they include I. Bogdanovich, N. Gnedich, V. Kapnist, and V. Narezhnyi. But this very fact demonstrates the fragmentary and incomplete nature of the Ukrainian literary process of that age.

The problem may be approached from a different angle. What determines the completeness or incompleteness of a literature is not the presence or absence of certain features, but rather whether a literature can satisfy all the essential cultural needs of its own society during a given historical period. Applying this criterion, we would have to say that Ukrainian literature of the Kievan period was complete (despite its heavy dependence on Byzantine models), whereas Ukrainian literature of the second half of the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth century was patently incomplete. This, of course, has nothing to do with the artistic value of individual works, but refers only to the social function of a literature as a whole.

The incompleteness of nineteenth-century Ukrainian literature was perceived by contemporary Ukrainian observers. Thus Mykhailo Maksymovych wrote in 1840 to a Galician correspondent that in the Russian Ukraine "there can be no [complete] literature in the South Russian [Ukrainian] language, but only individual works," such as those of Kotliarevs'kyi, Kvitka, Hrebinka, and a few others. According to Maksymovych, the main vocation of the Ukrainian language and oral folk poetry was to enrich the Russian literary language that he considered common to North and South Russia.[2] These ideas were voiced not by a Russian chauvinist, but by a man profoundly dedicated to the Ukrainian national-cultural revival, of which he was a founding father.

Later generations of nineteenth-century Ukrainian intellectuals were less complacent about this state of affairs. Writers, literary critics, and publicists of the middle and the second half of the century — Mykola Kostomarov, Panteleimon Kulish, Ivan Nechui-Levyts'kyi, Mykhailo Drahomanov, and others — explicitly recognized the reality of the problem and discussed various strategies for dealing with it. (This could be the subject of a fascinating study in literary sociology.) Ukrainian literature rose above the level of a "literature for domestic consumption" and began to emerge as a complete national literature only at the turn of the twentieth century. This resulted, on the one hand, from a marked intensification of the literary process and the appearance of a galaxy of gifted writers who broadened the thematic and stylistic scope of Ukrainian literature. On the other hand, of no less significance was the emergence of Ukrainian scholarly and journalistic prose and the ever-expanding use of the Ukrainian language in schools and for public and official functions in the Austrian provinces of Galicia and Bukovyna. In the much larger lands of the Dnieper (Russian) Ukraine, the breakthrough of the

[2] K. Studyns'kyi, "Z korespondentsii D. Zubryts'koho," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 43 (1901): 25–28; cited from M. Iu. Herbils'kyi, *Peredova suspil'na dumka v Halychyni* (Lviv, 1955), p. 100, and Jan Kozik, *Ukraiński ruch narodowy w Galicji w latach 1830–1848* (Cracow, 1973), p. 250.

Ukrainian language into education and public life occurred only after the fall of tsarism, in 1917.

The thesis that the completeness or incompleteness of a literature is determined by its social function implies that the problem is not purely literary, but rather primarily sociological and political. Čyževs'kyj was quite right in stating that an incomplete literature reflects an incomplete nation. I will continue the discussion on the plane of social-political history, concentrating on the distinction between historical and non-historical nations.

The concept of a non-historical nation may appear to be a contradiction in terms: the nation, like every other social group, exists in time and therefore is necessarily historical. This objection can be met on two levels. First, not every duration in time possesses the quality of "historicity." The evolution of a natural species, or the life of a colony of social insects, cannot be considered historical because they lack the specifically human element of consciousness. Man is a being endowed with mind and consciousness; consequently, every human community is to some extent historical. However, the mode of existence of primitive tribes and ethnic groups possesses only a rudimentary, embryonic historicity. The potential for historicity becomes actual only when a community achieves self-consciousness. Second, in the context of nineteenth-century East European and Balkan history, the distinction between historical and non-historical nations has a specialized, technical meaning which will be clarified below. One could substitute other terms for "non-historical nations": thus Mykhailo Drahomanov spoke of "plebeian" nations and classified the Ukraine among them.[3] I consider the terms "plebeian," "incomplete," and "non-historical" more or less interchangeable, but I prefer the last, along with its antonym, "historical nation."

Where did this distinction originate? I have made no special study of the problem, but I am convinced that Professor Grabowicz errs in ascribing its paternity to Herder (p. 510); this attribution is most unlikely, because of Herder's anti-statist attitude and his glorification of folk and folk culture.[4] Nor has the concept anything to dc with Gobineau's fanciful racial theories, as Grabowicz suggests. It seems that the differentiation of nations into historical

[3] See the title of his Italian-language essay, "La letteratura di una nazione plebea," *Rivista internazionale del socialismo,* 1880, no. 4, listed in the "Spys prats' M. P. Drahomanova," in M. Pavlyk, *Mykhailo Petrovych Drahomanov, 1841–1895: Ieho iubylei, smert', avtobiohrafiia i spys tvoriv* (Lviv, 1896), second pagination, p. xvi. The contrast and conflict between the "aristocratic" and "plebeian" nations of Eastern Europe is fundamental to Drahomanov's political thought, and it is analyzed in several of his treatises and major articles.

[4] Cf. Isaiah Berlin, *Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas* (New York, 1977), pp. 157–58: "His [Herder's] national feeling was not political and never became so. . . . He believed in kinship, social solidarity, *Volkstum,* nationhood, but to the end of his life he detested and denounced every form of centralization, coercion, and

and non-historical, though first theorized by Hegel, took on independent importance in the legal and administrative practice of the Habsburg Empire. By the time of the 1848 revolution, the terms were already current in publicist literature. It was inevitable that in the heat of political controversy they were often misused for polemical and propagandistic purposes. Among those who sinned on this count we find the co-founder of so-called scientific socialism, Friedrich Engels.[5] However, such abuses do not detract from the objective historical validity of the concept. Robert Kann, the outstanding authority on nationality problems in the Habsburg Empire, classifies the peoples of Austria-Hungary into two categories: "the national groups with independent national history" and "the national groups without independent national history." Among the former he counts the Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Croats, and Italians; among the latter, the Slovaks, Serbs, Slovenes, Romanians, and Ruthenians (Ukrainians).[6] Hugh Seton-Watson draws a similar distinction between "the old continuous nations" of Europe and the "new nations," with whom he classifies the Ukraine.[7]

But in what did the difference actually consist? Was it determined by the presence or absence of an independent national state? Professor Grabowicz comments: "By the reason of the loss of political independence the Polish nation in the nineteenth century would also have to be called incomplete . . ." (p. 510). Here Grabowicz comes close to the core of the problem, but he misses the essential point.

It is true, of course, that no independent Polish state was to be found on the political map of nineteenth-century Europe. We must not forget, however, that Polish statehood did survive in part in the form of Napoleon's Grand Duchy of Warsaw and, later, as the "Congress" Kingdom. From the 1860s the Poles enjoyed extensive political and cultural autonomy, approaching a sort of substitute statehood, in Galicia. The existence of the Polish nation was explicitly recognized by the great powers in the Treaty of Vienna of 1815, and it was at all times accepted as a matter of course by European public opinion. More important, the Polish community itself had a continuous sense of its national identity, expressed in an uninterrupted chain of political actions and in a rich, variegated cultural life.

I conclude that the decisive factor in the existence of the so-called historical

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conquest, which were embodied and symbolized both for him, and his teacher Hamann, in the accursed state."

5 Cf. Roman Rosdolsky, "Friedrich Engels und das Problem der 'geschichtslosen' Völker. (Die Nationalitätenfrage in der Revolution 1848–1849 im Lichte der 'Neuen Rheinischen Zeitung')," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 4 (1964): 87–282.

6 Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848–1918,* 2 vols. (reprinted, New York, 1970). A detailed discussion of the two categories of nationalities is to be found in volume 1.

7 Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (Boulder, Colorado, 1977), especially chapters 2 and 4.

nations was the preservation, despite the loss of independence, of a representative upper class as the carrier of political consciousness and "high" culture. Usually, as in the cases of Poland and Hungary, this upper class consisted of the landed nobility. However, in the Greek Phanariots we find a stratum of merchant patricians fulfilling the same function. Conversely, the so-called non-historical nations had lost (or had never possessed) a representative class, and were reduced to an inarticulate popular mass, with little if any national consciousness and with a culture of predominantly folk character. This differentiation is not an arbitrary theoretical construct, for it is grounded in empirical historical reality.

Professor Grabowicz denies the validity of this criterion. According to him its acceptance would imply the absurdity that "every nation that ever 'lost' an elite or ruling class through war or revolution (the Czech, the French, the Russian, the Chinese, etc.) would be incomplete" (p. 510). Here Grabowicz confuses two altogether dissimilar historical situations: a change in the composition of a national elite resulting from an internal revolution, and a total (or near total) elimination of a national elite resulting from foreign conquest. In studying the history of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions, we see a traditional elite overthrown and superseded by a new elite of the same nationality. Moreover, the revolutionary elite, as a rule, absorbed a considerable portion of the traditional elite (what comes to mind is Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi's observation that only those revolutions succeed that are supported by a dissident segment of the former ruling class).[8] Thus in the case of internal revolutions, whatever one may think of their merits or demerits, there is no cause to speak of a break in the basic continuity of national existence or of a loss of a nation's "historicity." In his classic *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution* (1855), Alexis de Tocqueville irrefutably demonstrated the continuity between the old French monarchy and the modern French nation born from the Revolution. The same applies, as Richard Pipes and Tibor Szamueli have recently argued, to pre- and post-revolutionary Russia.[9] There can be little doubt that the Soviet state, in both its internal and international aspects, is the heir and continuator of imperial Russia.

The Czech case is radically different, and there is no justification for bracketing it with the nations that underwent a change of elite through an internal revolution. After the White Mountain calamity in 1620, nearly the whole of the traditional Czech upper class was wiped out by the conquering Habsburgs, and the Czech nationality found itself reduced to the peasantry and the lower social strata in the towns. The germanization of Bohemia had advanced so far that the great Czech scholar Josef Dobrovský is reported to

[8] Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, *Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv: Pro ideiu i organizatsiiu ukrains'koho monarkhizmu* (Vienna, 1926), pp. 38–39 and passim.
[9] Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (New York, 1974); Tibor Szamuely, *The Russian Tradition* (London, 1974).

have predicted, in 1791, that the Czech language was doomed to extinction.[10] However, this tendency was checked and reversed by several countervailing factors which cannot be discussed here. The reconstruction of a politically self-conscious, socially and culturally mature Czech national community occurred relatively early in the nineteenth century. Thus the disruption in the continuity of the national existence of the Czechs was less deep than, say, that of the Bulgarians. The Czechs may be regarded as a borderline case between the non-historical and historical nations of Eastern Europe.

The results of the preceding analysis can be summarized as follows. In the post-Napoleonic era, the whole of Eastern Europe, including the Balkans, was divided among three great empires — the Russian, the Austrian, and the Ottoman. (The Ottoman Empire gradually crumbled in the course of the nineteenth century, but Russia and Austria-Hungary remained intact until World War I, discounting the separation of Lombardy and Venetia from Austria in 1859–1866.) The three empires included many nationalities, which can be roughly differentiated into two categories: those which even under foreign imperial rule had a recognized status, and those which lacked it. The determining factor was the presence or absence of a traditional representative class. Among the nationalities of the second type, those labeled non-historical, new elites evolved in the form of the intelligentsia. National movements of that type had a populist coloring, and in time they were to display a remarkable vitality. Still, the national strivings of the two categories showed clearly different characteristics throughout the entire era. Traces of these differences are noticeable in the social make-up and the collective mentality of the East European nation even today.

Let us now look at the emotionally charged question of the superiority and inferiority of nations, which I have deliberately set aside until now. It is undeniable that initially the historical nations enjoyed strong political and cultural advantages over their plebeian neighbors. However, "superiority" and "inferiority" ought to be perceived in relative terms. No group, like no individual person, can actualize all values simultaneously. Strength in certain areas is always compensated by deficiencies in other areas, and vice versa. In the course of time, an initial advantage can turn into a handicap, and a dialectical reversal can occur (Hegel's celebrated discussion of the master-slave relationship is an analysis of such a reversal). It is possible to demonstrate that "historicity" was not always an unmixed blessing. In certain cases, it burdened a nation with an undesirable legacy. The Romanians, for instance, possessed a national historical existence of sorts in the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, semi-autonomous entities under Ottoman suzerainty. This helped the modern Romanian state to emerge relatively early, in the

[10] Milada Součková, "The First Stirrings of Modern Czech Literature," *Harvard Slavic Studies* 2 (1954): 259.

middle of the nineteenth century. But another consequence was that Romanian public life was infected by an unfortunate tradition of Ottoman and Phanariot mores. Thus, those Romanians who until 1918 lived under Hungarian rule, as an oppressed minority and a typical non-historical nationality, were in civic culture superior to their compatriots in the autonomous principalities and in the later united Romanian Kingdom.

While the non-historical nationalities were striving to construct modern national communities on a popular base — from the bottom up, socially speaking — the historical nationalities were faced with the opposite problem: the extension of the national community from a pre-existing elite to the common people. (Magyar-speaking and Polish-speaking peasants stood outside the pale of, respectively, the historical Hungarian and Polish nations; these nations coincided with the corporately organized nobility.) The process of social democratization made it imperative to endow the nation with a broad popular base and to transform the former serf into a citizen.[11] This was not an easy or painless task, as illustrated by the tragic experience of the 1846 Polish national uprising in Western Galicia, when the patriotic insurgents were massacred and delivered into the hands of the Austrian administration by the Polish peasantry of the region. The problem proved particularly intractable and, indeed, insoluble whenever the bulk of the population differed ethnically from the local upper class who were members of the historical nation.

The political ideologies of the historical nations were dominated by the concept of state rights and historical frontiers; the plebeian nationalities that happened to live within these historical boundaries were to be kept in a dependent position and, if possible, assimilated. Such overly ambitious, unrealistic territorial programs exacted a heavy price. The great Hungarian national revolution of 1848–1849 was handicapped by the resistance of minorities (in fact, regional majorities) —the Serbs, Romanians, and Slovaks. Owing to a favorable political constellation and the skill of their leaders, the Hungarians achieved a brilliant success in 1867 (the so-called Austro-Hungarian Compromise): the recognition by the dynasty and the Vienna

[11] Cf. the observations of the Ukrainian sociologist Olgerd Bochkovs'kyi:

> Among peoples that possessed their own states, or the so-called historical peoples, the development of national self-determination proceeded from the top to the bottom. . . . Several centuries were needed to transform the corporate, estates-bound society [of the feudal age] into a modern class society, while nationalization gradually expanded into depth and breadth. Modern democracy favored the national awakening and rebirth of the so-called non-historical peoples that represent the second type of genesis of European nations. Among them, the process of self-determination proceeded from the bottom of society upwards.

O. I. Bochkovs'kyi, *Nauka pro natsiiu ta ii zhyttia* (a reprint of two pamphlets, *Narodzhennia natsii* and *Zhyttia natsii,* which originally appeared in Lviv in 1939) (New York, 1958), p. 26. Bochkovs'kyi defines the concept of historical nations too narrowly, by restricting it to those endowed with continuous statehood.

government of Hungarian statehood and its full internal autonomy within the historical boundaries of the Lands of Saint Stephen's Crown. However, half a century later, at the post-World War I peace settlement, the Hungarian state suffered dismemberment and all non-Magyar areas were detached from it. The Poles, too, strove to restore the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within its pre-partition frontiers. Polish claims were opposed by the spokesmen for the newly-emerged Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and later also Belorussian national movements. This issue aggravated relations between the Poles and their eastern neighbors. In the end, the Poles were forced to reconcile themselves, however reluctantly, to the permanent loss of the eastern borderlands of the historical Commonwealth. The neo-Byzantine dreams of the Greeks — their "Great Idea" — were the cause of enduring Greek-Bulgarian hostility; they also enticed the Greeks, in 1920–1922, into an adventurous policy in Asia Minor, with the known catastrophic results. Finally, one historical nation totally disappeared from the face of the earth — the Baltic Germans, who for centuries had ruled the native Latvians and Estonians, but lacked a popular base of their own.

The gist of the preceding discussion is that the concepts of national superiority and inferiority are relative. I disagree with Professor Grabowicz's view that these concepts can be dispensed with altogether. In dealing with a specific historical problem, we are obliged, by the strength of the evidence itself, to acknowledge the superior or inferior performance of communities interacting together. For instance, in studying the history of a war we can, quite objectively, conclude that the military effort of one state was superior to that of another. This applies to all spheres of social and cultural life. Confusion occurs only if criteria which are adequate for one sphere are uncritically extended to other spheres, or are generalized.

Let me now probe into the underlying theoretical assumptions of Professor Grabowicz's rejection of "the differentiation, and, necessarily, evaluation of nations according to superior and inferior, historical and non-historical, complete and incomplete." Grabowicz charges Dmytro Čyževs'kyj with "evolutionist thinking" derived from nineteenth-century anthropologists (Grabowicz mentions Morgan, Taylor, and Bachofen) "who shared the basic premise that all human cultures follow the same path and pass through the same stages in their cultural evolution" (p. 512). Evolutionism leads to the establishment of an arbitrary hierarchy in which nations are ranked according to how far they have advanced along the path of universal progress. In contrast, Grabowicz, apparently influenced by modern structural anthropology, recommends that each culture be comprehended "as a functioning whole" (p. 512). Being a whole, a nation and its culture, including literature, by definition cannot be incomplete. According to Grabowicz, Čyževs'kyj's evolutionism and his application of universal — in fact, West European — standards to the history of Ukrainian literature causes him to slight "the uniquely Ukrainian 'substance'" (p. 509).

I am no apologist for unilineal, universal evolutionary schemes which tend to blur the specific character of historical epochs, nations, and cultures. I think, however, that Grabowicz's holistic approach contains the danger of an opposite fallacy: it exaggerates the uniqueness of nations to the point where they begin to appear as isolated, autarchic monads. It is painful to find a scholar of Professor Grabowicz's erudition and sophistication in the compromising proximity of "the ethnocentric, parochial and ahistorical perspective" against which he himself inveighs in a different context (p. 506). I share Grabowicz's conviction that each nation possesses a unique "substance" (character, essence, or quality). But I know of no other way to define this unique substance than by the use of comparative methods. It is not that one nation should serve as a "yardstick" for another, but that nations must be matched against each other. The cognitive work of the historian is here grounded in the reality of the historical process itself. History means a constant confrontation, interaction, and interprenetration of communities and cultures. The uniqueness of a nation actualizes itself through this very process.

There remains one last question which is related to the problem of the completeness and incompleteness of nations. This question possesses considerable theoretical interest and, in the case of the Ukraine, great practical relevance. Grabowicz states: "When some classes or groups disappear or are 'lost' there occur changes in internal make-up, in institutions, in social stratification, but the nation does not therefore die or become incomplete" (p. 510). I wish I could share Professor Grabowicz's optimism. But a nation is an articulate community of consciousness and will, not just an aggregate of individuals who happen to share a common language and certain ethnic traits. In past ages, when the carrier of national self-consciousness was a representative class, that class's disappearance — through physical destruction or a loss of nerve — indeed amounted to "the death of a nation." What remained was an amorphous ethnic mass, at best an incomplete nation. Such national decapitation occurred twice in Ukrainian history, each time followed by a rebirth: the first in the seventeenth century and the second in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Of course, modern nations have become democratized, extending in principle to the whole people. This broadening of the social base makes the "death" of modern nations unlikely, short of actual genocide. But the Ukrainian case has some unusual features. Owing to the repressive policies of tsarist autocracy, the process of what can be called "primary nation-building" was much delayed in the Ukraine. It made great strides during the Revolution and the 1920s, but it was never carried through to completion. In fact, the process of nation-building was checked and partly reversed during the quarter of a century of Stalin's rule. It is debatable whether the Ukraine even today can be considered a complete nation — and here I refer to more than the absence of political independence.[12] As I have

[12] In 1977, the Soviet Ukrainian dissident Iurii Badz'o wrote in an open letter: "Owing

argued elsewhere, the present masters of the Ukraine seem determined to perpetuate this condition of national incompleteness.[13] I point to this fateful problem, but its full discussion transcends the limits of the discussion set out here.

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to the circumstances of our history, the process of the national consolidation of our people still remains unfinished. . . . As a legacy of the Russian Empire, we received a disorganized national organism. Our national rebirth did not have the opportunity to establish itself firmly." "Iurii Badz'o hovoryt': 'Pravo zhyty,'" *Svoboda* (Jersey City, N.J.), 1 September 1979, p. 4.

[13] Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi, "Rusyfikatsiia chy malorosiianizatsiia?," *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies,* no. 4 (Spring 1978), pp. 78–84.

Some Further Observations on "Non-historical" Nations and "Incomplete" Literatures: A Reply

GEORGE G. GRABOWICZ

Professor Rudnytsky's observations are surely welcome, especially in view of the rather melancholy fact (reminiscent, in a sense, of the lack of any truly adequate discussion of Čyževs'kyj's *History* during his lifetime) that this is the first substantive response to my critique.* That the dialogue is joined by a historian and not a literary scholar determines, of course, the focus of these observations; it may also be taken as a further comment on the relative degree of activity in these two fields. The problem that has been broached, however, pertains to both history and literary history, and, even apart from its immanent intellectual content, deserves attention and elucidation, simply because it is there. Whether it stems from Čyževs'kyj's formulations or not, it has become a presence (or, as I will argue, a stumbling block) both in scholarly and in general discussions of Ukrainian literature and history.

I shall be as direct as Professor Rudnytsky. Despite a number of interesting and valid points, his main argument leaves me entirely unpersuaded: whatever its hypostases — complete/incomplete, historical/non-historical, or superior/inferior — this binary and by necessity categorical distinction is not, to my mind, a "legitimate," i.e., productive tool or category for either historical or literary-historical analysis.

As so often, the initial problem here is one of definition — and undoubtedly Professor Rudnytsky, like all who have studied the matter, is quite aware that the idea of "nation" has been and to some extent still remains ambiguous. (That naming or defining a phenomenon does not grasp its "essence," as Popper cautions us, points to a further, epistemological problem. For the moment, however, we can hold it in abeyance.) "Nation" in western, e.g., American usage, is often used synonymously with "country" or "state" (viz. "The United Nations"); conversely, it is also taken to mean "the people," i.e.,

* "Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 4 (December 1978): 407–523. An emended separate edition has appeared in the Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (Cambridge, 1981).

as equivalent to *narod.* Between the poles of the political (and ultimately statist) and the ethnic definition, there is a middle position according to which nation is understood as a large socio-cultural collective defined by a *set* of essential features which both distinguish it from lower level collectives like tribes or ethnic groups and at the same time establish continuity with them. Such a model approach to the definition of nation is found, for example, in Anthony D. Smith's sociological study, *Theories of Nationalism,* which deals with "nationalism" and by extension, "nation," too, in a global framework and over the whole course of human history. Smith proposes seven defining features: (1) cultural differentiae (which would include language), (2) territorial contiguity and mobility, (3) large size, (4) external relations, (5) in-group sentiment and loyalty, (6) citizenship rights, i.e., a degree of politization, and (7) economic integration.[1] The first two features, along with a common kinship network, define a "tribe." The first five define an "ethnie" or ethnic group. All seven define the "nation proper." What is most important perhaps is that they are given not as a prescriptive or stipulative definition, but as a model; commensurately with his non-normative, heuristic approach, Smith often refers to groups that are "commonly accepted as nations," apart from their correlation with this set of defining features.

Professor Rudnytsky should not be faulted, perhaps, for not elaborating his own model-definition of "nation"; his focus, after all, is the narrower problem of "historical" and "non-historical" nations. But in the absence of such a definition, and thus also with the implication that the meaning of "nation" is somehow self-evident and unambiguous (rather than being, as I would hold, polysemous and often amorphous and thus precisely requiring a pluralistic, model approach), his argument runs the risk of reductiveness and oversimplification. A concrete example of how the unilinear approach leads to such oversimplification is shown by Rudnytsky's readiness to predicate a fundamental difference between nations (i.e., between "complete" and "incomplete," "historical" and non-historical") on the basis of *one,* albeit ostensibly essential feature — the presence of a "representative upper class as the carrier of political consciousness and 'high' culture" (p. 363). If we do perceive a difference between, say, the Polish and the Ukrainian nations at a given historical juncture — and I certainly do, although not in the terms chosen by Rudnytsky — that difference surely involves more than the presence or absence of a "representative upper class"; it necessarily involves a host of other features or factors that reflect that totality of the given group's social and political structure, historical experiences, traditions, the culture in general. In a word, as long as we are talking about nothing less than nations as such — and the binary terms under consideration do precisely that — the treatment

[1] See Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York, 1972), pp. 186–89; cf. also the entire chapter on "Definitions," pp. 153–91.

must be holistic. To do otherwise, to isolate one moment out of the continuous fabric that is the life of large human collectives and to claim that it is sufficient to define, or, more precisely, to specify the very mode of existence of that collective is to be reductive. To my mind, this is not a heuristic device or procedure, but a distortion. In the same way, the concepts defended by Rudnytsky substitute, I think, an ostensibly universal, but actually schematic and abstract criterion (or value) for what should be a holistic, or, at the very least, multifaceted analytical approach.

The concept of "historical" vs. "non-historical" nations is indeed the natural starting point. (The notions of complete/incomplete, superior/inferior are only its further expansion and simplification.) The theoretical father of the historical/non-historical dichotomy is Hegel, of course. In saying that "the formula 'incomplete nation' seems to echo Herderian distinctions between 'historical' and 'non-historical' nations or peoples" (p. 510), I am guilty of a certain ellipsis, but I do not feel that the statement is altogether in error. The terms, to be sure, and the grand theoretical superstructure are Hegel's, but the act of distinguishing between nations or peoples on the basis of a unique spirit (*Volksgeist*) for each is clearly Herderian.[2] It was Herder who, for example, saw the Slavs as basically peaceful and idyllic and the Germans as warlike,[3] and it was precisely such "poetic" impressions-generalizations that were subsequently systematized in Hegel's metaphysics of history. My concern in that passing comment was not with the content of the distinction (i.e., that Herder apotheized the *Volk* and Hegel the State), but with the fact and the invidious consequences of making that kind of distinction. On that ground, too, I find it quite reasonable to say, as I did, that such distinctions "received their crudest expression in the racial hierarchy of a Gobineau." But, in fact, our concern is not with the paternity of the concept or its more or less bizarre offsprings, but with the concept itself. And here I find it passing strange that Rudnytsky gives such short shrift to its theoretical underpinnings: Hegel is mentioned only in passing, and Engels, who applied Hegel's ideas in a concrete historical and political analysis, is merely dismissed for misusing this concept "for polemical and propagandistic purposes." In fact, Rudnytsky seems to take "the legal and administrative practice of the Habsburg Empire" as a form of validation of the concept — and to this argumentation from praxis I hope to return. But the theoretical, intellectual basis for this distinction certainly deserves some attention.

[2] "In strict Herderian terms, Hegel saw religion, as well as morality and art, as a manifestation of the people's spirit (*Volksgeist*). Every people has its own *Volksgeist,* incorporating a unity of life which is peculiar to it. . . . Following Herder's 'Christianity and the National Religions,' Hegel stated that every people has its own specific sociocultural institutions corresponding to its national character." Shlomo Avineri, "Hegel and Nationalism," in *Hegel's Political Philosophy,* ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1970), pp. 116–17.

[3] See Konrad Bittner, *Herders Geschichtsphilosophie und die Slawen* (Reichenberg, 1929).

For Hegel — and this he stresses *expressis verbis* at both the opening and the conclusion of his *Philosophy of History* — world history is nothing less than a theodicy, a justification of the ways of God to man.[4] At the same time, "The history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom."[5] The stages of this progress, and thus "the natural division of Universal History," are provided for Hegel by man's three major civilizations: the Oriental, "which knew that only *one* man [i.e., the despot] is free"; the Greek and Roman, which "knew only that *some* men are free — not man as such"; and the Germanic nations, who, "under the influence of Christianity, were the first to attain the consciousness that man as man is free."[6] This is the dialectic of specific *Volksgeister* that realizes Reason in History (i.e., God's design). The culminating expression of this march of Reason in History is the state; it is the "hieroglyph of reason." Or, in his famous formulation from the *Philosophy of Right,* "Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, daß der Staat ist."[7] From this it must follow that those peoples or nations that do not establish a state are without history, they are "history-less" or "non-historical" (and, in fact, are not very different from "wild nations").[8] In view of the universalist, essentialist, and radically idealist nature of Hegel's philosophy of history, it is not at all surprising that he pays scant attention to the concrete and specific features and the actual histories of the "history-less" peoples: for him they are quite simply on the periphery, or indeed beyond the bounds of history, as he

4 Thus: "Our mode of treating the subject [i.e., Universal History] is, in this aspect a theodicaea — a justification of the ways of God — . . . So that the ill that is found in the World may be comprehended." And: "That the History of the World, with all the changing scenes which its annals present, is this process of development and the realization of Spirit — this is the true *Theodicaea,* the justification of God in History." Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History,* trans. J. Sibree (New York, 1900), pp. 15 and 457.

5 Hegel, *Philosophy of History,* p. 18.

6 Hegel, *Philosophy of History,* pp. 18–19. In using "Germanic" I am following Avineri's reasoning: "Hegel," he notes, "termed the last phase of historical development *die germanische Welt* (The Germanic World) and not *die deutsche Welt* (The German World). . . . The term "Germanic" is, in the German usage, always used to connote a cultural sphere, and had no political implications . . ." ("Hegel and Nationalism," p. 130).

7 Acording to Kaufman and Avineri the correct translation of this sentence should be "It is the way of God in the world that there should be [literally, is] the state." "What Hegel meant to say," continues Avineri, "was not that the state is the 'March of God' on earth or anything of this nature, but that the very existence of the state is part of a divine strategy, not a merely human arbitrary artifact." Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge, 1972), p. 177.

8 "In dem Dasein eines *Volkes* ist der substantielle Zweck, ein Staat zu sein und als solcher sich zu erhalten; ein Volk ohne Staatsbildung — (eine *Nation* als solche) hat eigentlich keine Geschichte, wie die Völker vor ihrer Staatsbildung existierten und andere noch jetzt als wilde Nationen existieren." Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830)* (Hamburg, 1959), p. 428.

defines it. His references to them are few and far between, and when compared to the attention that the *Philosophy of History* devotes to the "truly historical" nations (in effect, *Volksgeister*: the Oriental, the Greco-Roman, the Germanic) they show themselves to be schematic and simplistic in the extreme.[9]

Hegel's philosophy, especially of history and the state, has been the subject of multifarious attacks and rebuttals to such attacks. He has been accused of abetting political reaction and justifying and inspiring totalitarianism of both right and left;[10] he has been charged with arrogant ethnocentrism;[11] more persuasively — for it strikes at the heart of his intellectual validity, his philosophical method — he has been accused of subverting and denying history itself.[12] What is incontrovertible, however, is that his philosophy of history, like his *Phenomenology of Spirit,* is wholly metaphysical. It is, as he himself maintains, a purely speculative philosophy; both the objects and the tools of its inquiry are pure essences and pure ideas.[13] In this endeavor, while empirical

[9] For example: "The *Slavonic nations* were *agricultural.* This condition of life brings with it the relation of lord and serf. In agriculture the agency of nature predominates; human industry and subjective activity are on the whole less brought into play in this department of labor than elsewhere. The Slavs therefore did not attain so quickly or readily as other nations the fundamental sense of pure individuality — the consciousness of Universality — that which we designated above as 'political power,' and could not share the benefits of dawning freedom"; *Philosophy of History,* p. 420. Or, even more pointedly: "This entire body of peoples [the Slavs] remains excluded from our consideration, because hitherto it has not appeared as an independent element in the series of phases that Reason has assumed in the World. Whether it will do so hereafter, is a question that does not concern us here; for in History we have to do with the Past"; ibid., p. 350.

[10] See especially Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (London, 1945), and Kaufmann's rebuttal in *Hegel's Political Philosophy.*

[11] Herzen is reputed to have joked that according to the Hegelians, God is now living in Berlin; see Roman Rosdolsky, *Zur nationalen Frage: Friedrich Engels und das Problem der "geschichtslosen" Völker* (Berlin, 1979), p. 168. The problem may be partially terminological: see fn. 6, above. At the same time Avineri is an apologist for Hegel, and he does underestimate his ethnocentrism.

[12] That is, by Benedetto Croce: "the only facts which, in his [Hegel's] opinion, are valuable for history are those which represent the movement of spirit or the history of the state. All the particular facts that remain are a superfluous mass which, when faithfully collected, only oppress and obscure the objects worthy of history; the essential characteristic of the spirit and of the times is always contained in great events. . . . Whoever meditates these words will find in them most plainly the pernicious distinction between two kinds of facts, between historical facts and non-historical facts, essential facts and unessential facts, which has often since reappeared among the disciples of Hegel." *What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel* (London, 1915), pp. 145–46.

[13] Thus he says at the beginning of the *Philosophy of History*: "It must be observed at the outset, that the phenomenon we investigate — Universal History — belongs to the realm of Spirit." Or: "It is a result of speculative Philosophy that Freedom is the sole Truth of Spirit." Or: "Spirit is self-contained existence." Pp. 16–17; cf. also the "Introduction," pp. 16–27 and passim.

data may be used for illustration, it is decidedly secondary, and, as Croce demonstrates, can be dispensed with altogether. A full awareness of this could forestall many misunderstandings.[14] It would also make clear that any constituent syllogism (and the whole question of "geschichtslose Völker" in general, or of the Slavs in particular, is for Hegel a minor issue, often not much more than an aside) is meaningful only within — and is only as valid as — the whole of his metaphysics. Outside of this system, where history is no longer defined as the progressive self-realization, the growing self-consciousness of the Spirit (Freedom), which, by Divine design, is meant to culminate in a state, the idea of a "non-historical nation" is meaningless.[15] The very phrase is indeed a *prima facie* contradiction in terms. Rudnytsky's rather cursory attempt to justify the theoretical-logical meaningfulness of this construction (p. 361) fails on both the formal and the factual side: (1) The whole discussion is precisely about nations, not "primitive" tribes or ethnic groups (let alone about collectives of social insects). If a given group merits consideration as a nation, then, by virtue of being a nation — and a sense of community and self-consciousness as a community is a factor in anyone's working definition of "nation" — it must be "historical." If it is not historical (in this sense), then it is not a nation, but a "lower" formation, like a tribe or ethnic group. All nations, in short, are historical in that, according to Rudnytsky's own criterion, they are communities that have achieved self-consciousness. (2) The factual problem is that this feature, as any social scientist would state, characterizes not only nations but ethnic groups and tribes, as well: they all have a highly developed self-consciousness and a sense of their separateness and specificity, and in fact, the more "primitive" the group, the more finely tuned it is (thus various primitive groups, e.g., the Yanoamo of the Amazon jungle, consider only themselves to be people, all others being "non-people"). What is at issue, on the one hand, is not self-consciousness, but the means and the modality of preserving and transmitting it, or, most simply, the difference between oral and written documentation, or between the use of mythical or rational modes of cognition. On the other hand, it is a matter not so much of self-consciousness as of identification with the largest unit, the nation. Such identification, as a rule, is least developed and appears last among the peasantry, and therefore any group, like the Ukrainians in the nineteenth century, which is largely com-

[14] As Avineri argues: "on no account can Hegel's theory be so constructed as to refer to any existing state; it is the *idea* of the state with which Hegel is dealing and any existing state cannot be anything but a mere approximation to the idea." *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State,* p. 177.

[15] The very term *Volk* (which can be taken to mean "people" or "nation") is determinate only within the system of the theory: "Being a people means being organized in a political framework — this is the principle by which *Volk* is defined, here [1796 essays on the Christian Religion] as well as in Hegel's later political writings. . . . Later Hegel wrote about a Prussian *Volk* or a Bavarian *Volk,* etc., because those *states* did exist." Avineri, "Hegel and Nationalism," p. 120.

prised of peasants could be said to lack it. But this is very much a relative thing: a similar lack of national identity (or "self-consciousness") can be found among the peasants of Poland or Russia — and yet one would hardly think to call the Poles or Russians "non-historical" nations. The question of nationhood and the development of modern nations is most complex, and I certainly do not presume to resolve these complexities here. I think it is clear, however, that Rudnytsky's first, logical-theoretical justification of the formulation "non-historical nation" on the grounds of a given group's "self-consciousness" remains loose and contradictory.

The second "specialized" and "technical meaning" of this notion, which Rudnytsky places "in the context of East European and Balkan history," is plainly derived from Hegel's legacy. It is a derivation based on a profound misreading of his thought, however. The "polemical and propagandistic" misuses and abuses of the concept of "geschichtslose Völker" to which Rudnytsky alludes, should be seen not as the exception, but as the rule; distortions and vulgarizations become inevitable when that concept (which, as I have noted, is basically a minor point within a large and ramified theory) is wrenched from its idealist and metaphysical framework and passed off as an "objective," putatively empirical judgment. Here we have a striking confusion of two very different modes of thought. The confusion becomes particularly noxious when socio-political ("revolutionary") prescriptions and prognoses are stirred in. Thus Engels's judgment on the year 1848 in the Austrian empire:

> Among all these nations and nationalities in Austria there are only three which are bearers of progress, which have participated actively in history, which are still capable of living — the Germans, the Poles, the Magyars. Therefore they are now revolutionary.
>
> All the other national groups, great and small, have first of all the mission to perish in the revolutionary world tempest. Thus they are now counterrevolutionary.

And further:

> The general war which will . . . break out will shatter this Slav separatist association and will destroy all these small bullheaded nations.
>
> The next world war will not only make reactionary classes and dynasties, but whole reactionary peoples . . . [to] perish from the earth. And this is progress, too.[16]

[16] Cited in Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848–1918,* 2 vols. (New York, 1977), 2: 44–45. For the Ukrainian Marxist Roman Rosdolsky, an explanation (and exculpation) of this stance is a major task of his book on Engels and the nationalities question. It is interesting to see, however, that he prefaces the formulation of the problem with a categorical rejection of the validity of the theory: "Die Theorie der 'geschichtlichen' und 'geschichtslosen' Völker ist allerdings seit langsam tot, und niemandem (insbesondere keinem Marxisten) würde es mehr einfallen, sie wieder beleben zu wollen. Worauf es

In the course of his discussion Rudnytsky buttresses his argument by referring to Robert Kann's classification of the peoples of Austria-Hungary into "national groups with independent national history" and "national groups without independent national history."[17] To me, this hardly supports Rudnytsky's position: the difference between the two formulations, far from being merely terminological or a case of different labels, is, in fact, profound. For on the one hand there is a formulation (historical/non-historical) which is loose, entirely open to various interpretations (depending on one's understanding of history), implicitly evaluative (and connoting "imperialist" and ethnocentric attitudes) and carrying the indelible trace of Hegel's metaphysics, and, on the other, a formulation which, if somewhat more cumbersome, is more or less objective and empirical.[18] Hugh Seton-Watson's distinction between "old continuous nations" and "new nations," while not without some potential for misinterpretation, also resembles Kann's in its implicit focus on such relatively concrete matters as political existence. It hardly needs elaborating that the two approaches which are manifested in the respective terminologies are not equally scientific. The difference between saying "non-historical nation," on the one hand, and some variant of "national group without independent national history" or "national group without memories of statehood,"[19] on the other, is, it seems to me, much like the difference between those earlier anthropologists (up to the time of Malinowski) who still spoke of certain peoples as "primitive" or "savage," and more modern ones who speak of such societies only in concrete terms, i.e., of social structure, kinship relations, levels of technology, etc. Unless the historian, including the literary historian, actually intends to engage in speculative philosophizing, he would certainly be better served by concepts and terms that are unambiguous and truly objective.

The case for the terminology — and behind it the concept — that Rudnytsky favors is also not made by falling back on the political understanding and practice of the given time, in this instance, that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (pp. 361–62). For here, surely, we can and ought to discern a difference between the way a certain phenomenon was perceived by given individuals in a given time and place, and the actual phenomenon that we can now begin to perceive with all the benefits of scholarly advances and historical perspective. We certainly should not be obliged to follow the conceptual and terminological lead of Austro-Hungarian bureaucrats, statesmen, or publicists; the consensus of the great powers in the Treaty of Vienna, or of

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heute allein ankommen kann, ist zu erklären, wie ein materialischer Denker vom Range eines Engels diese theorie vertreten konnte?" *Zur nationalen Frage,* p. 122.

17 See Kann, *Multinational Empire,* 1: 43–67.

18 Kann is not entirely consistent: he does refer to "nations without history," with or without quotation marks, but his final, working formulation seems to be "nationalities without independent national political history" (*Multinational Empire,* 1: 46).

19 See Smith, *Theories of Nationalism,* p. 202.

nineteenth-century European public opinion, does not, in and of itself, validate a *theoretical concept*. To say that it does is to deny the empirical and logical underpinnings of such constructs. In short, if praxis and popular consensus were sufficient for theoretical validity, then any popular "myth" (such as of America's "manifest destiny"), or official dogma (say, concerning the alleged aesthetic superiority of Socialist Realism over any other creative method), or both popular and official misconception (e.g., the pre-Galilean conception of the solar system) would be true simply because enough people believed it or because an executive power was strong enough to enforce its views.

Although it has been implicit in my approach all along, I should perhaps state explicitly that, apart from matters of interpretation, I do not at all question the existence of concrete features and structures of social and political life that distinguish various peoples, for example, nineteenth-century Ukrainians and Poles. Among these features, the presence or absence of experiences and memories of independent statehood, different social stratification, different relative numbers and strengths of specific classes and economic groups (especially elites), and the different nature and efficacy of various institutions all loom very large. I do not doubt in the least that they determined a given national profile or "character" and indelibly affected the nature of national movements. In this context, too, I am ready to accept Rudnytsky's distinction between the fate of the Czech elite and those of the French, Russian, and Chinese nations (pp. 363–64). I demur, however, at the charge of confusing the two cases: my point in parenthetically listing these examples was not to suggest equivalence between them (I am sure there are serious differences between the latter three, as well), but simply to argue against the notion that a "loss" of elites or ruling classes made for "incomplete" nations. At any rate, to my admittedly circumscribed knowledge, no historian has called any of these nations incomplete. I shall presently return to Professor Rudnytsky's description of the Czechs "as a borderline case between the non-historical and historical nations of Eastern Europe." I am not in a position to judge the accuracy of his assertion that after 1620 "the Czech nationality found itself reduced to the peasantry and the lower social strata in the towns."[20] As it concerns the Ukrainian case, however, I find his definition of "non-historical nations" as those which "had lost (or had never possessed) a representative [upper?] class, and were reduced to an inarticulate popular mass, with little if any national consciousness and with a culture of predominantly folk character" (p. 363) to be grossly oversimplified and overstated. It resembles nothing so much as the caricature — "chłop i pop" — that was casually bandied about by political opponents of the Ukrainian and, *mutatis*

[20] When compared to Kann (*Multinational Empire*, 1: 152–57) this appears to be too categorical.

mutandis, other national movements.[21] This is doubly unfortunate because, I am sure, not only would Professor Rudnytsky resent such a caricature, but he himself is more than qualified to debunk it. As far as the question of elites or upper classes is concerned (I confess I do not quite understand the modifier "representative" — is it meant to signify political commitment to autonomy or independence? purity of ethnic origins? linguistic practice? a certain proportionality with respect to the total demographic mass of the group?), it is quite clear that in the first half of the nineteenth century, for example, precisely this milieu provided the men who created and supported Ukrainian cultural and intellectual life. The outstanding Ukrainian historians, philologists, and academics (e.g., Bantyš-Kamens'kyj, Bodjans'kyj, Markovyč, Maksymovyč), supporters and funders of individual projects or entire institutions (Karazyn, Parpura, Martos, Halahan), and, of course, virtually all the Ukrainian writers of this period (from Kotljarevs'kyj to Kvitka and Hrebinka and then to Kostomarov and Kuliš) were all from the gentry class (largely middle and petty, but occasionally also of the upper ranks).[22] Hulak-Artemovs'kyj, who was born into a priest's family, later advanced to the highest ranks of government service and status. The major apparent exception — Ševčenko — really serves to prove the rule: although born a peasant and serf, he entered the life — indeed, the "inner sanctum" — of the cultural elite and numbered among his supporters and admirers the highest strata of Ukrainian (and Russian) society — the Repnins, the de Bal'mens, the Lazarevs'kyjs, Bilozers'kyjs, etc. In the western, i.e., Austro-Hungarian Ukraine, the functions of an elite were largely performed by the clergy, and from this stratum of society were recruited the writers and activists of the national reawakening (e.g., the so-called *Rus'ka trijcja*).

How does one reconcile these facts with Rudnytsky's claim that the Ukrainians, as a "non-historical" nation, "had lost (or had never possessed) a representative class, and . . . were reduced to an inarticulate popular mass, with little if any national consciousness . . ."? How, in short, can such a definition arise if the historian, in Rudnytsky's own words, is concerned with "empirical historical reality" (p. 363). Other than assuming that Rudnytsky is talking only about the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary (which is no answer, because the issue is the whole, albeit benighted, nation, and because even the Galicians had their "elite" — the clergy, who were not altogether inarticulate), and other than assuming that he is only considering a short and particularly uncreative period, perhaps in the eighteenth century (which is also no answer,

[21] Cf., for example, Kann on some German reactions to Czech national aspirations: *Multinational Empire,* 1: 153–54.

[22] See Pavlo Fylypovyč's "Social'ne oblyččja ukrains'koho čytača 30–40 rr. XIX viku," in his *Literatura* (New York, 1971), pp. 110–80. Although this article focuses on the readership of Ukrainian literature in this period, it also throws light on the "production side."

because the discussion implicitly focuses on long periods and particularly on the nineteenth century, where the issue of national consciousness can be discussed with confidence), we must conclude that the sticking point is indeed the question of "representativeness" and, even more so, of political consciousness. In effect, political consciousness and power is made into *the* criterion for determining degree and quality of nationhood, and the state (as is so apparent from Rudnytsky's discussion of nineteenth-century Poland, pp. 362–63) remains the ultimate yardstick.

The reductiveness and fallacy of this unadmitted shift (with "class," "articulateness" and finally "national consciousness" apprehended only through the prism of political efficacy) becomes most apparent in the concluding notion of "a culture of predominantly folk character." Though this formulation may seem plausible to some (in view, for example, of such phenomena as the *kotljarevščyna* of the early nineteenth century, the surface *narodnist'* of Ševčenko, the populism of the later nineteenth century, the middle class fashion for folk artifacts of the present, and so on), it arises from some basic misunderstandings. Quite simply, in all civilized societies, folk or "low" culture exists side-by-side with "high" culture; the two are parallel, but distinct. In civilized societies the folk culture is by definition a subset of the overall "high" culture. As a result of fashion or ideology the latter may be fascinated by or concerned with the former (e.g., the *kotljarevščyna* or *xlopomanija*), but it is neither coextensive with it nor *determined* by it. If Rudnytsky's argument is meant *quantitatively,* then it is merely tautologous: since the majority of Ukrainians at that time were peasants, then their "folk" culture would be "predominant." But then the same would have to be said of Polish or Russian culture, where the peasantry was also numerically predominant. If the argument is intended (as it clearly seems to be) as a *qualitative* judgment, i.e., on the *nature* of Ukrainian culture, then he is plainly suggesting (the term "predominantly" prevents it from being altogether categorical) that the Ukrainians (like all "non-historical" nations) were not so much a nation as a tribe — for it is precisely a definition of a tribe that it has no "high" or "low" culture, but one "folk" culture.[23] The bridge between historical and political analysis must be precarious indeed if one can so easily slip into such conclusions.

For all the manifest flaws, and its legacy of misconstructions, the concept of "historical" and "non-historical" nations did originally have — in Hegel's philosophy — a theoretical basis. In contrast, the notion of the completeness/incompleteness of nations — and literatures, in particular — has nothing to recommend it: no theory, no logic, no empirical verifiability, no heuristic

[23] Matters are not helped, of course, when the great majority of the émigré community persistently identifies "Ukrainian" culture with "folk" culture.

usefulness, and, prior to these observations, no articulate exposition. It appears, to paraphrase a well-known line, as a specter haunting Ukrainian studies, or, more precisely perhaps, some Ukrainian scholars. To my mind, it is at most a feeling or an impression masquerading as an objective analytical judgment.

My objections to this notion were spelled out at some length in "Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature" (pp. 509–12). In brief, I see this criterion as implicitly normative and evaluative, theoretically vague, inevitably impressionistic in application, and suggesting a static rather than dynamic sense of society and culture and, within that, of literature. In connection with Professor Rudnytsky's observations, however, I would add one or two more points. The first really recapitulates what was said above: The notion of an "incomplete" nation or literature is based on bad logic in that it confuses the question of the very mode of existence of a group, the nation, with certain qualities or the manner of functioning not so much of the group as a whole as of its constituent parts. For one cannot say that the Ukrainian group had no elite alongside its peasant mass, but only that that *elite* was, for example, less numerous or less politically active than that of a neighboring group. In this regard the concept of a "plebeian" nation is also fallacious, and of potential interest to the scholar only as a reflection of the populist premises and, generally, of the perceptions of a given age. Since we are talking about a large, many-leveled, complex, and above all open-ended collective and system (and not something on the order of a baseball team or a marching band which, indeed, becomes incomplete if the pitcher or the tuba player misses the bus), the very notion of incompleteness is spurious. The system compensates for and adjusts to various circumstances; it is a dynamic, not a static, entity. If the group lacks the structures and dynamics that an agreed-upon model of "nation" calls for, then it is more logical and intellectually more honest to say that it is *not* a nation but some "lower" formation, like ethnic group or tribe, rather than to muddle through with an imprecise and contradictory compromise of a term.

The notion of "incompleteness," as I had noted in my critique, is all but explicitly evaluative. To my considerable surprise, Professor Rudnytsky actually accepts this evaluative component and, indeed, argues for the validity of speaking about "superior" and "inferior" nations. In so doing he gives final, and, to me, incontrovertible proof of the ongoing confusion in his observations between the group, the nation, as a totality and its individual components, their features and their (again specifically political) actions. The difference between the two is fundamental: "nation" is for all practical purposes an idea, an abstraction, to be grasped conceptually and theoretically and, preferably, to be analyzed in terms of a model; it not only cannot be evaluated (that would make as much sense as saying that men are better than women, or — the traditional — that apples are better than oranges), but one cannot speak of it —other than metaphorically — as an agent or a subject of activity, for

clearly it is specific individuals who act, and not the nation as a whole. The components or strata of the nation can in turn be discussed more concretely, if only because they constitute a relatively closed and objectively definable collective (membership in the szlachta, for example, was largely clear-cut in legal, if not in economic terms), although here, too, there is room for ambiguity. Confusing the two can lead not only to logical absurdity (the idea of an incomplete open-ended system), but also to morally repugnant popular conceptions or delusions, such as that of collective guilt, or, indeed, of a master race. I again insist that the example of Gobineau is pertinent: the readiness to extrapolate from individuals and circumscribed sub-groups to the whole nation, in its totality, and the willingness to countenance distinctions in terms of superior and inferior (and for all his interesting concluding comments on the relative strengths and weaknesses of given societies, Professor Rudnytsky still apparently believes that one can speak of superior and inferior *nations* rather than of more or less successful social or political processes, for example) demonstrates, to my satisfaction, at least, that such thinking not only can lead but very likely will lead — in the praxis of the unsophisticated or of demagogues — to racism and to national and cultural stereotypes.

To be sure, the idea of a nation's incompleteness and inferiority can also provide us with a certain diversion. If completeness/incompleteness, or superiority/inferiority is to be understood as an analytical tool with general applicability, then we should be able to establish a scale, even a hierarchy of complete and superior nations. By all indications the English, the most western of the Europeans, would be the most complete and superior nation. The Germans, especially in Hegel's opinion, would be superior to the Poles — although the Poles, I suspect, would dispute this. The Czechs are more incomplete than the Poles (i.e., a borderline historical nation, according to Professor Rudnytsky) but less incomplete than the Ukrainians. If we were to cast a glance further east we would probably conclude that the Kazakhs, for example, are even more inferior (less complete, more non-historical). And what about the Irish? But this is ultimately a depressing exercise. It is also somewhat depressing to contemplate that in a time when it is no longer proper, but indeed considered insulting, to speak of "underdeveloped" rather than "developing" nations, when no social scientist would think of evaluating or ranking nations or cultures, an attempt is made to revive concepts (and terms) as outmoded, intellectually problematical, and potentially misleading as these. Finally, we can only speculate as to why the notion of incompleteness is treated seriously by a number of Ukrainian scholars — and, to my knowledge, only by them. Is it a reaction to political trauma and the threatened state of Ukrainian political and cultural existence in the Soviet Union? Is it a form of compensation for the irresponsible and megalomaniacal treatments of Ukrainian history and culture in some quarters

of the émigré community? The dynamics and issues in question probably go far beyond the scope of this discussion.

My concluding remarks on the role of these concepts in literary history will be much briefer, largely because this is a narrower case of the overall theoretical problem, and also because I have already dilated on them in my critique. In this connection I should note that in the course of reexamining the Hegelian roots of this question, one can also discover the great extent to which Čyževs'kyj himself was influenced by that philosophy. Apart from the obvious fact that he was the author of a major study on Hegel in Russia, and the editor of another important work on Hegel among the Slavs,[24] it is also evident that his thinking in the *History of Ukrainian Literature* is profoundly Hegelian. Its primary manifestations are, on the one hand, his idealistic and monistic understanding of literary history, whereby an idea (albeit a complex and highly ramified one, like "the Renaissance" or "the Baroque") and a *style* that *externalizes* that idea are made the natural and all but exclusive focal point of his investigation; on the other hand, his sense of an ongoing dialectic of ideas-styles (Renaissance versus Baroque, Classicism versus Romanticism) is also Hegelian. Although Čyževs'kyj cannot, obviously, postulate a final synthesis, that is, the ultimate literary style (or idea) with which literary history would culminate, he does borrow Hegel's notion of a closed (if not necessarily teleological) system. For Čyževs'kyj the indicators and determinants of the completeness, the "full development," of the system are the various genres that literature can and should possess, *and* the presence of a "full complement" of social strata that are to be the producers and consumers of literature.

Professor Rudnytsky's observations on literary history can be grouped, as I see it, around three main points. The first of these is the question of cultural context. Before addressing it, I must note that Rudnytsky's recapitulation of my position is not entirely accurate: in two important matters he tends to set up straw men which can then easily be knocked down. The first concerns the difference between the West European and a generally European model of literary history. In the relevant passage (p. 511) I speak twice of Čyževs'kyj's continuing tendency to postulate a model or scheme of literary periodization and genres that is implicitly or, as with the "Biedermeier" period, explicitly drawn on West European literatures. Rudnytsky, however, speaks of "other European literatures" in general and suggests that I deny the relevance of that context for Ukrainian literary history. Had Čyževs'kyj's model actually been synthesized from a broad spectrum of European litera-

[24] See his *Gegel' v Rossii* (Paris, 1939), and *Hegel bei den Slaven,* ed. Dmitrij Tschiżewskij (Bad Homburg vor der Höhe, 1961). The latter — a second edition — includes not only Čyževs'kyj's original, long article (later the book) on Hegel in Russia, but also his study of Hegel among the Slovaks.

tures, including the "peripheries" (Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Scandinavian countries, and so on), I would have had little to object to, for the model would necessarily have been more flexible and tentative — indeed, it would have been a model, not a rigid schema. I would, and do still, however, object to a prescriptive and normative application of such a model, where an *absence* becomes seen as an "incompleteness." What is at issue is a heuristic device, not a yardstick. The second miscontruction or misunderstanding concerns the example of oriental literatures, which was chosen to illustrate my thesis "that every literature is a complete system, to be judged on its own terms and in its proper cultural context." It was not a suggestion that Ukrainian literature is closer to Turkish literature than it is to French, or that "the relationship of Ukrainian literature to other European literatures" is "the same as that of Turkish, Persian, or Chinese literature."

At any rate, Rudnytsky's basic argument that "the Ukraine is undeniably a member of the European cultural community" is properly qualified by his own subsequent words — "albeit a somewhat marginal one" (p. 359). It is precisely this "marginality," or, as I would prefer, "cultural specificity" that must be a central concern for the historian of Ukrainian literature. It is more than clear, for example, that the Ukraine's culture and thus its history, too, differs significantly from that of neighboring Poland, let alone England or France. The legacy of Eastern, Byzantine Christianity,[25] the absence of the experience of the Renaissance and of Humanism, the fact of centuries-long existence on the crossroads of East (both Muscovite and Islamic) and West impart a peculiar cast to Ukrainian culture. "To apply to Ukrainian literature," as Rudnytsky advises, "the common European standards and criteria" without cognizance of such differences — in effect, without having demonstrated that they are in fact, and not merely presumably, common — is to produce the kinds of distortions that I anatomized at some length in my critique.[26]

The second point — the desideratum of a comparative approach — is directly related to the first. The answer to it is as straightforward as it is self-evident: comparisons are valuable and valid only if the phenomena being compared are in fact comparable; otherwise the exercise is as sterile and obfuscatory as the above noted ranking of nations. The quotation from the interwar critic and essayist Myxajlo Rudnyc'kyj (Mykhailo Rudnyts'kyi) that Rudnytsky adduces to buttress his argument is interesting and valuable in its own right, but beside the point in this context. Myxajlo Rudnyc'kyj's statement is the call of a critic and publicist, made to a Galician reading public that was largely provincial and, above all, subverted in its tastes by a perfervid politization of literature, to perceive and respect aesthetic and intellectual

[25] See especially O. Zilyns'kyj's "Duxova heneza peršoho ukrajins'koho vidrodžennja," *Steži* (Innsbruck-Munich), 1, no. 7/8 (on cover: 7/10) (1946–47): 6–20.
[26] I refer the reader especially to the section on "Classicism," pp. 463–83.

values. Need it be said that a critic or writer agitating (in the best sense of the word) for cosmopolitan tastes and literary sophistication is different from the literary scholar or historian whose prime obligation is to describe, analyze, and synthesize?

Let us be rudimentary for a moment. What can one legitimately compare? One can compare aesthetic objects, that is, literary works — but again, provided that they are somehow commensurate. It is quite instructive to compare a Romantic *poèma* by Byron with one by Puškin or Ševčenko, but it is usually hardly to the point to compare across genres, for example, an epic and a lyrical poem. In turn, comparison that involves valuation can be quite problematical: while Ševčenko's *Hajdamaky* is surely a better work than Goszczyński's *Zamek kaniowski,* can one say that *Evgenij Onegin* is better than *Pan Tadeusz*? While most critics who are qualified to judge would probably agree that Tolstoy is better than Prus, and Prus better than Myrnyj, few would care to make such comparisons. Indeed, even comparing commensurate, that is, demonstrably good (or great) writers *within one literary tradition* is a risky business. Northrop Frye, for example, is biting in his estimation of the

> casual, sentimental, and prejudiced value-judgements, and all the literary chit-chat which makes the reputation of poets boom and crash in an imaginary stock exchange. That wealthy investor Mr. Eliot, after dumping Milton on the market, is now buying him again; Donne has probably reached his peak and will begin to taper off; Tennyson may be in for a slight flutter but the Shelley stocks are still bearish.[27]

Comparing periods in different literatures, if done at all, is done in terms of breadth and complexity (e.g., by saying that Polish Romanticism is "more developed" than Ukrainian or indeed Russian Romanticism) and not with any claim for establishing intrinsic value or the superiority of one over the other. Apart, perhaps, from agreeing that there are "major" and "minor" literatures, scholars generally do not indulge in the comparative evaluation of whole literatures, precisely because the factors are so many and complex and the conclusions so contingent. This exercise is best left to publicists.

The third and final point that I perceive here centers around Rudnytsky's comments on the actual manifestations of the "incompleteness" of Ukrainian literary history. Following Čyževs'kyj's lead he sees this as most pronounced in the period of Classicism (although he does not exempt the nineteenth century, either). Part of my answer to this is contained in the

[27] Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (New York, 1966), p. 18. And in general it may be worthwhile to recall the aphorism used by Herder for stressing the specificity and uniqueness of cultural phenomena and especially the pointlessness of measuring them against some absolute standard: "Shakespeare was no Sophocles, Milton no Homer, Bolingbroke no Pericles" (*Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit,* Bk. 13, chap. 7).

relevant section of "Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature" and I again refer the reader to it. There is another point to be made, however. It is simply to remind ourselves that like "nation," "national literature" is a mental construct, an abstraction, or, more precisely, a historiographic formula. It is not a thing. To say that the "missing features [of Ukrainian literature] have been, so to say, transplanted to neighboring literatures" (this, you see, is when "the incompleteness of a literature becomes particularly glaring"; p. 359), is to indulge in a radical form of reification. With such a formulation one is tempted to visualize a ("potentially" or "incompletely"?) Ukrainian writer depriving Ukrainian literature of what should rightfully belong to it by ("disloyally"?) sending off his odes, epics, or other works in the "high" genres to Moscow or St. Petersburg to be deposited, "for all time," in Russian literature. And the writers one would have to include here are not only Bogdanovič, Gnedič, Kapnist, Narežnyj and later Gogol', but also Kotljarevs'kyj, Kvitka, Hrebinka, Ševčenko, Kuliš, and indeed virtually all the Ukrainian writers in the Russian Empire in the first half, or the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, all of whom also wrote in Russian. (An analogous situation obtains in western Ukraine with those who wrote in Ukrainian and Polish.)

There are two basic errors in such a reading of Ukrainian cultural and literary history. One involves reification and *idealization,* the two really being opposite sides of the same coin. Despite the Romantic and sentimental images ("national treasure," "repository of national wisdom," and so on) that we may have become so accustomed to, a given literature is not a bank account with a clearly specified owner, or a party with an unambigous platform: it is a process and a system. As such it is complex, often ambiguous, and hardly apprehensible, except in historical perspective. While any literature possesses various universal features and structures, it is — in its specificity — an emanation and reflection of a particular culture. For this reason its concrete manifestations are predicated on cultural readiness and on the needs of the group. To speak here of "missing features," as Rudnytsky also does with regard to the absence of a medieval epic tradition in Czech literature, is to suggest that literature is (and should be) written according to some universal, ideal prescriptions. As we see from the examples of Hanka and Čyževs'kyj, some literary scholars do believe this, but literary history, and especially the psychology of literary creativity, argues for a different dynamics; the writer-scholar who writes to fulfill a universal or "European" norm or "slot" (Kuliš comes readily to mind) is plainly the exception. In short, if some "features" — in effect, genres — are "missing," it is not that "history had denied them" to a given nation, as Rudnytsky argues, but simply that there was no cultural readiness or need for them. Otherwise, how is one to understand this phenomenon of "denial"? Was there a ban or ukaz in the medieval Czech lands against creating epic poetry?

Late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Ukrainian literature presents

another problem, namely, that of bilingualism. Rudnytsky's total disregard of this issue (even though, as I am at pains to show in my critique of Čyževs'kyj, it is intimately tied to the question of alleged incompleteness) is the second error I see in his reasoning. The presence of bilingualism in much of Ukrainian literature is manifest, and need not be elaborated here.[28] The problem facing the scholar, which I can now only state and not elaborate, is to formulate the implications of this fact for Ukrainian literary history. The main implication, as I see it, is that the concept of Ukranian literature conveys two distinct meanings: on the one hand, traditionally, of the literature written in Ukrainian (after 1798 in the vernacular); on the other, of the literature expressing the broad range of Ukrainian culture. Since in the period in question Ukrainian society in the Russian Empire was bilingual, its literature was in part also written in Russian. Russian, in short, was an imperial *lingua franca,* and recourse to it, whether due to conventions of genre or other reasons, whether by the author of the *Istorija Rusov* or Ševčenko, did not make the author or his work any less Ukrainian. Since the historiographic formula for national literatures has so long been determined almost exclusively by the criterion of language, with almost all works written in Russian automatically consigned to Russian (national, not imperial) literature, there is a clear need for reevaluation. Such a reevaluation may also serve to challenge the factual side of the claim made by Čyževs'kyj, and repeated by Rudnytsky, that Ukrainian literature lost works or whole genres to Russian literature. Certainly Ukrainian history focuses on the political or economic activity of the elite; none but the radical populist would exclude it from the model of "the Ukrainian nation." By the same token its literary activity, such as it was, also deserves to be considered — even if, or precisely because, the works in question became part of a supra-national, imperial literature. In practical terms, I think it much more important for a future history of Ukrainian literature to deal with the broad gamut of Russian-language but nonetheless Ukrainian works than it is to focus on such non-existent periods as the "Biedermeier."[29] I should stress, however, that my argument against the notion of incompleteness is not at all contingent on the idea of such a "recovery of lost ground." To be sure, a fuller picture will result, and a future history of Ukrainian literature will have more works and authors to deal with, but the basis of the argument against the notion of incompleteness remains theoretical and conceptual.

[28] See "Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature," pp. 520–522. See also my "The History of Polish-Ukrainian Literary Relations: A Literary and Cultural Perspective," in *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present,* ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton, 1980), pp. 107–131.

[29] An indication of the dimensions of this literature is given in V. Sypovs'kyj's massive *Ukrajina v rosijs'komu pys'menstvi* (Kiev, 1928). Despite its size the study is limited to one period (1801–1850). Clearly, not everything that is discussed by Sypovs'kyj is to be recategorized as belonging to Ukrainian literature: the new criteria, the historiographic formula, is a task for the future.

The final point to be faced here concerns precisely that which remains impervious to theory, that is, perceptions, expectations, and a frustrating sense of "something missing." This, as I already suggested in my discussion of Čyževs'kyj,[30] is often the real core of the argument about incompleteness. Rudnytsky's formulation of this is as follows: "What determines the completeness or incompleteness of a literature is not the presence or absence of certain features, but rather whether a literature can satisfy all the essential cultural needs of its own society during a given historical period" (p. 360). Apart from tending to unverifiability (how does one determine the degree of satisfaction if not by focusing on concrete features, like genres?), the definition defines itself out of any historical validity. For the simple truth of the matter is that by all indications, no civilized society is self-sufficient or "complete" in the manner postulated here: they all borrow, imitate, translate or read in the original the products of other literatures. Only in a "primitive" society — a tribe, for example — are *all* the essential needs met by the native (most likely oral) literature. If anything, the example Rudnytsky adduces in the very next sentence, that of the putative completeness of Kievan literature, is valid only to the extent that it suggests the extremely narrow social base of that (written) literature, a literature almost exclusively by and for the clergy, or rather the literate among them. However, Kievan literature, too, cannot be called incomplete, since other, specifically oral genres served to fill out cultural needs.[31] In a period closer to us, say, the nineteenth century, there are numerous examples not only of borrowings, imitations, and translations, but of various strata of given societies satisfying their literary needs by reading foreign literatures —viz. the fashion for French romances in Poland and Russia in the first decades of the nineteenth century. In general one can say that while some strata are satisfied by the native production, others, surely, are not. The latter, of course, includes the intellectual elite who are, almost by definition, international in their literary tastes and needs. To be sure, different emphases and different profiles obtain in different societies. Their examination is the task of the sociology of literature, especially the recently popular studies of literary reception. To this end, however, the reductive and evaluative thesis (it is certainly not a model) of the completeness or incompleteness of literatures can make no real contribution.

One must also guard, it seems to me, against a form of what literary critics call the imitative fallacy. In this context this would be allowing various writers and participants in the literary process, be it Maksymovyč, Kuliš, or Nečuj-Levyc'kyj, to determine by their attitudes and opinions our strategy of conceptualization and analysis.[32] (As Roman Jakobson is reputed to have said

[30] See "Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature," pp. 504 and 510.
[31] See "Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature," p. 512.
[32] It may be shown, for example, that not only Metlyns'kyj (cf. his poem "Smert' bandurysta"), but at one point even Kuliš (in his *Mixajlo Čarnyšenko*) spoke of the

to the proposal of giving Vladimir Nabokov a chair in literature at Harvard, "The elephant is a great beast, but for that we do not make him the keeper of the zoo.") Their roles, their works and opinions, are material for analysis, not a methodological prescription.

As I would hope my comments make clear, the model and strategy for dealing with Ukrainian literary history must do justice to the complexity of the subject. A number of intrinsic and extrinsic relationships must be considered. For this reason any artificial isolation, any sense of nations as "isolated, autarchic monads," which Rudnytsky somehow sees in my approach but which I do not see there at all, would be out of place. I also hardly need to be persuaded that a comparative perspective — which is basically lacking in Čyževskyj's *History* — is in order. Such a perspective, however, has, to my mind, nothing to do with the "matching" — in effect, evaluating and grading — of nations and literatures that Rudnytsky is apparently committed to. And while I do not presume to foretell the political future of the Ukraine, I am confident that the history of Ukrainian literature that is still to be written will not be haunted by the specter of incompleteness.

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Ukrainian language (and literature) as dying. Not only did it not die, it was not near dying: the rather hyperbolic metaphor was used to refer to a period of dramatic change — which in fact turned out to be a rebirth. As regards the letter of Maksymovyč to Zubryc'kyj (which I cite and discuss on p. 497 of the critique), it must be noted that Rudnytsky's rendition of it (p. 360) involves an insertion of the word "complete," in square brackets. In point of fact, Maksymovyč is explicitly saying that the existing works in Ukrainian *do not constitute,* to his mind, a *literature,* be it "complete" or "incomplete." It is the task of the scholar to analyze this statement and put it in a larger framework — and not to lead the "witness."

REVIEWS

Doctoral Dissertations on Ukrainian Topics in English Prepared during the Years 1928–1978. By *Bohdan S. Wynar.* With the assistance of *Susan C. Holte.* Englewood, Colo.: Ukrainian Research Foundation, Inc., 1980. $3.50 (U.S.), $4.50 (elsewhere).

The Ukrainian American Index: The Ukrainian Weekly 1978 and 1979. By *Christine L. (Gehrt) Wynar.* Englewood, Colo.: Ukrainian Research Foundation, Inc., 1979 and 1980. $6.00 and $9.50 (U.S.), $7.00 and $12.50 (elsewhere).

Since 1974 an important function of the Ukrainian Research Foundation, Inc., has been to operate a Reference and Information Center that collects, organizes, and disseminates information on current events relating to Ukrainians and Ukrainian Americans. In addition to the two items under review here, Christine Wynar has also published *Ukrainian Children's Literature in North America* (Ukrainian Foundation, Inc., 1979, $3.00) and is compiling the forthcoming *Ukrainian American Index: Ukrainian Art Digest Index, 1963–1979.* Tatianna Gajecky and Bohdan S. Wynar are due to publish *Ukraine: Book Printing and Publishing, Bibliography, and Libraries.* Besides these works, a "critically annotated bibliography of scholarly works pertaining to all aspects of Ukrainian culture"* is being prepared, under the title *Bibliography of Books on Ukraine in English,* as is a volume of documents on Ukrainian history from Kievan Rus' to the present day, in English translation. These publications by the Ukrainian Research Foundation will undoubtedly be very useful to researchers, librarians, and students.

Bohdan Wynar's compilation of doctoral dissertations originally appeared in the *Ukrainian Historian* (vol. 16 [1979], pp. 108–127). Nonetheless, serious students of Ukrainian studies will certainly welcome its availability as a separate pamphlet. Here errors in previous dissertation lists have been corrected. Wynar has arranged the titles broadly, by subject. The chart at the end shows that the greatest number of studies have been in history, politics, and international relations, with literature and drama, linguistics, and the church and religion following, in that order. Some dissertations completed in 1978 are not cited, however, in spite of the title; perhaps the compilation should have

* *The Ukrainian American Index: The Ukrainian Weekly 1978,* p. iii.

concluded with works completed in 1977. By all means, an author index should have been included.

Concerned about the declining number of doctoral dissertations on Ukrainian topics, Wynar points out significant gaps and proposes areas for further research. This should be most helpful to those considering work in the Ukrainian field. One of the compilers' conclusions is to note a characteristic tendency in Ukrainian studies to avoid "sensitive (and consequently more demanding) topics" (p. 112).

In the preface to the *Ukrainian American Index: The Ukrainian Weekly*, Christine Gehrt Wynar succinctly summarizes the history of the major Ukrainian newspapers in the United States. She then presents her reasons for indexing the *Ukrainian Weekly* and discusses the scope in coverage of the index, as well as the mechanics of filing, spelling, cross referencing, and so on. The 1979 index has the notice that since the *Ukrainian Weekly* will no longer be available as part of *Svoboda*, the major daily Ukrainian language newspaper in the U.S., the project of indexing will be suspended until a source of funding can be found. Since the compiler herself notes that other newspapers need indexes and that retrospective years need attention, funding might better be sought for complete titles. Also, since newspaper indexing is very time-consuming, use of a computer might be explored. The publications announced as forthcoming indicate that the *Ukrainian American Index* is intended to be a series, with the *Ukrainian Art Digest* due to be published next.

Indexes can be valuable aids to scholars, students, librarians, and the community in general, so one must hope that these projects continue. However, coordinating the efforts and resources of the various Ukrainian research centers and professional organizations would undoubtedly produce more comprehensive and exact research tools.

One note of caution to bibliographers and cataloguers — the index volume for 1979 of the *Ukrainian Weekly* has "1980" on the cover; the title page is correct, however. The compiler's name appears as Christine L. Wynar on the 1978 index and as Christine Gehrt Wynar on the 1979 index.

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THE POLITICS OF RURAL RUSSIA: 1905–1914. Edited by *Leopold H. Haimson*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979. 309 pp. $19.50.

The subject of this collection of articles is the political resurrection of the

Russian nobility from 1905 to 1914. The editor, Leopold H. Haimson, provides a historical frame of reference for the essays, and articulates three themes taken up by the authors. In the introductory article, "The Russian Nobility and the System of the Third of June," he elaborates the collection's main theme — increase in the nobility's electoral weight within the constitutional state apparatus after the electoral laws were changed upon the dissolution of the Second Duma. One of the book's faults is the repetitive discussion of the tsarist electoral system; there is little real disagreement among the authors about the system's effect in ensuring the ascendancy of the nobility.

The effect of noble domination of the constitutional state is considered in Alexandra Korros's "The Landed Nobility, The State Council, and P. A. Stolypin" and in "What Was the United Nobility?," by Roberta Thompson Manning and Geoffrey A. Hosking. Korros describes how noble circles within the post–1907 state controlled the formation of policy. She identifies the limited range of noble aspirations, and shows how this, together with the preponderance of the nobility within the upper house of the bicameral tsarist legislature, hampered Stolypin's attempts to modernize. The article by Manning and Hosking complements Korros's since it explores the unofficial channels of power and forms of organization used by the nobility in this period. It also relates how the nobility regrouped after 1905 to regain control over the marshals of the nobility and to elect conservative deputies to the zemstvos, and how their activity was coordinated through the congress of the "United Nobility."

The second theme is that the goals of the nobles were unique in form and antagonistic in substance to the aims of other social groups in tsarist Russia. Haimson's introductory article focuses on the clash of interests between the urban and rural elites — that is, between the bureaucracy and the nobility. It is pointed out that in this confrontation the nobility became increasingly dependent on the state, even while attempting to limit state activities and claiming to be independent. The concluding article by Haimson, "Observations on the Politics of the Russian Countryside, 1905–1914," dwells on noble antagonism to the peasantry. The nobles' conception of peasant docility and simplicity led them to blame peasant discontent on the zemstvo intelligentsia and other radical goups, and hence led to their failure to meet the real challenge posed by the peasantry.

In "Zemstvos and Revolution: The Onset of the Gentry Reaction, 1905–1907," Roberta Thompson Manning takes up Haimson's contention that the nobles' hostility was aimed at the demand for social transformation articulated within the zemstvos. She shows that the liberal movement, and its Kadet successors, failed to hold noble support because of its organizational form and program, which called for land reforms that threatened the nobility's very existence. The nobles' support for liberalism was a reaction to the disasters of the Russo-Japanese war, and the concepts of social transformation and political organization were actually alien to them.

The nobles' difficulties in adapting to 1905 are also examined in Michael C. Brainerd's "The Octobrists and the Gentry, 1905–1907: Leaders and Followers?" and in Robert Edelman's "The Election to the Third Duma: The Roots of the Nationalist Party." Both the Octobrist and Nationalist parties were less threatening in substance than the Kadet; yet only the unique circumstances of the nobility's existence in the Ukraine and Belorussia allowed the Nationalist party to become an urban political party. Edelman shows that cohesion in the Nationalist ranks was facilitated by competition between Russian and Polish nobles, the lack of zemstvos, and the frequency of nobiliar residence in Kiev. Brainerd's examination of the strength of noble support for the Octobrist party concludes that the Octobrists lacked party discipline, a party program, and a rural party organization, and thus relied on the force of personality. Even so, the Octobrist program remained more acceptable to the nobility than did the Kadet.

Noble disaffection with so-called political strategies, such as Octobrism, receives the attention of Ruth Delia MacNaughtan and Roberta Thompson Manning in "The Crisis of the Third of June System and Political Trends in the Zemstvos, 1907–1914." Their examination of the noble deputies to the zemstvos emphasizes the futility of linking noble politics to parties or partisan points of view.

Noble antipathy to the other rural group — the peasantry — should have received more attention in the collection. In the only article focusing on this group, "The Russian Peasantry and the Elections to the Fourth State Duma," Eugene D. Vinogradoff examines the decline of peasant political activity prior to World War I and its effect on the election of peasant deputies. Vinogradoff also investigates the effect of regional and class differences among the peasantry on the election of peasant deputies, and the effect of declining peasant activism on noble political perceptions.

The third and final theme — the role of noble political culture — lacks authority at times because, with the exception of Vinogradoff's and Edelman's articles, the social and regional differences within tsarist Russia are ignored. On the whole, however, there is sufficient analysis of political culture, and the gamut of the nobility's political activity is reviewed. The editor can be commended for unifying the authors' themes and summarizing their major points.

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DIE LIGA DER FREMDVÖLKER RUSSLANDS, 1916–1918. By *Seppo Zetterberg*. Studia Historica veröffentlicht von der Finnischen Historischen Gesellschaft. Helsinki, 1978. 279 pp.

During World War I, both the French and German foreign offices established an institutional framework for dealing with the multinational Russian Empire. The German Foreign Office attempted to enhance the war effort against Russia by organizing Russia's national minorities into a league which would draw attention to their grievances. This organization, the League of the Foreign Peoples of Russia, was intended to weaken Russia internally by coordinating the nationalist aspirations of Poles, Finns, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Jews, and Georgians, as well as of the Baltic and Moslem nationalities. Dr. Seppo Zetterberg, who teaches East European history at the University of Helsinki, has written a comprehensive study of this organization. The edition under review here is the study's translation into German.

The league itself is an elusive subject. Coordinated from Berlin, it operated through the German embassy in Bern and the private apartment in Stockholm of a Finn, Dr. Herman Gummerus. (Zetterberg's most important research was done in the files of the German Foreign Office and in the diaries and papers of Dr. Gummerus.) The Lausanne Nationalities Conference in June 1916 marked the only "full meeting" of the league's rather ambiguous membership, but at that meeting the league itself had to remain invisible in order to lend an appearance of spontaneity to the delegates' anti-Russian speeches. The activity of the league was also shortlived; it both began and peaked in 1916, with the Lausanne Conference and a public appeal to Woodrow Wilson.

Zetterberg gives the impression that the league was more a collection of individuals than an organization of nationalities. Its most important members were Dr. Gummerus, the German Lithuanian Baron Friedrich von der Ropp, and the Lithuanian Juozas Gabrys. Other important figures were the Ukrainians Volodymyr Stepankivs'kyj and Dmytro Dontsov, the Estonian socialist Aleksander Kesküla, and the Polish monarchist Michał Łempicki. These men were for the most part émigrés, and during the war it was difficult to ascertain to what extent they actually "represented" their nationalities. After the Russian Revolution in 1917, the league was dealt a severe blow when it turned out that most of its members had few contacts and little support in their homelands. The bulk of the national populations seemed to prefer autonomy within Russia to the "independence" sponsored by Germany. The league's unrepresentativeness is almost amusingly characterized by its search for a Latvian member. The "Groupe Letton en Suisse" was founded on paper without a single Latvian, and when actual Latvian groups protested, Ropp began to hunt frantically for "irgendwelche lettische Unterschriften" (p. 94). Gummerus's diary records "fruitless attempts to seek out

Latvians" (p. 95). Since the men in the League were, for the most part, acting as individuals —be it as double agents, eccentrics, or diplomatic free agents — Zetterberg might have done well to discuss their personalities and characters more fully.

The league was weakened by antagonism between members. Some of the disagreements were in matters reflecting personal style, for instance, the quarrel between Ropp and Dontsov over whether the league's bulletin should be scholarly (Dontsov) or sensational (Ropp). Others were more specifically national: Lithuanian distrust of the Poles, Latvian and Estonian hostility towards the Baltic Germans. Zetterberg draws attention to problems stemming from the hierarchy of national development. For instance, the Finns were unwilling to link their vigorous claim to full independence to the newer and weaker national aspirations of the Belorussians; for this reason, the signatures of the Belorussians were omitted from the league's letter to Woodrow Wilson.

Almost all of the members of the league were suspicious of their sponsor, Germany. Their suspicions were not unreasonable, since Ludendorff, never very enthusiastic about the league, intended to annex much of Poland and the Baltic lands. The league's German advocates, however, favored a *Dekompositionspolitik* against Russia and the establishment of East European *Pufferstaaten* between Germany and Russia. (Ironically, this conception closely resembles the *cordon sanitaire* which the French later favored as a means to contain Germany.) However, the German Foreign Office, cautious in its exploitation of nationalist aspirations, drew back from organizing a broader *Weltliga,* which would have included anti-British peoples such as the Egyptians and the Irish, but would also have risked drawing more attention to the nationalities of Austria-Hungary.

Zetterberg's discussion of Stepankivs'kyj and Dontsov is of particular interest for Ukrainian history. Stepankivs'kyj, depicted as the more important during this period, immediately appreciated the full complexity of wartime national opportunities. In 1915 he reached an understanding with Gisbert Freiherr von Romberg, the German ambassador in Bern, and then settled in Switzerland, where he helped to create the league.

Stepankivs'kyj and the Lithuanian Gabrys worked together in planning the organization. However, after the actual founding of the league in 1916, Gabrys could not accept an official position without jeopardizing his influence as general secretary of the Paris-based Union of Nationalities. Thus, Stepankivs'kyj became chief of the league's all-important Bern office, which was soon loosely entangled with his own "Groupe Ukrainien en Suisse." Although officially he was only one of the league's seven vice-presidents, Stepankivs'kyj's role in the Bern office made him one of the leading powers in the league — so much so that the official president, the Pole Łempicki, resented what he saw as inappropriately great Ukrainian influence.

This influence was heightened when Dontsov came to Bern in 1916 to assist Stepankivs'kyj and edit the league's *Korrespondenzblatt.* Until that time, Dontsov had been in charge of the Ukrainian Press Bureau in Berlin, but, in keeping with the league's basic premise, it was felt that he could be more influential in a neutral country. The triangular relations between Stepankivs'kyj, Dontsov, and the German Foreign Office are intriguing and ambiguous. Zetterberg's evidence indicates that Dontsov was kept unaware of the financial backing behind his editorial project, which was almost completely German. Stepankivs'kyj, who had more direct financial dealings with the Germans, may also have been ignorant of the full extent of the German funding of the league. But Stepankivs'kyj was certainly more intricately involved than Dontsov, who, under attack from Ropp for being too "scholarly," soon resigned his editorial position. Instead of writing inflammatory propaganda, Dontsov preferred to collect historical documents in anticipation of a peace conference — a cautious approach somewhat ironic in light of his later activities.

Even though Stepankivs'kyj was more aware of German sponsorship, it would be simplistic to conclude that he was no more than a German agent. Stepankivs'kyj was initially valuable to the German Foreign Office because he had so many contacts in England and France. He insisted that the Lausanne Nationalities Conference be conducted in a spirit of friendliness towards the Entente. This, on the whole, followed German wishes; after all, the German Foreign Office did not want its agents to look like agents. However, by the end of the war, Stepankivs'kyj was almost certainly in touch with the British Foreign Office and probably was receiving British funds, as well. The Estonian Kesküla maintained that "Stepankivs'kyj wants to exploit political combinations and juggle the diplomats of all possible nations to play them off against one another" (p. 60).

It was this juggling, however, which may ultimately have undermined Stepankivs'kyj's influence in his homeland. When he finally returned to Kiev in 1918, it was impossible for him to play an important role because he was seen as an "international spy" (p. 255). Zetterberg concludes that "the role of a double agent had rendered him politically untrustworthy" (p. 229).

Since Germany lost the war, one can conclude that the nationalities were the real beneficiaries of the league's propaganda. However, the motivations of the league's members remain ambiguous. Zetterberg gives them the benefit of the doubt and asserts the sincerity of their patriotism, pointing out that very few realized the full extent of German financial sponsorship of the league. His book is actually dedicated to its protagonists: "Without the selfless activity of these men, the writing of this study would not have been possible" (p. 12).

This somewhat unconventional dedication reminds one that nationalism in Eastern Europe is by no means a dead issue. Almost all the nations represented in the league in 1916–1918 are subject to Soviet domination today. Zetterberg is sympathetic to their situation, and there is even a mild irony in

the fact that this Finnish study of German support for the East European nationalities was partially funded by a West German grant and then published in German. Zetterberg himself is a careful scholar, and he has provided a fascinating portrait of nationalist propaganda warfare in a time of world crisis.

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THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION. By *Roy A. Medvedev*. Translated by *George Saunders*. Foreword by *Harrison E. Salisbury*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. xxi, 240 pp. $15.95.

This book is more interesting for who wrote it, why it was written, and how it got published than for what it actually says. Roy Medvedev has the distinction of being the best-known Soviet dissident now residing elsewhere than in jail, exile, or emigration. The 55–year-old school teacher turned historian is the son of a Civil War hero, army officer, and party member who disappeared in the purges. Since the late 1960s he has published ten books, several in collaboration with his twin brother, Zhores, who now lives in London. None, however, has appeared in his native land. His best work, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (1971), cost him his party membership and subsequently his position at the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. For the last decade he has lived modestly in a fifth floor walk-up apartment on the northern outskirts of Moscow, apparently supported by his brother's remittance of royalties from the sale of their books in the West and by his wife's meager earnings as a doctor.

What is curious about Roy Medvedev is that, judging from the book under review, he continues to have ready access to Western scholarly literature, émigré accounts, and some unpublished Soviet materials. He also is allowed to meet with visiting Western scholars, to be interviewed by foreign correspondents, and to send his manuscripts abroad. (He was not allowed, however, to have his name placed by a dissident group on the ballot for the most recent election to the Supreme Soviet, and his family apparently has been subject to considerable harassment.)

There are a variety of explanations for Medvedev's continued productivity. He does not sign petitions, hold press conferences, or go out of his way to serve as a spokesman for dissident causes. It might also serve Soviet divisive purposes that he has on occasion attacked Solzhenitsyn and Ginzburg and has in turn been criticized by Sakharov for not being a more visible defender of the human rights movement. It is relevant that he does not write clandestinely; indeed, he has acknowledged that he sends first drafts of his works to the

Central Committee. It has also been suggested that he has liberal friends in high places in the party and police apparatus who approve of his version of "socialism with a human face" and welcome the questions which he is asking, as well as the option which he represents to the status quo. Perhaps the most cogent reason Medvedev has not suffered the fate of Solzhenitsyn or Sakharov, however, is that he remains a convinced Marxist, he is optimistic about the Soviet future, and he is an ardent defender both of Lenin and of the Bolshevik revolution. This is clearly evident in his most recent book.

The October Revolution is something of a disappointment. It is not, as its title and authorship might imply, a detailed revisionist account of the Bolshevik coup. Medvedev does not do for October what Burdzhalov has done for February. In fact, very little attention is paid to the events of the October Revolution, and nothing new is learned about them. The first half of the book is devoted to broader questions of a philosophical and dialectical nature concerning the inevitability of revolutions. The book concludes that the end of the autocracy in February was neither inevitable nor an accident. While it was the "result of historical laws," "the specific form its end took was by no means the only possible outcome." Medvedev attacks orthodox Soviet historians such as I. I. Mints for being "full of inaccuracies and distortions," but he nevertheless reflects the orthodox and questionable view that the Bolsheviks had a "widespread underground organization" which coordinated the strikes and demonstrations leading up to the tsar's abdication. One might agree with his philosophical arguments that the October Revolution was even less inevitable, that it was not premature given the conditions of 1917, and that Lenin's role in it was crucial. It is another matter, however, to accept Medvedev's contentions that Lenin "outlined a specific tactical plan for the insurrection" and that the Military Revolutionary Committee "worked out a plan of action that detailed the deployment of forces in the coming battle." Perhaps evidence for these assertions exists in the archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, but this evidence is not adduced in *The October Revolution.*

The second half of the book (and by far the more interesting) concerns the fate of the Soviet government during the first six months of 1918. Medvedev argues that Bolshevik "errors and miscalculations . . . brought Soviet power to the brink of disaster" by the summer of that year. It was a political miscalculation, he feels, to call and then to disband the Constituent Assembly; it would have been better to postpone the election by a month so as to profit from growing Left SR popularity among the peasantry and then to strengthen and broaden the coalitional nature of the government. Economic errors were even more serious. Medvedev goes further than many Western historians in attacking the utopian moves toward a moneyless economy, the hasty efforts to nationalize all small business, and especially the disastrous policies of requisitioning grain by detachments of urban workers and of breaking up kulak landholdings by committees of poor peasants. As a result of these questionable

economic decisions, the "masses turned away from the Bolsheviks" and were receptive to the appeals of Lenin's enemies during the Civil War. The proper policy, according to Medvedev, would have been to introduce a NEP-type program based on an open market system in the spring of 1918.

This is an interesting idea, especially coming from a Soviet historian, but it is also a misreading of Lenin's intentions and personality. He was in no mood in the aftermath of October and on the verge of supposed world revolution to make political and economic compromises or to alter his firmly held preconceptions. It took three years of Civil War, peasant revolt, urban strikes, and Kronstadt to bring him to that point. Medvedev has the habit of focusing on the Lenin of 1921–22 and then transposing that chastened and perhaps more humane individual back into earlier periods. He also projects the past into the present and in doing so gives purpose and relevance to his own historical investigations. One wonders if the inspiration for the present study does not in fact lie in its concluding paragraph:

> It is impossible not to recognize that all of the political and economic crises in our country during the past fifty years (the 1928–1932 crisis, the 1953–1954 crisis, and the 1963–1964 crisis, as well as certain recent indications of crisis) have been linked primarily with mistakes of one kind or another in agricultural policy. . . . This is why abundance in agricultural production still eludes us, why we have no surpluses of grain and meat. This is why we have to buy such surpluses from the capitalist countries. Of course the solution to our present economic problems cannot be what it was in Lenin's time. But it does not hurt to keep in mind certain aspects of NEP even today.

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THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF SOVIET RUSSIA. By *R. W. Davies.* Vol. 1: THE SOCIALIST OFFENSIVE: THE COLLECTIVIZATION OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE, 1929–1930. Vol. 2: THE SOVIET COLLECTIVE FARM, 1929–1930. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. vol. 1 —416 pp; vol. 2 — 178 pp. $35.00.

The titles under review here are the first two volumes of a projected five-or-six volume series that R. W. Davies has undertaken to write on the history of the Soviet economy during the 1930s. Both volumes cover the years 1929–1930. The first, dealing with the process of collectivization, is rigidly chronological; each chapter covers events that occurred over a period of several months. The second volume, on the structure of the collective farm, is organized topically. The several chapters deal with features of the collective farm system such as machine tractor stations and the size of the kolkhoz.

Within that structure, however, each topic is treated chronologically; for instance, the chapter on the size of the kolkhoz follows month by month the progress of the debates and events surrounding that issue.

The source materials are predominantly contemporaneous Soviet periodicals and monographs, which the author has studied with awesome thoroughness. The effect is to bring a certain immediacy to the text, so that the reader sometimes has the sense of actually living (or re-living) history. One is also made aware of the variety of opinions held and approaches tried in those years. This, indeed, is one of the major contributions of Davies's study. From the perspective of later years, it often seems as if the structure of the kolkhoz was cast in concrete from the outset. Davies describes, however, the extensive debates over such questions as whether kolkhoz members should be paid at a piece rate, on a "per-eater" basis, or on the "labor day" method that eventually triumphed. One is also struck by the scarce and erroneous data upon which such choices were finally made, as well as by the wishful thinking that entered into the decisions. The collective farm as it emerged in the mid-thirties was not the product of careful calculation, but of a great deal of accident, error, and revolutionary fervor. One can conjecture that had Stalin's grip not tightened as it did in later years, the extensive experimentation during 1929–1930 might have continued and eventually produced more effective structures and policies.

The subject treated in these volumes has received an enormous amount of scholarly interest and attention outside the USSR. It is surprising, therefore, that the text gives little attention to previous research. The author relies so thoroughly on contemporary sources that one could imagine the study was written in 1932, except that it (a) reflects the author's knowledge of the subsequent history of Soviet agriculture, and (b) uses Soviet archival materials published only after Stalin's death. The latter, however, do not offer major insights beyond those provided by the open publications of the time. Their chief contribution is to supplement the narrative with additional facts. For example, in the description of the operation of workers' brigades during the all-out collectivization drive early in 1930, Davies draws on archival materials relating to the work of the Tambov brigade. These add to the available data on the activities of the brigades, but on the whole confirm what is already known rather than provide new information. Perhaps the archives now published have been carefully screened, and some important unpublished materials still remain. In any case, the archival materials do not significantly add to the narrative. All the more remarkable, then, is the richness of the data that Davies found in the openly published works.

While the author does not discuss the relationship of his findings to those of other non-Soviet scholars, in the course of the narrative he does offer his own opinions and evaluations. They are offered, however, not as a polemic, but simply as his own assessment.

The two volumes present a clearly written, detailed narrative of two momentous years. They do not offer large reinterpretations, but they do convey a full sense of the uncertainty under which major decisions were made, and the variety of conflicting alternatives out of which the structure of Soviet agriculture emerged.

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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE USSR. By *Theodore H. Friedgut.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. 353 pp. $18.50.

This book is an exhaustive examination of participation as an aspect of the political system of the USSR. After the customary conceptual and historical introduction, Theodore Friedgut deals—rather too briefly, in my opinion—with the theoretical discussion of participation under "developed socialism." The overwhelming substantive concentration of the work is upon the formal representative system. Nearly one-fourth of the book is devoted to elections of the soviets and another fourth to the activities of these legislative bodies.

The author presents considerable new material on the crucial nomination process, suggesting, if not rigorously defining, circumstances in which a small minority of official candidates are rejected by their constituencies. His discussion of the role of elected deputies and the standing committees of the soviets is likewise well-informed. Nevertheless, he notes that the election campaigns, important as they are for legitimizing the general political system, are distinctly less significant than Party events like the Congresses. Less than one-fifth of Friedgut's book is devoted to other aspects of popular participation, such as village meetings, community service committees, comrades courts, and *druzhiny*, although he correctly notes the extraordinary numerical involvement of young Soviet citizens in this last organizational activity. The fact is that Western scholars of Soviet legal forms, the principal analysts of both *druzhiny* and comrades courts, have gone far beyond Friedgut in their penetrative analyses of this type of participation. Finally, he scarcely mentions certain types of very widespread participation in organizations like the Komsomol, the civil-military auxiliaries, and Knowledge Society lectures.

In other words, Friedgut, like most writers of first books on the USSR, is somewhat "trapped" within the institutional framework which provides initial access to the data that interests him. Within that framework, his conclusions are judicious, if rarely novel. He notes the value of "voluntary" activity as a support for the political system and as a means of reducing full-time official labor. Yet Friedgut correctly emphasizes that Party members, especially those whose executive posts

permit diversion of time to the soviets, become increasingly prominent as one ascends the organizational pyramid of "representative" institutions. American civic activity—where businessmen whose careers permit, and often demand, occasional preoccupation with "volunteer" duties tend to predominate—is not very different. Nor is the renewed Soviet recognition that a professionalized administration precludes rotation in significant offices startling by Western standards. What is different about Soviet practice is the extreme insistence on centralism and maintenance of control, as contrasted to the "localism" of volunteer activities which characterizes, at least superficially, civic service in the West.

Soviet centralization also permits a degree of virtual representation—i.e., legislative bodies mirroring the composition of the citizenry—which has rarely been matched even by the ethnically "balanced tickets" of American machine politics. Thus, Friedgut notes, women are heavily represented in soviet bodies in Central Asia, although largely excluded from other aspects of public life. Conversely, the representation of Jews has rapidly declined everywhere as anti-semitism has advanced. The author is right, nevertheless, to conclude that participation is broad, especially among Party members, although it is not always truly voluntary. He is also correct in asserting that there is a kind of mutual understanding between the activist who intrudes upon the private life of the citizen (e.g., in getting out the vote) and ordinary people who view participation as a ritual necessity. Friedgut concludes that such understanding minimizes the "cost" to the activist (whose time devoted to such activity is also rather slight); but some evidence suggests that, especially in the workplace, the activist does pay a price in interpersonal friction.

Conceptually, Friedgut's analysis is impressive, for he draws from a wide range of scholarly theory on mobilization and participation. He also advances numerous cogent comparisons with the West and some with East European practice outside the USSR. The work is not so innovative methodologically. The author necessarily relies on a wide-ranging, well-chosen survey of materials from the Soviet press. At points he effectively utilizes anecdotal material from Soviet émigrés to Israel, where he teaches. For example, he shows how a popular candidate who replaces a member of the official slate may incur severe reprisals even if named deputy. One would certainly prefer a more systematic, quantitative utilization of oral information, but perhaps this was not feasible.

Friedgut also profited from exchange study in the USSR in 1970, even being called upon to present a seminar on his preliminary findings. Frankly, though, I must conclude that this opportunity, valuable as it was, provides a clue to why an obviously well-prepared and incisive scholar devoted so much time to a topic where the pay-off is relatively low. This topic is, in fact, typical of those which political science candidates for exchange with the USSR have felt obliged to present, and which undoubtedly permit more access to Soviet informants than would more analytically significant themes. The price, in this instance, was the devotion of nearly a decade to a subject which, although handled very well, pro-

vides only a slight increment to our knowledge about the USSR's political system. From all indications, however, one can expect Dr. Friedgut to use this foundation and his keen analytic skills to provide far more searching analyses in the future.

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SOCIALIST POPULATION POLITICS: THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE. By *John F. Besemeres.* New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1980. xvi, 373 pp. $25.00.

Dr. Besemeres, who currently works in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in Canberra, is well acquainted with the problems discussed in this volume. He has spent five years in Eastern Europe investigating demographic trends and their political implications. That he must have had direct access to the original sources of information is evident from the voluminous notes and statistical material listed in the appendix, which comprises one-quarter (90 pages) of this impressive and well-researched study.

The author is more concerned with the politics of East European countries than with their policies, as he expressly states: "The emphasis in this study is placed on the political impact of demographic trends rather than the demographic impact of political decisions." Among other topics, he discusses the effects of population growth on labor supply, ethnic composition of each country, international relations, ideology, and population policies. While the author assesses these issues for all East European countries, he gives special consideration to three select models: the USSR (100 pages), Yugoslavia (90 pages), and Poland (40 pages). He is most familiar with the last two countries; the inclusion of the USSR was probably dictated by its importance as the oldest and strongest socialist partner. Although the focus on the three seems more or less opportune, it is successful, for the analyses complement each other well.

Recent population trends in Eastern Europe are characterized by a rapid decline in fertility, with a net reproduction rate of less than 1.0 in East Germany and Hungary and barely above 1.0 in other countries. This contrasts with past trends, which reflected intensive growth. The one exception is Albania, which maintains a very high birth rate.

The demographic decline that began fifteen to twenty years ago contributed to the disappearance of labor reserves and a shortage of manpower. The future sociopolitical effects of these changes are uncertain: according to the author, they may induce the liberalization of the socialist systems, such as "decentralization of decision making" or, alternatively, lead "to increasingly mercantilist population policies and to elaborate labor controls."

The present trends have caused the socialist countries to define their population policies: these are highly pronatalist in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and East Germany, relatively mild in Poland and the USSR, and neutral in Yugoslavia. The last country merits special consideration, since it is the only socialist state which allows emigration.

A substantial portion of the study is devoted to the racial and ethnic problems of the East European countries. In this regard, the USSR and Yugoslavia have much in common, for both have shown a progressive shift in population growth from the Slavic to the Muslim groups. While this does not threaten the political structure of the two states today, it may in years to come. Particularly important are geopolitical considerations regarding Turkestan in the USSR and the Kosovo region in Yugoslavia, which border on China and Albania, respectively.

Of special interest is the spectacular growth of population in Poland in the postwar years, which has altered the relationship among the neighboring countries. Poland's 35 million population, which is ethnically homogeneous, the author says, is rapidly catching up to the Ukraine's 50 million, which includes a considerable number of minorities. Poland, the author notes, has become twice as populous as East Germany, although it was only some 25 percent larger just after the war; its position vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia has also improved. Although this growth has tapered off in recent years, Poland's population follows the general trend in Eastern Europe. The author leaves certain questions unanswered. One of these is the supposed 99 percent Polish ethnic composition of Poland, a figure incompatible with the aggregate rate of growth. How could the 20 million ethnic Poles of pre-World War II Poland increase to 35 million in forty years, when the country suffered considerable war losses? The solution to the puzzle must be sought in the country's treatment of hidden minorities, which Dr. Besemeres was unable or unwilling to investigate.

Technically, the book is organized, written, and documented well. It could have been improved by demographic charts and graphs, such as population pyramids. Especially useful would have been geographic maps of Yugoslavia and the USSR identifying the ethnic regions, which would have saved the reader the inconvenience of frequent referrals to the political atlas. Also, the presentation of documentary and bibliographical material might have been improved. For instance, statistical tables could have substituted for the frequent numerical quotations in the text.

The bibliographical sources given under "Notes" are useful, but difficult to trace. Abbreviations placing "ibid." together with the author's name make identification of the appropriate reference virtually impossible. Important works are intermingled with insignificant newspaper articles when an alphabetically listed, select bibliography would undoubtedly have been preferable.

Apart from this criticism, the work by J. F. Besemeres is a worthwhile contribution to the study of population politics. It can be read profitably by both aca-

demicians and politicians, for it provides concrete information as well as a very interesting speculative prognosis.

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OKAJANNI ROKY: VID LUK"JANIVS'KOJI TJURMY DO VORKUTS'KOJI TRAHEDIJI (1935–1940). By *Hryhorii Kostiuk (Hryhorij Kostjuk)*. Toronto: Diyaloh, 1978. 165 pp. $6.00, paper.

In the history of the Soviet Ukraine, the era of the 1930s is the most unclear and the least studied. One of the best works written on the period is Hryhorii Kostiuk's *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine*, published in 1960. The work under review is a good supplement to the preceding one by this same author.

First, Kostiuk's memoir is lively, interesting, and impressive. His narrative is based on personal experiences and includes only facts that he himself witnessed or those told to him by reliable eyewitnesses. The author provides a firsthand account of the arrests, interrogations, and everyday life at the Luk"janivka prison in Kiev and at the Vorkuta labor camp.

In prison men sometimes have extraordinary encounters that would never occur on the outside. This was especially true in the Ukraine and the Soviet Union in the 1930s, when so many intellectuals, writers, and party activists were imprisoned. Kostiuk had the opportunity to discuss ideas with individuals whom otherwise he would probably never have met. His recollections of conversations with other political prisoners record the views of Trotskyists and national Communists about the revolution, the tenets of Ukrainian Communism and Stalinism, and the fate of prominent individuals.

The narrative published in this volume covers the time from Kostiuk's arrest in Kiev in November 1935 to the mass executions at Vorkuta in 1938. One section is devoted to the prison hunger strike at the Vorkuta labor camp, which was the first mass political strike to occur in a Soviet penal institution. The story of the Vorkuta tragedy related by Kostiuk, an eyewitness, is perhaps the fullest available. The hunger strike's main initiators and organizers were imprisoned Trotskyists. The strike began in the last days of October 1936, and continued for 130 days, during which the 400 prisoners participating were isolated. The ultimate result of the protest was the execution in 1938 of 1,300 of 3,000 prisoners. In the early 1950s the Vorkuta labor camp again became a center of protest, forming a virtual "Vorkuta tradition" in the Soviet penal system.

The memoirs also provide interesting details about personalities of the 1920s and 1930s. In relating a conversation with Davyd Kopycja, Kostiuk mentions a

play by Kopycja about the famine of 1933; the play is mentioned nowhere else, so this is the first clue to the existence of the work. The information about the Chinese student Babao Lju Lju Šen, the former Borot'bist F. I. Piznjak, and the politician P. I. Bucenko is fascinating. Kostiuk also tells us, for instance, that Jevhen F. Hirčak, Skrypnyk's right-hand man and the author of the Ukrainization policy, lost the ability to speak and went insane.

This small book contains much valuable information. I hope that the remaining parts of Kostiuk's narrative will be published soon.

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THE UKRAINIAN TRANSLATIONS OF SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS: A STYLISTIC ANALYSIS. By *Orysia Prokopiw*. University of Ottawa Ukrainian Studies, vol. 2. Ottawa and Edmonton: University of Ottawa Press and Gateway Publishers, 1976. xii + 334 pp. $12.50, paper.

For ages poets and critics have been lamenting over the difficulties of translating poetry. Samuel Johnson's "poetry . . . cannot be translated" was echoed by Victor Hugo, who called the translation of poetry an "absurd, impossible" undertaking. Vladimir Nabokov envisaged translations in shades of "evil." Nonetheless, poetry is being translated and studies on the subject continue to appear. In this connection, Prokopiw's book should be welcomed by students of English translations of Slavic literature.

Prokopiw analyzes the Ukrainian translations of Shakespeare's sonnets by eleven poets, translations which were published from the 1880s into the 1960s. The poets are grouped as follows: (1) Ivan Franko and his contemporaries Pavlo Hrabovs'kyi and Maksym Slavins'kyi; (2) two poets in the Ukraine–Svyatoslav Karavansky (who emigrated to the United States in 1979) and Dmytro Palamarchuk; (3) six Ukrainian émigré poets—Vasyl Onufrienko, Yar Slavutych, Oleh Zuyevsky, Ihor Kostetsky, Ostap Tarnawsky, and Sviatoslav Hordynsky. "The author's objective is to ascertain the methods by which the translators treat [lexical and morphological] difficulties" (p. viii). Her "main purpose" is to "examine the translators' approaches toward the translating of the sonnets and their success in reflecting the original author" (pp. viii–ix).

The study evaluates the extent to which each translator was successful in conforming the structure of his version to that of the original. Hence, in chapter 2 the author first explains the structure of Shakespeare's sonnets, and then shows how each translator was able—or unable—to overcome difficulties associated with stanzaic form, rhyme scheme and endings, meter, logic, and syntactic and formal structures. In Prokopiw's view, Kostetsky, Zuyevsky, Hordynsky, and Onufrienko follow Shakespeare's structure most closely.

The ability to transfer the rhetorical figures of the original is said to constitute a test of the translator's overall competence. In chapter 3 Prokopiw first explains how Shakespeare uses a given rhetorical figure, and with what meaning. She then examines the difficulties which can arise in rendering such figures in Ukrainian. As an example, antanaclasis is a particularly difficult rhetorical figure for a translator to handle. Thus the wordplay on *for*, alternating between prepositional and conjunctive meanings, cannot, for lexical reasons, be reproduced in Ukrainian. Finally, the author analyzes in detail each translator's method of confronting the challenge and how it reflects on the overall quality of the translated sonnet. According to Prokopiw, Zuyevsky shows the most skill in rendering Shakespeare's rhetorical style.

Inasmuch as imagery is an important stylistic element in Shakespeare's poetry, Prokopiw devotes chapter 4 to this aspect of the translations. Indeed, as she rightly points out, a translator's inability to transfer Shakespeare's imagery will deprive the sonnet of the "content and spirit" of the original. She judges Franko to have been the most proficient at conveying Shakespearean imagery in Ukrainian.

Prokopiw's book is a very conscientious and methodical analysis of the Ukrainian translations of Shakespeare's sonnets. Undoubtedly she possesses a thorough knowledge of her subject. Her literal retranslation into English of the Ukrainian texts will be appreciated by those with a minimal command of Ukrainian. Nevertheless, a few blemishes mar an otherwise praiseworthy book. The introduction provides only the shortest summary of Ivan Franko's important "Deščo pro štuku perekladannja" (p. 9), which deals specifically with the translation of poetry. Moreover, the author merely mentions a detailed study of Franko's translations and three studies of Kostetsky's translations of Shakespeare's sonnets; a few words about these works would have been appropriate and useful.

In some instances Prokopiw's retranslations from Ukrainian into English are misleading or inaccurate. To cite but one example: "Moja ž Ljubov stupaje po zemli" (sonnet l. 12, p. 257) is rendered as "*Why* my Love . . . ," instead of the correct "*But* my Love . . . ," since *ž* is an intensifier here. The bibliography does not list M. S. Shapovalov's "Pro Frankovi pereklady Shekspira," although this important work is mentioned in the book (p. 8, fn. 21). The page numbering is faulty, for the blank pages between chapters are not included in the page count. For the benefit of the general reader, a brief biographical sketch of each translator should have been included. Finally, the style is, alas, one typical of doctoral dissertations—impersonal, formal, and choppy. Moreover Prokopiw has a tendency to repeat the same word(s), or derivatives thereof, at frequent intervals. In a few instances the text is difficult to understand at first reading.

The above shortcomings notwithstanding, Prokopiw's work has the merit of casting new light on Shakespeare's destiny in the Slavic world in general and in the Ukraine in particular. At the same time, it is a pioneering and welcome contribution to the study of English-Ukrainian literary translations.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIAN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE. Edited by *Robert Auty* and *Dimitri Obolensky*. Companion to Russian Studies, vol. 2. London: Cambridge University Press, 1977. xiii + 300 pp. $15.95 paper; $34.50 cloth.

This second part of the three-volume *Companion to Russian Studies* is mainly concerned with the history of Russian language and literature. It opens with R. Auty's article "The Russian Language" (pp. 1–40), a contribution by J.S.G. Simmons with invaluable data on the history of printing in Russia (pp. 47–55), and essays by Dimitri Obolensky and Nikolay Andreyev (pp. 56–89 and 90–110, respectively) that cover the period of Old Rus' literature. These brilliant opening chapters are at once thorough and concise.

After chapter 4, the quality of the contributions becomes uneven. Chapter 5 (pp. 111–32) by M.A.S. Burgess discusses the eighteenth century, but never comes to grips with the conflicting literary styles, genres, and trends (not to mention ideas) in the empire during the period. Chapters 8 and 9 on the history of Russian theater (pp. 231–46 and 247–70), also by Burgess, use material from Russian drama very sparingly, an imbalance in part corrected in chapter 10, on Soviet theater (pp. 271–85), by Michael Glenny. In chapter 6 (pp. 133–84), by V. Setchkarev, the thread of literary history during the "golden" and "silver" ages is occasionally lost in moot pronouncements (e.g., "Lev Tolstoy [1828–1910] is Russia's greatest writer after Pushkin," 153). In chapter 7 (pp. 185–230) Max Hayward underrates, perhaps more than aesthetic criteria warrant, the literature produced in the years directly after 1917 (especially pp. 186–88).

Perhaps the book's greatest disappointment is chapter 5. There the term "baroque" is applied indiscriminately for authors from Dimitrij Rostovskij (1651–1709) to Deržavin (1743–1816). (This is not the place to polemicize on the use of the term, or argue for a "baroque" Russian temperament; suffice it to note that I. P. Eremin's excellent diachronic studies on the subject, "Poètičeskij stil' Simeona Polockogo" and "Russkaja literatura i ee jažyk na rubeže XVII–XVIII vv.," should have been consulted.) The chapter is further marred by misprints and oversights. The assumed name of Antiox Kantemir is not "Khariton Makentin" (p. 115), but Maketin, and his satires were published for the first time not in Russia in 1762 (p. 115), but in a French edition in 1749 (another error is the addition of a "Little" to the title, p. 115). Fonvizin did not become a free-thinker after his trips to the West (p. 120), but was one prior to them. The assertion that "the Russian Freemasons defended the ideas of the enlightenment" (p. 123) is meaningless without a date for and definition of their own "enlightenment." Falconet's statue of Peter the Great was not unveiled in 1789 (p. 125) but 1782. Today scholars widely acknowledge that the anonymous article which Radiščev "contributed" (p. 125) to *Xudožnik* in all likelihood was not written by him. Also, this chapter's "Guide for Further Reading" is skimpy and erratic.

But the next chapter, too, is disappointing. Setchkarov writes that the "main characteristic of Chekhov [Čexov]" is a "special brand of melancholia," "sweet melancholy," or "mood of sweet depression" (pp. 162, 163) and that his

"greatness" lies in a "love for man" (p. 162)—which tells us more about the prevailing trend in Čexov criticism over the past century than about the work of Čexov or the tensions and ambivalence of the man behind it. In the case of Gogol, the man and his work receive a narrowly "religious" treatment. The word "devil" is frequently juxtaposed with Gogol's name and work (six times on p. 144), but with little appreciation of that writer's predilection for salacious jokes or his striving late in life to rid himself of moral impurities (cf. p. 145). No mention is made of the prevailing view of Gogol as a social satirist, nor is there even a hint at the extent of his heritage. One would never guess that new Gogols sprang up during the master's lifetime, or that Gogol's heritage is still alive, for example in Vladimir Vojnovič, whose works are too recent for discussion in the chapter on Soviet prose (p. 202).

This collection of essays prepared for the university student and the general reader was an ambitious endeavor. Unfortunately, while the opening four essays meet high standards of excellence, the last six have serious shortcomings.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIAN ART AND ARCHITECTURE. By *Robin Milner-Gulland* and *John Bowlt*. Edited by *Robert Auty* and *Dimitri Obolensky*. Companion to Russian Studies, vol. 3. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980. xiii + 194 pp. $16.95 paper; $29.95 cloth.

Like the two earlier volumes of this trilogy, which are devoted to history and to language and literature, respectively, this volume on Russian art and architecture aims to provide "a first orientation" for both university students and the "interested general reader." Here, too, "particular care has been taken to provide up-to-date bibliographies, which are intended as a guide to further study." The volume contains forty-three architectural drawings and 107 black-and-white photographs of objects of artistic interest. The generally poor quality of the photographs—many are too small or badly reproduced—is one reason why the volume probably will not attract that general reader. Also, only students who read Russian will find the bibliographies of much use, a situation that can be attributed only in part to the shortage of suitable works in English. The bibliographies are "up-to-date" as of several years ago, moreover.

John Bowlt's chapters (3 and 4) on art and architecture between 1860 or so and 1972 (why 1972?) strike this reviewer as a competent survey of the subject in conventional art-historical fashion. Numerous names and dates are offered, successive schools or movements are concisely defined, the term "art" is understood to consist almost exclusively of easel painting, and "architecture" is made to include projects that might be more properly assigned to a history of Soviet engineering.

Professor Bowlt's concluding lines (p. 172) are a fair sample of what he has to say here:

The revival of the best traditions of the progressive architecture of the 1920s—the preoccupation with function, with rationality, with application of glass—has taken place over the last decade or so: the ponderous labyrinth of the Hotel Rossiya (D. N. Chechulin and others, 1968) which unfortunately impairs the general architectural cohesion of Red Square, the Novyy Arbat complex (which Posokhin and others derived from a Constructivist design of 1923 for a City of the Future, 1968-9) and the ill-positioned annex to the Hotel Natsional' (opened 1970, Voskresensky and others), point both to rapid familiarization with the latest constructional techniques and to a modern conception of the role of architecture in an industrialized society. Provided that this conception is expanded to include serious environmental study, landscape planning and amelioration of construction materials, we may hope for a positive international contribution by new Soviet architecture.

Dr. Milner-Gulland's treatment of art and architecture from A.D. 988 to about 1860 (chapters 1 and 2) is more problematical, in both senses of the word. Most non-Soviet experts would probably object that "Old Russian" art was not quite as splendid or independent a phenomenon as he would have us believe. More seriously, Milner-Gulland's periodization of developments to about 1700, and therefore his discussion of much that follows, has been determined by political rather than artistic criteria, which might be thought odd in an art historian even if his controlling assumption—that a "Russian state" existed on "Russian soil" continuously from the tenth century onwards—were not obsolete. The history of art and architecture from 1700 to 1860, on the other hand, is periodized according to what are essentially stylistic criteria: the "Petersburg Baroque (1700s-1760s)" is followed by the "age of Neo-Classicism." This is reassuring, until we read that the former was a period of "experiment and transition" which is called "Baroque" only or mainly by reference to West European conventions; that the last quarter of the seventeenth century was also part of the "Russian Baroque age"; and that the first four decades of the eighteenth century "actually mark something of a cultural pause" (pp. 72, 49). It seems that from early in that century Russian art not only "was" but *is* "to be judged by the criteria of European taste"; and so the age of Neo-Classicism "marks the period when, from the European viewpoint, Russia culturally 'came of age'": the period when, this is also to say, the "westernization of Russian culture can properly be considered as achieved" (pp. 71, 87, 72). Yet it is never explained how or why this obviously crucial Europeanization or Westernization of Russian artistic culture took place, the passing reference to the "Petrine reforms" (p. 71) providing only the meanest clue. Also, Milner-Gulland is curiously ambivalent about the contribution that the numerous European artists working in Russia made to the process (p. 76).

To be sure, so concise a survey of nine centuries of artistic production will inevitably elicit critical disagreement, and in this respect Dr. Milner-Gulland has much the greater burden to bear than Professor Bowlt. But even setting aside the reservations already expressed, and apart from questions that one might raise on

factual or even aesthetic grounds (is the painting of Briullov really to be thought of as having "too often teetered on the edge of the ridiculous"?, p. 106), I must note with regret Milner-Gulland's decision to ignore or treat summarily popular art, the minor or applied arts, fortification and town planning, and architecture in wood.

I wish it were possible to be more enthusiastic about this work, since, as both authors suggest, existing historical surveys of these subjects (in English and even in Russian) are more or less seriously flawed. There is much that is useful in this book, although perhaps not for beginning students. Certainly it is the most compact and reliable work of its kind in English. But equally, to quote Milner-Gulland's own disclaimer (p. 1), "this survey is certainly no substitute for the rigorous, detailed, and up-to-date study . . . which we need."

James Cracraft
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
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